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Introduction 
In March 1993. the United States Navy and Marine Corps established the 
Naval Doctrine Command as the primary authority for the development of naval 
concepts and integrated naval doctrine. It has several specific roles-serving 
as the coordinating authority for the development and evaluation of Navy 
service-unique doctrine. providing a coordinated Navy-Marine Corps voice in 
joint and combined doctrine development. and ensuring that naval and joint 
doctrine are addressed in training and education curricula and in operations. 
exercises. and war games. 
Although this was the first time the sea services had established a formal 
command to prepare and publish multi-service naval doctrine, it was not the 
first time that either service. or navies in general. had formal written doctrine. 
In the minds of most serving officers, however, doctrine was something new 
for the fleet. Newport Paper Number Nine is the first of two publications in this 
series which will present the story of naval doctrine's history and theory for use 
in war colleges, command and staff colleges. professional schools, and other 
centers of excellence. The major message of these pages is that naval and navy 
doctrine is not new and there is value today in reviewing the lessons of past 
doctrinal development experiences. 
Under the leadership of the Naval Doctrine Command's first commander, 
Rear Admiral Frederick Lewis. U.S. Navy, the Command set out to examine 
history to learn the lessons of naval doctrine development from the past. This 
effort was not an attempt to publish history, as such. Instead. it was directed 
primarily as a study of history from the perspective of doctrine-a term 
generally not found in the index pages of naval historical studies. Our own navy 
and four European navies were selected for in-depth analysis. primarily because 
the history of these navies is well-documented and it was relatively easy to fmd 
the evidence of past doctrinal development once researchers became familiar 
with the concept. 
Newport Paper Number Nine contains the results of research conducted on 
the navies of the United States, Great Britain. France, Italy. and Spain. Each 
has a unique story to tell, and each story has value for us today. This paper 
concludes with an interpretive essay on the relationship of doctrine to technol­
ogy. particularly revolutions in military affairs (RMAs). It questions the ground 
forces-oriented RMA paradigm and makes a strong case for the uniqueness of 
naval warfare. 
A forthcoming Newport Paper. which continues with two additional inter­
pretive essays on the theory of military and naval doctrine and two essays that 
express the need for doctrine. takes the lessons learned from all these studies 
and provides the u.s. Navy and Marine Corps with the issues that must be 
addressed in naval doctrine publications of today. 
We at the Naval War College are pleased to assist the Naval Doctrine 
Command through original research. doctrinal development. instruction on 
doctrine and its history, and publication of materials such as these which can 
be used as readings to support teaching. The formation and use of doctrine must 
be a dynamic and interactive process involving active debate and discussion of 
issues on the pages of our professional journals. We in Newport are committed 
to supporting that professional dialogue and await your contributions . 
. R. Stark 
Rear Admiral. U.S. Navy 
President. Naval War College 
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Doctrine and Fleet Tactics in the Royal Navy 
James J. Tritten 
T
HE u.s. NAVY was characterized in a recent RAND Corporation study 
as "the supra-national institution that has inherited the British navy's 
throne to naval supremacy."t Given the legacy of traditions that have passed 
from the Royal Navy to the U.S. Navy, one cannot consider naval doctrine in 
the U.S. Navy without first conducting an analysis of how naval doctrine 
evolved in Great Britain.2 This paper reviews and analyzes doctrine in the 
British navy. It concludes with an assessment of the doctrinal process in the 
Royal Navy and with potential lessons for the U.S. Navy today. 
First Stirrings: The Navy Royal and Private Enterprise 
The Royal Navy's entree into the world of written doctrine commenced with 
King Henry Vill, who took a great interest in the development and enhancement 
of a fighting "Navy Royal" in addition to a merchant fleet.3 Henry was aware 
of the Spaniard Alonso de Chaves' first written substantive naval doctrinal 
work, Quatri partitu en cosmografia practica, also known as Espejo de 
navegantes [Seaman's Glass], published in 1538.4 Henry issued a set of written 
fighting instructions to develop the combat performance of his fleet. Based upon 
the Spanish model, they improved upon use of the artillery concept and the 
taking of the weather gauge (or upwind side) during battle.5 This doctrinal 
principle endured until the end of the age of sail. Henry's instructions were 
reissued in 1544 and provided for the integration of sailing ships and rowed 
galleasses in a combined arms battle fleet. 
During the reign of Henry VIII, the embryonic navy developed the concept 
of the "capital ship" with smaller supporting ships and auxiliaries and a 
shipbuilding base. During the reign of subsequent monarchs, the navy acquired 
slowly many of the characteristics of a modem composite fleet-one designed 
to perform a variety of tasks and command local waters. This fleet was the tool 
that allowed England to enter the international conflicts of the sixteenth century. 
The development of the "Navy Royal" was enhanced by the experiences of 
English privateers and semi-pirates, who experimented with the use of artillery 
at sea to engage larger ships and convoy escorts. In subsequent engagements 
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the naval broadside was perfected. There were signs that an infonnal line ahead 
was developing into doctrine as early as the Annada battle ( 1588), but in 
general, coherent naval doctrine had to await the fonnation of a truly modem 
fleet during the Commonwealth. Ordinarily, commanders of this era did not act 
as components of an integrated fleet but rather as individual entrepreneurs 
whose primary motivation was the pursuit of prize money. 
Anglo-Dutch Wars 
The anny-dominated English Commonwealth government followed the 
Dutch lead in mandating escons for merchant ships. The Convoy Act of 1650 
established a requirement for naval protection of shipping, which eventually 
resulted in confrontation with French and Moslem privateers and Holland. 
Many of the naval engagements during the subsequent Anglo-Dutch Wars 
( 1652-1674) were fought against Dutch convoys. 
Three of Oliver Cromwell's best anny colonels were asked to serve as 
seagoing generals to lead the navy. Cromwell distrusted the monarchist tenden­
cies of naval officers and, of course, he himself was of the anny. The massing 
of so many cannons at sea allowed for new tactical opportunities, and they were 
recognized in revisions to the tactical procedures of the day. 6 Early cannon were 
notoriously inaccurate, hence the earliest doctrine was to amass offensive 
flrepower close together in line ahead so that a devastating broadside could be 
delivered. If artillery became the "king of battle" ashore, the broadside became 
the sine qua non of battle afloat; and just as flrepower bred linear tactics ashore, 
it led to similar developments at sea. 
In addition to tactical improvement, the seagoing generals recognized also 
the need to improve battle management. They provided some degree of order 
to the general chaos of early privateering sailing ship tactics, which was brought 
about by, essentially, "mimicking the leader," whereby captains watched and 
confonned to the maneuvers of the leader (e.g., if he closed to engage, they all 
did). The English seagoing generals developed well-structured plans for 
managing as many as a hundred ships in battle, many of them privateers, and 
they saw the need to experiment with tactics and the overall battle plan before 
engaging in combat. The context for most battles was defense of and attack on 
convoys. 
This period also marked the introduction of a new professional officer corps 
in England and a centralized organization for the administration of the fleet. 
Cromwell's refonn effons, which were supported by England's gentlemen, 
would result in an emphasis upon maritime forces rather than the already 
2 
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powerful anny.' Local seagoing commanders began in 1636 to issue written 
instructions for their subordinates.8 Parliament issued comprehensive articles 
of war in 1652, and in 1653 the first comprehensive written doctrine was 
promulgated by a fleet commander. This written doctrine combined both sailing 
instructions and fighting instructions, in separate but companion volumes. The 
doctrine on fighting instructions was much shorter than the sailing doctrine. 
Fighting instructions cannot be studied without considering sailing instruc­
tions. The fighting instructions attempted to mass firepower. The commander 
now had a different command and control problem than previously, since his 
captains would no longer simply mimic his behavior-they were required to 
place their ships in precise positions, which required a system of communica­
tions. However, the signal book was incomplete by itself, since, if the captain 
merely acted upon receipt of orders, he might fail to take advantage of a tactical 
opportunity in the absence of a signal or when signals could not be sent or seen. 
Doctrinal fighting instructions thus informed the commander how to make 
decisions in the absence of other more tactical directives. 
The new standing orders were immediately put to the test during three 
Anglo-Dutch Wars in which: 
• Strategically, England essentially replaced the Dutch at sea throughout the 
world. 
• Operationally, England executed a series of campaigns including several 
devastating convoy battles, blockades, and bombardments of the Dutch 
shoreline. 
• The seagoing generals more then held their own against the Dutch fleet, 
led by the greatest admirals of the world. 
The English success was generally due to the massing of superior firepower 
and refusing to let the Dutch close for boarding. The defeated Dutch, on the 
other hand, continued to rely on the milie and had not yet accepted the primacy 
of artillery. 
The Cromwell-era fighting instructions and other reforms were not 
repUdiated with the dissolution of the Commonwealth. Indeed, the return of the 
monarchy under Charles II had a beneficial effect upon the politically untainted 
fleet, which was now commissioned the Royal Navy and was provided with a 
new benefactor, at the direct expense of the Army. The Royal Navy of this era 
may have had its origins in the need to protect convoys, but with the combat­
proven potential of artillery and massing, doctrine began to shift to the offensive 
form of warfare. Simply put, the fleet could be used for other than defensive 
tasks. 
3 
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Doctrinal sailing and fighting instructions were issued in various fonns by 
several different fleet commanders. The instructions were flexible, issued as 
guidance that was unlikely to be followed scrupulously in the heat of battle. 
Revisions to the fighting instructions and new instructions reflecting combat 
lessons were issued repeatedly during the wars (in 1654, 1655, 1666, 1672), 
and for the first time as an integrated whole in 1672-1673.9 These revised 
fighting instructions allowed for tactical flexibility on the part of the local 
commander-to include milie tactics and the breaking of the line. Frequently 
overlooked, but important, was the function of both fighting and sailing 
instructions for ensuring that commanders acted more as components of an 
integrated fleet having political aims rather than as entrepreneurs whose 
motivation was the pursuit of prize money. 
Commanders in Chief Sailing and Fighting Instructions 
Following the Anglo-Dutch Wars, newly revised fighting instructions were 
issued in 1678, 1688, 1690, 1691, 1695, 1702, and 1703. Many of these 
revisions allowed for additional initiative on the part of the local commander. 
The first fleet-wide sailing and fighting instructions were issued during the reign 
of William and Mary (1689-1702). Although the actual date of their publication 
is not known precisely, the instructions followed generally those previously 
issued in 1672-1673. 
During the War of the League of Augsburg (1688-1697), the French 
managed to unite their Toulon and Brest fleets into one fighting unit. The 
numerically inferior English elected initially to maintain a Mfleet-in-being" until 
detached units could return to bolster their defense. The concept of a fleet-in­
being called for a numerically inferior force to remain in port from which it 
would threaten to sortie. Since it did not seek engagement, the effectiveness of 
the concept would depend upon the enemy's perception of its combat 
capability-it served more as a deterrent than a true fighting force. If the 
fleet-in-being could deter the French from invading England, then it would be 
a successful use of assets. The Crown, however, disagreed with the concept, 
and a combined English and Dutch fleet sortied under Admiral Lord Herbert 
Torrington, who was promptly defeated at the Battle off Beachy Head 
(Beveziers) in 1690 by Admiral Anne-Hilarion de Costentin, Comte de Tour­
ville. Fortunately for the English, the French were unable to capitalize upon 
their tactical victory. 
Following successes of a combined Anglo-Dutch fleet at the 1704 Battle of 
Malaga, using the line-ahead formation, the English attitude toward doctrine 
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may have split into two camps. 10 The first camp emphasized the ability of the 
line ahead to bring the maximum number of guns to bear on the enemy. Malaga 
had demonstrated that victory was possible with a well-disciplined battle line, 
and it naturally followed that defeat would result when this doctrine was not 
followed. This first group is referred to by some historians as doctrinal "for­
malists." The second group placed more emphasis on independent maneuver 
and is referred to as the "meleeists." The maneuver-oriented melee doctrine 
attracted some of the more dashing English commanders, who did not want to 
be as bound by rules and had the skills to master the freedom of maneuver 
warfare. 
The first version of what eventually came to be known as the Permanent 
Sailing and Fighting Instructions was issued during the reign of Queen Anne 
(1702-1714), probably about the time that the Act of Union created Great 
Britain. The various instructions issued by the fleet commanders in chief, and 
after 1799 by the Admiralty, gradually became known as Sailing and Fighting 
Instructionsfor Her Majesty's Fleet. These instructions were authoritative but 
not binding on the admirals in the fleet. Although most of the fighting instruc­
tions were printed by the Admiralty for use by the fleet commander in chief, 
they became regulatory only when signed by the fleet admiral and issued to 
subordinates. Copies of the instructions were made available to all admirals 
when they hoisted their flags. Tactical orders based upon the instructions were 
mandatory for the individual ship captains who were in receipt of signals drawn 
from the instructions. 
In 1714, a private publisher produced an unofficial book that enhanced the 
presentation, and presumably the comprehensibility, of the signals portion of 
the formal fighting instructions. Jonathan Greenwood's The Sailing and Fight­
ing Instructions, or Signals as They Are Observed in the Royal Navy of Great 
Britain even added signals not currently in use by the fleet. This unofficial 
publication was adopted by at least one Mediterranean fleet commander. 
Private publications of a doctrinal nature had appeared earlier in Britain. For 
example, The Seaman's Vade-Mecum and Defensive War at Sea (1700) 
developed recommendations for the defense of merchant shipping, including 
convoys. Convoy defense doctrine in this era was quite sophisticated; it was 
understood that the role of the escort was to sacrifice itself, if necessary, to allow 
the merchants to escape. Parliament passed the Cruisers and Convoys Act in 
1708, resulting in instructions for the proper interaction of merchants and 
commanders of warships. 
During the first part of the eighteenth century, the commanders in chief's 
fighting instructions were not routinely revised, presumably because none of 
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the maritime campaigns lasted long enough to warrant such reconsideration. 
Hence, there were no major technological breakthroughs. On the other hand, 
additional instructions, also doctrinal in nature, were issued by the fleet com­
manders, flrst in 1678 and regularly after 1710. These additional instructions 
were as important as the main flghting instructions but were issued by local 
commanders who were then held accountable for their use. IT validated by 
combat success, additional instructions could lead to additional deviations. 
Unfortunately, when the additional instructions were not validated in combat, 
and the flghting instructions provided an alternative course of action, they might 
also provide justification for punishment by court-martial. 
Developments during the Wars against the French 
Monarchy 
Courts-martial for combat failure while not adhering to the existing flghting 
instructions were an ever-present threat to the commander in the Royal Navy 
during the long years of war with the French. There was an infamous case of 
doctrinaire adherence to "keeping the line" above all costs at the disastrous 
February 1744 battle off Toulon. Admiral Thomas Mathews, maneuvering in 
what was virtually a line abreast, had expected his subordinate, Vice Admiral 
Richard Lestock, to use common sense and engage the enemy when Mathews 
signaled an attack. Lestock, "confused" by Mathews' continued flying of the 
signal for line ahead, maintained his station in line ahead and failed to join the 
engagement quickly. Mathews had him arrested. 
Complicating the problem was Admiral Mathews' failure to get his fleet into 
proper station on the previous night. Mathews had in fact issued the proper 
orders, but his subordinates had failed to execute them, and the fleet became 
further dispersed. The next day, Vice Admiral Lestock ignored some of 
Mathews' instructions to increase sail and get into line-ahead position more 
quickly; indeed he actually shortened sail on two occasions. Mathews and 
Lestock were not on the best of terms before the battle, hence the failures at 
Toulon are a bit more complex than whether or not offlcers adhered blindly to 
doctrine in lieu of common sense. 
At the court-martial, Lestock was exonerated because he had followed his 
commander's primary signal (line ahead) during an extremely confusing 
engagement of changing and conflicting signals and maneuvers. Mathews was 
cashiered instead-due primarily to the escape of the Franco-Spanish fleet 
under Admiral La Bruyere de Court. Four captains who had exercised initiative 
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under conflicting signals and maneuvers, therein deviating from the standard 
and additional instructions, were also cashiered. 
The scandal of Toulon provoked reform, and new instructions for the 
Mediterranean fleet were prepared to alleviate future confusion. Mutual support 
was to take precedence over maintenance of the battle line. Abandonment of 
the line ahead in favor of the general chase was sanctioned when the enemy 
fleet was markedly inferior, disabled, or "on the run." Of course, if the admiral 
gave signal for the general chase and failed, he would still be subject to close 
after-action scrutiny by a court-martial. 
During the First Battle off Cape Finisterre in 1 747, Admiral Baron George 
Anson took advantage of existing loopholes in the fighting instructions regard­
ing maintenance of the line ahead. Even though he used the general chase, he 
avoided court-martial because he defeated the French and captured numerous 
convoy merchants. Admiral Sir Edward Hawke ordered a general chase in the 
successful Second Battle off Cape Finisterre ( 1 747). New additional instruc­
tions followed, further refining and clarifying the doctrine contained in the 
fighting instructions. 
As a result of Parliament intervention, joint doctrine developed extensively 
during the Seven Years ' War ( 1 756-1763). William Pitt, Secretary of State and 
leader of the House of Commons, ordered his generals and admirals to 
cooperate, which they did with remarkable success. Elaborate written doctrine 
was prepared for the transport, protection, disembarkment, and support for 
ground troops, and it was used successfully in the captures of Louisbourg 
(1758), Quebec (1759), and Belle Isle (1761). This followed the disastrous 
performance in Admiral Edward Vernon's and General Wentworth's abortive 
amphibious operations against Cartagena ( 1 740- 1 74 1 ). 
There was also additional doctrine developed for blockading and observation 
squadrons as well as for the interdiction of ships undertaking to leave a port. 
Much of this doctrinal development was published in the form of private signal 
books for which there was no official commander in chief or Admiralty 
sanction. The successful telegraph signals system that later supported Admiral 
Lord Horatio Nelson at Trafalgar had its birth in the privately published 
doctrinal and signal development that took place during this era. 
In a celebrated Seven Years' War episode of failure that was tied to the 
fighting instructions, the British in 1756 failed to engage fully a French fleet 
off Minorca that was supporting the landing of a ground force, and which 
resulted in the eventual loss of the garrison. The British admiral, Sir John Byng, 
was eventually shot for his performance during this episode, but not for failing 
to follow the existing fighting instructions, although that certainly was a major 
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element of the prosecution's case. I I Byng had in fact deviated from the fighting 
instructions in his plan of attack at Minorca. However, he was shot simply 
because he failed to gain a victory when one was needed-a British force in 
America, under the command of General Edward Braddock, had just suffered 
a major loss to the French and Indians. The second major defeat, at Minorca, 
threatened the British government, which at the time also was sensitive to 
charges that it had not provided Byng with enough ships. 
Simply put, a scapegoat was needed. Braddock had been killed in Pennsyl­
vania, and Byng was available. The court-martial found Byng guilty of failing 
to "do his utmost" either to defeat the French fleet or relieve the garrison on 
Minorca; a law of 1749 mandated the death penalty for admirals who failed to 
try hard enough. A review of the tactical situation, however, can lead one to the 
conclusion that neither defeat of the enemy fleet nor relief of the Minorca 
garrison was possible and that even had Byng fully engaged the French, and 
had his plan been properly executed by his captains, victory was by no means 
certain. In fact, compounding the difficulties he had in signaling intentions from 
the rear of the fonnation were signal books that did not contain provisions for 
exactly what he intended. Byng further complicated the matter, like Mathews 
at Toulon, by continuing to fly the line-ahead flag while simultaneously 
signaling to engage and maneuvering for a nearly line-abreast attack against a 
well-fonned enemy line. 
The shooting of Byng had major repercussions throughout the Royal Navy. 
It did not, however, make the fighting instructions dogmatic; it had the opposite 
effect. Admiral Hawke's victory at Quiberon Bay (1759) was due in part to his 
courageous decision to initiate a chase before properly fonning into a battle 
line. This victory had strategic implications; the loss of their escort force ended 
French plans to transport ground forces from Quebec to Europe for an invasion 
of England. Concurrent with the French loss in 1759 at the Battle of Lagos 
(again due to a general chase rather than line ahead) and the loss of Quebec in 
that same year, the result of Quiberon was a shift in the war's focus from 
contesting control of the seas to applying real power from the sea to the shore. 
Common sense was introduced into subsequent courts-martial that con­
cerned failure to follow doctrine. Admiral Augustus Keppel was exonerated for 
failing to follow the fighting instructions: he did not "waste" time to fonn a 
battle line (directly engaging Admiral Louis Guillouet, Comte d'Orvilliers) and 
failed to "do his utmost" (the fleets passed each other on opposite tracks at the 
Battle of Ushant in 1778 where Keppel was defeated). 
Another private doctrinal book, Naval Evolutions: Or a System of Sea 
Discipline (1762), was published by Lieutenant Charles O'Bryen, Royal Navy. 
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This book was based largely on Pere Paul Hoste's L 'Art des armees navales ou 
traite des evolutions navales (1697). Although the translation of the French 
extracts was poor, and the experiences of the recent Seven Years' War tended 
to discount much of the doctrine, it signaled a growing desire by fleet officers 
to have a tactical manual in book format. 
The publication of then-Captain Sebastien Fran�ois de Bigot, Vicomte de 
Morogues' Tactique navale ou traite des evolutions et des signaux in 1763 was 
noticed not only in Paris but also in London. Within four years, it had been 
privately translated into English-probably by Charles or Christopher 
O'Bryen. Like O'Bryen's earlier work, only sections were translated, and the 
quality of the translation was poor. The translation of Morogues' work included 
an additional section on fighting at sea, probably written by one of the seagoing 
O'Bryen family. 
A movement commenced to capitalize on these privately published doctrinal 
books by officially revising the fighting instructions. However, no one on active 
duty was willing to take on the commanders in chief; hence the standing fighting 
instructions were allowed to languish "as is," and local commanders continued 
to issue and revise additional instructions. These additional instructions indi­
cated a growth in doctrine that capitalized upon the lessons of the Seven Years' 
War. Finally, the Admiralty itself issued a supplement to the standing fighting 
instructions codifying local practice, thus avoiding a debate over existing 
-articles versus established procedures in the fleet. Left unsettled was the 
proliferation of tactical doctrine and sailing and fighting instructions by both 
the commanders in chief and private individuals-all in use by commanders at 
sea. 
During the opening days of the American War of Independence, Admiral 
Lord Richard Howe, commander of the British fleet in North America, pub­
lished his own quite sophisticated signals book. Unlike the standing fighting 
instructions provided by the Admiralty, Howe's Instructions/or the Conduct 
0/ the Ships 0/ War, Explanatory of, and Relative to the Signals contained in 
the Signal-Book Herewith Delivered (1776) consisted of standing orders, 
explanations of tactical ideas, and standardized signaling evolutions. Howe 
adopted some innovative maneuvers for the execution of the battle line. He 
issued additional instructions the next year with further emphasis on the role of 
the individual commanding officer. 
Taken as a whole, the system of fighting instructions by that time in force 
off North America was so complex that an extensive period of instruction and 
exercises would have been required before the fleet could respond to the 
directions of its commander. There is evidence that Howe held regular meetings 
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of his admirals and captains so that he could explain his doctrine, and also that 
he exercised them regularly as well. Howe issued additional instructions in 1778 
that formed the basis of a reconnaissance system later adopted by Nelson before 
Trafalgar. By the end ofhis service in North America in 1778, Howe had created 
the system of instructions and signals that he would subsequently use while in 
command of the Channel Fleet. 
A Set of Signals for a Fleet on a Plan Entirely New (1777), by Lieutenant 
Sir Charles Henry Knowles, another privately published book, used the best 
parts of Morogues' Tactique navale ou traite des evolutions et des signaux and 
provided for actions by fleets or separate divisions. In his subsequent Fighting 
and Sailing Instructions, published in 1798, although written in 1780, Knowles 
expanded upon individual ship engagements to a degree that foreshadowed 
Nelson. 
Rear Admiral Richard Kempenfelt, chief of staff of the Channel Fleet, 
embarked singlehandedly in 1779 on the most ambitious tactical reforms ever 
undertaken by any one officer in history. During a twenty-seven-month period, 
he issued more signal books and fighting instructions than anyone before or 
after him. Many of the instructions were influenced by Howe; one was an exact 
copy of a signal book used by the French. It was, however, not their centralized 
version but rather a separate system adopted by Rear Admiral Fran�ois Joseph 
Paul, Comte de Grasse-Tilly (an officer to whom the Untied States owes a great 
debt). Kempenfelt blended the best of Howe and the French into a system of 
instructions and signals that allowed for greater control over a larger fleet in 
fighting a well-disciplined opponent. 
Innovations were generally confmed to the Channel Fleet. Despite Howe's 
earlier efforts in North America, officers subsequently assigned to those waters 
and to the West and East Indies generally reverted to the combat-proven fighting 
instructions and supplemental instructions that were issued. Natural conser­
vatism as well as primitive communications hampered transmission of new 
ideas from Europe to the far-flung reaches of the empire. Also, the commanders 
in those distant stations had their own ideas about how to defeat the French, and 
the Channel Fleet had yet to prove the value of its innovations in major combat. 
Admiral Lord George Brydges Rodney was a commander who was willing 
to test the waters with new doctrine. Departing European waters with a 
considerable portion of the Channel Fleet, Rodney seized the opportunity to 
attack a Spanish convoy and then a Spanish squadron at the Battle of Cape St. 
Vincent, also known as the "Moonlight Battle" and the Battle of Santa Maria 
(1780). Rodney used the new freedom to his advantage-he signaled a general 
chase instead of maintaining the battle line. After his arrival in Caribbean 
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waters, Rodney met a French squadron at Martinique (1780), but he failed to 
bring on a successful engagement. Rodney censured his captains for failing to 
break tradition and execute a melie, and he subsequently drilled them in his 
doctrine. 
A series of doctrinal issues being debated at the time included: 
• Should the admiral ride in the van, at the center, or outside the line? 
• Should he sail in a heavily anned ship of the line or in a fast frigate? 
Shifting the flag to a frigate had been tried by Lord Howe off Rhode Island in 
1778, and Admiral Sir George Rodney did the same off Martinique in 1780. 
Following de Grasse's capture at the Saints (1782), French doctrine changed to 
require that commanders in chief fight from frigates. Generally, the British 
ended their experimentation by allocating a place for the admiral to occupy in 
a heavily anned ship at the center. 
The new doctrine of giving precedence to local instructions was not 
foolproof; the defeat of Admiral Lord Thomas Graves at the Battle off the 
Virginia Capes (1781) can be explained in part by the lack of clarity in local 
doctrine. Graves had only recently taken command of the North America station 
and had yet to hold a meeting with his commanders to explain his views on 
doctrine and signals. Furthennore, ships of the West Indies and North American 
squadrons had been using different signal books. When Admiral Samuel 
Viscount Hood failed to use common sense and engage de Grasse despite 
confusing signals, he knew the defense of his actions rested in his strict 
adherence to the precise signals flown by Graves. This all sounds remarkably 
like Mathews and Lestock at Toulon and very unlike what would take place at 
Trafalgar. Graves' failure to attack Admiral de Grasse until the French had 
sortied from their anchorage was something else that would not be repeated by 
Nelson, at the Nile. 
John Clerk of Elden, a retired merchant from Edinburgh, analyzed the naval 
tactical issues of the day and wrote an Essay on Naval Tactics in 1782. This 
essay pointed out the superiority of the French system in particular respects and 
recommended concentrating strength against weakness-specifically against 
only a portion of the enemy's line. In fact, this tactic was used by Rodney in 
his successful and very significant victory in the Battle of the Saints that same 
year, resulting in the capture and disgrace of de Grasse. Rodney failed to exploit 
the victory fully, indicating that even innovative commanders were still some­
what conservative. Discipline was still so great at this time that, although some 
of his advance ships were in a position to fire on French ships being chased at 
the Battle of the Saints, Hood denied permission to fire, since he had not been 
granted pennission to do so by his own senior, Admiral Rodney. 12 
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Although Clerk claimed credit for influencing Rodney's action, in point of 
fact Rodney did not plan to break the line, nor was such a maneuver new. 
Nevertheless, the victory at the Saints was the Royal Navy's major success 
during this phase of the long war with France, and after that, Rodney's supposed 
action and Clerk's book took on a life of their own. Clerk was well connected 
socially in higher naval circles and had access to the evidence presented at the 
various courts-martial resulting from important battles. His analysis and logic 
were sound. Independently wealthy and with no official connections to the 
Admiralty, Clerk was able to write his own views without fear of reprisal or 
[mancial ruin. Although Clerk's book was a direct attack on the fighting 
instructions, it had an influence on British naval thinking. 13 It was decidedly 
offensive in its orientation. One of the commanders who favored it was Admiral 
Lord Horatio Nelson, who reportedly had his chaplain read it to him. 
The loss of the North American colonies and Howe's assignment to the 
Admiralty from 1783-1788 stimulated further doctrinal reform in the Royal 
Navy. A number of fighting and additional instructions were issued and 
reissued. Captain Jacques Bourde de Villehuet's 1765 Le manoeuvrier ou essai 
sur La theorie et La pratique des mouvements du navire et des evolutions navales 
and Commodore Jurien, Vicomte de Grenier's 1787 L 'art de La guerre sur mer, 
ou tactique navale were fully and accurately translated into English in 1787-
1788. The latter is one of the most masterful books on tactics written during the 
age of sail, and it challenged fully the dogma of the line ahead. 
Doctrine during Wars against the French Republic 
The privately published Signal Bookfor the Ships of War (1790) was issued 
to the Channel Fleet, thus capping Howe's long process of doctrinal reform. 
Howe experimented with this revised doctrine and signals during the summer 
of 1790 Channel Fleet exercises. By the end of that year, Howe retired, and the 
mantle of doctrinal reform fell to the new commander, Lord Hood. Hood was 
more interested in fleet discipline and station-keeping than in doctrinal reform. 
He held exercises in 1792 to drill his captains in accordance with his version 
of doctrine and signals, which did not include many of the innovations permitted 
by his predecessor. 
With the outbreak of war with France in 1793, Howe was recalled and once 
again took command of the Channel Fleet. By now Howe had lost some of his 
enthusiasm for reform and agreed that until his captains could perform basic 
tasks in accordance with standing doctrine, there would be no need to grant 
them a freer hand. Howe led a well-disciplined and recently exercised Channel 
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Fleet against the Brest fleet of Rear Admiral Louis Thomas, Comte de Villaret 
de Joyeuse, in the Battle of the First of June, 1794.14 Villaret de Joyeuse had 
been a lieutenant at the time of the French Revolution (1789), as were his fellow 
flag officers. Most of the French captains had been very junior officers, captains 
or mates of merchant ships, and a few of them had been enlisted men. The 
perfonnance of the Brest fleet against the well-trained British and their able 
commander speaks well of Villaret de Joyeuse's leadership abilities and the 
value of fighting spirit in combat. 
The "Glorious First of June" was fought continuously over five days and 
four nights. Howe employed the new idea of separating an advance squadron 
from the main battle fleet, which could provide intelligence and act as a tactical 
reserve. Whereas at that time the preferred method for breaking the line was to 
concentrate mass upon a single vulnerable point, at the Battle of the First of 
June, Lord Howe had his whole fleet cut through the line simultaneously at all 
points, cutting between the sterns and bows of the nearest enemy ships. The 
tactic allowed the British to engage on the lee side, on which the French had 
neither loaded nor fully manned their guns. The tactic also was a hedge against 
the French escaping to leeward. Howe deserves credit as an innovative tactician, 
a signals specialist, and a successful commander in battle who never lost sight 
of the need to defeat the enemy fleet. 
At the battle's end, Howe was triumphant with a victory unparalleled in the 
past one hundred years. Six French ships of the line were carried off to Spithead; 
one had been sunk. and the melie had allowed superior British gunnery to wreak 
havoc among the survivors. On the other hand, the French convoy of 130 ships 
bringing supplies from America had been allowed to escape and enter port; 
indeed, not a single British ship appears even to have laid eyes on the convoy. 
Furthennore, Howe failed to exploit fully the victory, as had Rodney at the 
Saints, but with more excuse-the length of the battle, Howe's age (then 68), 
and damage to the British fleet inflicted by the French. 
This British success was followed by the fonnation of a combined Anglo­
Portuguese fleet. Howe's Ordersfor Combined Fleet essentially envisioned the 
new squadron as a separate maneuver unit. Given his recent success with the 
disciplined Channel Fleet, it is no wonder that Howe did not attempt to integrate 
fully the Portuguese. There was from 1793 to 1795 a fennent of tactical and 
signaling developments comparable to that during the American War of Inde­
pendence. It culminated in January 1796 with the issuance by Sir John Jervis, 
commander of the Mediterranean Fleet, of a Secret Instruction containing 
innovative tactical options. Jervis planned to unleash his captains in a general 
melee once he had broken the enemy line and its ships had become separated 
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and disorganized. Jervis also adopted the advance squadron concept used by 
Howe at the Glorious First of June. 
Jervis' faith in the superiority of his captains was warranted. The next period 
of British tactical successes was due in part to the bold actions of some leading 
and extremely confident local commanders. Rear Admiral Sir William 
Cornwallis, commander of a small squadron attacked by the Brest fleet off 
Belle-tIe (1795), fought on the offensive and succeeded in convincing the 
French that additional ships were en route. Then-Captain Horatio Nelson 
showed his aggressive fighting spirit during a series of minor engagements in 
the Mediterranean that same year. These battles were not of themselves impor­
tant, but they began to establish Nelson as a commander who sought to exploit 
immediate tactical victories. 
At the Battle of Cape St. Vincent (1797), where his well-trained Mediter­
ranean Fleet attacked a Spanish force having nearly twice the firepower, Jervis 
demonstrated superior seamanship, innovation, and good judgment in separat­
ing the convoy from its escorts. Seeing an opportunity to deviate from the battle 
line, Jervis signaled to his flag officers (who included Nelson, a commodore) 
and captains to form whatever formations they wished in order to exploit their 
tactical advantage. Nelson, who had anticipated this signal, captured two ships 
and boldly engaged the flagship, which had nearly twice as many guns and was 
the most powerful ship afloat. Jervis chose not to report that Nelson's success 
in taking advantage of an excellent tactical opportunity had been due to his 
exceeding his signaled authority, thus disobeying orders. 15 
The authorship of another privately published doctrinal book, A System of 
Naval Tactics, which appeared in 1797, is attributed to D. Steel. 16 Much of the 
document was a reworking of works by Pere Paul Hoste and Bourde de 
Villehuet. The section of the book that dealt with the Royal Navy was a more 
readable version of Howe's fighting and sailing instructions without any 
reference to engaging the enemy. Apparently the security of one's fighting 
instructions was becoming a concern. In 1798 Parliament got into the act of 
naval doctrine again, passing a law that made convoying compUlsory. 
In late 1797, Britain secured one of its most notable victories of the era. 
Admiral Adam Duncan, first Viscount of Duncan, employed extremely aggres­
sive tactics and an offensive fighting spirit in thoroughly defeating a Dutch fleet 
at the Battle of Camperdown. Duncan made good use of tactical signals to 
outsail the Dutch and bring his superior firepower to bear as rapidly as possible. 
Because of the fast tempo of the battle and the inferiority of their ships, the 
Dutch were overwhelmed before they could escape to leeward into coastal 
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waters. Duncan's attack, in columns of two, splitting the Dutch line from the 
weather side, was to be repeated by Nelson at Trafalgar. 
In 1799, the responsibility for the publication of the fighting instructions 
went to the Admiralty, where it remained until 1914 when it reverted back to 
the fleet commanders in chief. The doctrine published in the Signal Bookfor 
Ships of War, 1799, continued to stress the line ahead, despite current practice 
in the fleet and combat successes with the meLee. These fighting instructions 
were mandatory for the fleet, although the cunning Nelson was able to justify 
deviations when circumstances and his personal views conflicted with them. 
The Nelson "Touch" 
Rear Admiral Nelson's victory over the French at the Battle of the Nile 
(1798) gave the British their greatest victory in over one hundred years. Not 
on1y did Nelson benefit from major errors committed by the French com­
mander, Admiral Fran�ois Paul Brueys d' Aiguilliers, who tried to fight on the 
defensive, but he exhibited true genius in a daring night attack of a rapid tempo 
that overwhelmed his opponent. Vice Admiral Nelson's next victory was over 
the Danish at Copenhagen (1801), where he was pitted against a maldeployed 
stationary fleet and fortifications operating under a defensive doctrine. Al­
though he was in range of their shore batteries the night before the battle, Nelson 
held a dinner party aboard his flagship. His detailed and written orders, outlining 
the plan of attack in accordance with the newly issued Admiralty day signal 
book, were given to each of his captains. 
The plethora of newly issued signal books was not universally popular in the 
fleet, since the books did not allow communication of complex ideas. Sir Home 
Popham, an officer who would later rise to the rank of admiral, created an 
innovative and unofficial system of telegraphic signals that made use of 
numbers and later letters to substitute for words and phrases that combined to 
make sentences. This new system gave the admiral a powerful tool. Popham's 
model became an instant success in the fleet, although he was wise enough to 
disclaim it as a mere adjunct to the official system and thus avoid a fonnal 
confrontation with the Admiralty. Nelson fonnally adopted Popham's system 
of signals in 1803 and made full use of it off Toulon in the subsequently renewed 
war with France. 
A series of minor engagements followed the renewal of warfare, but the 
major concern in Britain was invasion. By a series of fleet maneuvers, the Royal 
Navy deterred any invasion of the British Isles. With over 150,000 troops 
assembled with a transport fleet that was unable to sail across the Channel due 
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to the presence of the Royal Navy, Napoleon had to abandon his plan. The 
French fleet was unable to mass in sufficient numbers to meet the challenge. 
The most celebrated of all battles in the age of sail, Trafalgar (1805), pitted 
a well-equipped fleet and combat-experienced commanders against the com­
bined Franco-Spanish fleet, which had neither adequate training nor well-fitted 
ships. 17 Nelson imbued his spirit of the offensive into every one of his captains. 
His written plan of attack made his objectives very clear-complete destruction, 
not taking ships for the prize money. 
Nelson intended to form into two parallel columns in line ahead, with himself 
and his second in command leading the charge (in violation of Admiralty 
doctrine), and then to close boldly the combined fleet as rapidly as possible, 
making it more difficult to be hit and minimizing the time British ships would 
be exposed to defensive fire. A rapid attack would also minimize the chances 
that the combined fleet could escape to leeward. Nelson also planned to conceal 
the points of his main attack until the last possible minute. Once his two 
squadrons broke through the enemy line, the aim was to concentrate offensive 
strength against the weakness of the split enemy fleet. Nelson improved upon 
this French concept of strength against weakness with another French concept, 
the pe[otoTlS, assigning specific tasks for specific portions of the fleet. This was 
a replacement of the now-centralized formalist doctrine of maintaining the line 
Nelson envisioned, not with just a signal for general chase but in fact with a 
new local doctrine of guerre d outrance (war to the extreme) . Based upon his 
previous battle experience against the French, Nelson felt that he could go 
beyond the general chase authority granted in the fighting instructions. This 
would not be possible against all enemies, but it was appropriate at this time 
and place. 
The selection of the time and place of his attack was facilitated by a superior 
reconnaissance plan aided by Popham's new signalling system. Nelson also 
used an advance squadron that could, if necessary, engage the enemy until such 
time as the main battle fleet arrived. 
Nelson generally followed his battle plan and, although both sides fought 
bravely, the resulting melie was a rout of the combined fleet. The reasons for 
victory were, the superiority of artillery and gunnery by the British, �eir 
superiority at maneuver and mutual support, and the generally inferior condition 
of the combined fleet. The British fleet never formed properly into two columns 
in line ahead; proper formation was subordinated to the offensive spirit and 
tempo; keeping the battle line was no longer all-important. Speed allowed the 
British to survive the charge directly into the teeth of an enemy, who had in 
effect "crossed Nelson's T." 
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Doctrine, of course, was used by Nelson, but often in a non-written fonn, 
reflecting his decentralized philosophy of command and control that peaked at 
Trafalgar. As Nelson 's experience grew, in lieu of fonnal signals and tight 
control during battle, he relied on, a series of meetings with his commanders 
before the coming battle. In these discussions he communicated his perception 
of the alternative courses the battle might take and the basic actions that were 
to be expected. 1 8 His famous line from his pre-battle memorandum-"No 
captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy" -is 
typical of a doctrinal style that matched his personal abilities as a charismatic 
leader, abilities atypical of commanders in the age of sail. 1 9  
Nelson's success w as  due i n  part to his style of doctrine-unwritten but clear 
in the minds of his subordinate commanders. It proved extremely effective. 20 
Whereas Nelson's signal to fonn into two columns, flown at the beginning of 
the Trafalgar battle, might be misinterpreted today as precise instructions to be 
followed to the letter, his captains knew how to interpret it properly. They 
continued to close the enemy at all possible speed, while simultaneously 
attempting to fonn into two columns in "irregular line-ahead." This was not the 
type of behavior witnessed at Toulon ( 1744) or off the Virginia Capes ( 1 78 1 ) .  
Nelson 's decision-making process w as  more intuitive than analytic, but this 
should not imply that he improvised in the middle of the battle. On the contrary, 
he planned his battles using both his intuitive and analytic skills. Nelson was 
convinced that, with the proper attitude and sufficiently equipped and trained 
force, one need only wade into the enemy. This had been the essence of Jervis '  
Secret Instruction of 1796. Indeed, none of the maneuvers that Nelson 
employed at Trafalgar were new; all had been anticipated by Villeneuve. On 
the other hand, Nelson did not give his subordinates an entirely free hand. 
There is more to Nelson's success than good doctrine and well-trained forces. 
There is the intangible factor of Nelson's own charismatic personality, which 
inspired men to greatness. Where others sought to use the signal book to bring 
order to the battle space, Nelson strove for chaos-within the bounds of 
capabilities and shaped by his personal doctrine. Nelson is thus an aberration 
who escaped successfully the confinement of the era's paradigm and embraced 
the "fog of war" as an ally. 
The Admiralty signal books and fighting instructions issued by Admiral 
Popham after Trafalgar made use of the tactical innovations initiated by Nelson 
at the Nile and Trafalgar, but their authors never understood the conditions that 
made such innovations possible. Nelson 's successors attempted to emulate the 
"Nelson Touch" with their own doctrinal writings, but they could not possibly 
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capture the essence of his brilliance in any signal book. Simply pu� the style of 
warfare practiced at Trafalgar was the correct style for a particular set of 
circumstances and a uniquely charismatic leader, one whose essence could 
never be "bottled," The myth of the "Nelson Touch" and the attempt to duplicate 
it is one of the major themes around which one can study later developments 
in the Royal Navy. 
The End of the Age of Sail 
Written doctrine in the form of fighting instructions gradually fell into disuse. 
When faced with an enemy that did not use rigid and effective tactics based 
upon sound doctrine, there was no need for the Royal Navy to do so either. If 
defenses were not skillfully prepared, there was no need for skillfully prepared 
offenses. The attacker needed merely to be unleashed and pointed in the right 
direction, 
In 1 809, in what would prove to be one of a long string of amphibious 
failures, the British mounted the largest (to date) invasion of the Dutch coast. 
Designed to put pressure on Napoleon's rear and thus support the Austrian 
allies, the assault on Walcheren Island involved some forty thousand troops, 
four hundred transports and almost two hundred naval escorts. The force was 
evacuated eventually, and the operation stands as a case of mismatched political 
objectives and military operations and of poor planning for a joint operation. 
The last major British naval victory in the age of sail was the controversial 
Battle of Navarino ( 1 827).2 1  A mere twelve years after Waterloo, Navarino saw 
the French, British, and Russians allied for one battle against three Turkish, 
Egyptian, and Tunisian squadrons. The three European squadrons fought on 
the offensive against Muslim ships that, under Admiral Ibrahim Pasha, were 
anchored in a defensive formation. The battle resulted in total annihilation of 
the Turkish fleet and the liberation of Greece. Unfortunately, Vice Admiral Sir 
Edward Codrington 's victory so embarrassed the Turks that it became 
diplomatically expedient that he be recalled home; his career was ruined. 
During the long wars with the Continental powers in Europe, British naval 
doctrine was, primarily, to engage the enemy fleet-to either destroy it (to sink 
a wooden warship was exceedingly difficult) or to capture enemy ships as 
prizes. Britain essentially sought general command of the seas via warfare of 
annihilation. If required to defend a convoy or a landing force, naval doctrine 
called for the escort force to engage offensively the enemy fleet, posing a threat 
rather than adopting a defensive position. If tasked to neutralize a threat of 
invasion, the fleet would engage offensively the enemy fleet posing a threat. 
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And to eliminate the source of power of a maritime nation, doctrine called for 
the destruction of the enemy fleet ftrst and only then exploitation of command 
of the sea by attacking merchant shipping. 
The primary tactics of the Royal Navy were to attack on the offensive from 
the windward side and then attempt to breach the ship's hull, kill the crew with 
aimed gunftre and-only if necessary-engage in close combat. In general, 
formal doctrine called for the strict maintenance of the line ahead, with 
deviations tacitly approved after the fact when commanders were successful. 
Between Toulon ( 1 744) and the Saints ( 1782), the British fought thirteen battles 
to a draw, using linear tactics, while they obtained six victories by abandoning 
the line-clear evidence of the need to ensure that successful fleet lessons 
learned are accepted as new doctrine. 
The Admiralty was not oblivious to these statistics. The issue was that if one 
formed the line ahead, one would be more likely to avoid defeat than if one 
abandoned the line. Hence the line ahead gave the commander his best guaran­
tee of not failing, even though he might not succeed. The personality of many 
of England's leading commanders was such that they felt their individual 
initiative, skill, and spirit allowed them to abandon the safety of the conservative 
formalist school of doctrine in favor of the melie. 
The Age of the Ironclad 
Although maritime technology advanced in the form of steam and the screw 
propeller, it was some time before the Royal Navy took the next step, that of 
ironclads. The simple reason appears to be that the role of oceanic policeman 
against lower technology forces could be carried out with the old wooden ships 
of sail. Even when the Navy adopted the new technologies, the absence of 
continuous warfare put tactical and doctrinal innovation into the schoolhouse 
and not the active fleet. Small detached units were left to improvise their own 
local doctrine, which they did successfully. Technological improvements now 
allowed more certainty (contrasted to the uncertainty of sailing via wind power) 
and more distant control (via signals) as this era progressed. The improved 
signalling capabilities may have played a role in the downfall of doctrinal 
development-after all, why take local initiative when the admiral (later the 
Admiralty) will send orders directly? 
With the formation of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence 
Studies (or RUSI) in 1 83 1 ,  an unofficial forum was created for the discussion 
of military issues. RUSI began publishing a journal in 1 859, creating a vehicle 
for the publication of new ideas. Journals and societies such as these flourished 
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throughout the world, and they provided an arena for doctrinal development 
not under the thumb of official Navy bureaucracy.22 Similarly, the Naval 
Records Society (founded 1893) allowed scholars to research documents from 
Royal Navy history. Pere Paul Hoste's L 'Art des armees navales ou traite des 
evolutions navales (1 697) was again (hut this time fully) translated into English, 
in 1834, by Captain J.D. Boswall, Royal Navy. 
In 1843 and 1846, Captain C.R. Moorsom, Royal Navy, published two brief 
works on naval tactics, which included a section on the actions between 
steamships. Moorsom was later promoted to vice admiral;  since he had not been 
to sea since the 1820s,23 his subsequent Organization and Maneuvers of Steam 
Fleets (1856) built on these early ideas. Although his recommendations were, 
as far as is known, never employed in practice, a modification was included to 
subsequent versions of the general signal book. The 1857 French Ministry of 
Marine's Tactique navale, for both sail and steamships, was translated in 1859 
for the benefit of Royal Navy officers. Additional privately published books, 
such as Sir Howard Douglas' Naval Warfare with Steam (1859), appeared on 
steamers in combat, but no changes were made in Admiralty fighting instruc­
tions. On the other hand, the Battle of Lissa ( 1866) gave primacy to develop­
ment of the ram rather than the gun. 
The impact of the ironclad was to raise once again the specter of invasion by 
France.24 It was claimed that steam had "bridged the Channel" and that thirty 
thousand Frenchmen could rush across in a single night. The result of this 
technological innovation was a shift in strategy rather than doctrine. No longer 
would the Royal Navy alone be sufficient for defense of the realm, but a sizeable 
portion of the standing anny would have to garrison the coastline as well. 
Doctrinal development continued under the auspices of Admiral Sir Geof­
frey Phipps Hornby. While in command of the British Flying Squadron ( 1869-
187 1), he experimented with tactics under steam. Hornby appears to have been 
the first flag officer to arrange for the ironclads of the Channel Squadron (which 
he commanded from 1872- 1 875) to act as pelotons, or separate tactical groups. 
The Admiralty approved of his concepts in 1874 and incorporated them into its 
signal book of 1 879 . Unofficial writings on naval doctrine continued to 
be sponsored by various professional associations that offered prizes as 
inducements for creative thinking and writing. It is of some small note that after 
the Royal Navy swept the seas of its enemies, it turned to scientific research 
and pursuit of discoveries.25 This parallels somewhat the more recent shift in 
the U.S. Navy to military operations other than war-which include environ­
mental concerns. 
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The next major expression of formal doctrinal thought was introduced in the 
writings of Vice Admiral Philip Colomb. The older of two brothers (both of 
whom wrote about naval matters), Philip retired from active service and took 
a position as an instructor at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich. While a 
commander, Philip had studied the results of the Battle of Lissa and nearly, but 
not totally, embraced the primacy of the ram over the gun. His later research 
efforts and writing concentrated on the science of naval tactics. Philip's 
approach was inductive, with due credit given reasoning, experience, and 
history. Philip Colomb's major contribution was Naval Warfare: Its Ruling 
Principles and Practice Historically Treated, first published in 1 89 1 .  
Naval Warfare is more than a doctrinal book. It contains rich discussions 
about strategy, is unabashedly pro-Navy, and parallels the work done in the 
United States by Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (which generally eclipsed 
Colomb's efforts). Within the pages of Naval Warfare one can fmd the doctrinal 
concepts of decisive battle, blockade, and fleets-in-being as means to assure 
command of the sea and, thereby, defense of the homeland, defense of sea lines 
of communications, and the ability to move the army overseas for offensive 
action. Colomb followed this work with his shorter Essays on Naval Defence 
( 1 896), reprinting a series of chapters, articles, and lectures at RUSI. 
Colomb's and Mahan's writings in favor of warfare by annihilation, the 
decisive battle, and an offensive doctrine met with favor among those of the 
material school, like Admiral Lord John Fisher, who favored the expansion of 
the Royal Navy and development of the dreadnought. These writings may not 
have been official Admiralty doctrine, but they were certainly internalized by 
the officer corps and accepted as unofficial doctrine representing the preferred 
views about war. To put it simply, for the material school, war was reduced to 
a technical problem with mathematical and mechanical solutions; war should 
be fought on the offensive with superior weapons, since the new likely enemy 
(Germany) would have at least technological parity and maybe technological 
superiority. 
No recounting of doctrinal development in the Royal Navy during the 
Victorian-era would be complete without mention of Vice Admiral Sir 
George Tryon, Royal Navy, and the loss of Victoria after her col lision with 
Camperdown in 1 893. Tryon had been an advocate of independent steaming 
and command initiative instead of orchestrated maneuvering by pelotons in 
accordance with signal books. With the blame for the collision attributed to his 
unorthodox ideas, it was inevitable that Tryon 's reform efforts would also fmd 
a watery grave.26 
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When Japan decided to create a Western navy, it chose to model its fleet and 
doctrine on those of the British. In their first major fleet engagement, at the 
battle of the Yalu ( 1 894),  the Japanese employed aggressive British tactics in 
ships, maximizing speed over armor and guns, and they decisively defeated the 
Chinese. On the other hand, the Japanese did not charge, or ram, or seek a melie. 
About this time the l00th anniversary of the British victory at Trafalgar 
occurred. A great celebration was held, and the myth of the "Nelson touch" was 
perpetuated. What was the "touch," however? Did it arise from the "band of 
brothers," the myth of the offense, the undisciplined melie, or the charismatic 
personality of Nelson himself? With the rapid development of new technology, 
bright naval officers looked for bureaucratic success. Also, having no enemies 
at sea, they turned to warfare ashore for glory. Indeed, one of the more important 
of the First Sea Lords of this era, Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, earned a Victoria 
Cross for his fighting ashore in the Sudan in 1884.27 
Doctrinal development in the Navy stagnated, and it was then that the myth 
of Nelson, carefully cultivated and perpetuated by Admiral Fisher, provided the 
new unwritten doctrine for warfare at sea. This unwritten doctrine included 
official adherence to stagnant fighting instructions, with the tacit implication 
that one could do no wrong if one aggressively engaged the enemy. Thus the 
Royal Navy simultaneously embraced, with its head, the formalism of the 
fighting instructions enforced by modem signals, as well as, with its heart and 
soul, the aggressive and relatively unconstrained spirit of Nelson. 
The next major British thinker about naval doctrine was Sir Julian Stafford 
Corbett.28 His historical analyses of doctrine, strategy, and tactics in the days 
of sail are classics: Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816 (1905), Signals and 
Instructions, 1776-1794 ( 1908), and Some Principles of Maritime Strategy 
( 19 1 1) .  To truly understand Corbett, one must see him as advocating the 
antitheses of the conventional wisdom of the time and knowing that he was 
doing it. Simply put, Corbett argued against the mindless embrace of the 
offensive, wars of annihilation, and the "Nelson touch," in favor of cool, 
historically based analyses to investigate all forms of warfare and set maritime 
operations into the context of the war as a whole. 
Sir Winston Churchill noted that when he came to the Admiralty in 1 9 1 1 ,  he 
found that there was not a single moment in the career of an officer where he 
was obligated to read books on naval warfare, let alone be examined on them. 
Hence, he organized the Naval War StatI to study the lessons of history and apply 
them to naval war planning strategy. Corbett used history to devise permanent 
"principles of maritime warfare." 1Dese efforts, however, were largely discounted 
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by serving officers who felt that technology had invalidated the lessons of the 
age of sail and who were otherwise captured by the spirit of Nelson. 
While Corbett served as a lecturer at the Royal Naval College at Greenwich, 
he published his more mainstream doctrinal thoughts in a series of classified 
booklets known as "The Green Pamphlet," or more properly, the Strategic 
Terms and Definitions Used in Lectures on Naval History. Although these 
predate Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, the doctrinal materials contained 
in "The Green Pamphlet" are more concise and specifically addressed to a navy 
audience. Written as it was by an appointed lecturer in Fisher's navy, this 
booklet came close to being written doctrine, even if it was not endorsed 
officially by Fisher himself. Indeed, other than the fighting instructions, there 
were no doctrinal documents.29 
Corbett's writings are in fact doctrinal, and, although they were not ap­
preciated by officers who were obsessed with the centrality of offense, annihila­
tion, and the decisive battle, they remain of interest today. The army officer, 
who was included in his audience, was far too preoccupied with mobilization 
rates, short war, offensive doctrines, and rail timetables to understand the 
important role to be played by sea power.3O It is simply that there is far more 
to naval warfare than seeking out and destroying an enemy fleet. Corbett 
attempted to explain how initiative can be part of the defensive form of warfare 
(the role that the fleet-in-being first employed in 1690), and that because of 
technological innovations, surprise no longer meant escape but could now spell 
disaster.3 1  
It is also true that sea power alone is not enough. Corbett attached importance 
to joint operations. The post-Fisher Admiralty generally ignored Corbett's 
theses and went so far as to put a disclaimer on his subsequent documentation 
of the Royal Navy's performance during World War 1.32 Despite his problems 
in "selling" his doctrinal message, there is a great deal of value in Corbett's 
writings for any naval service making its operations more integrated with 
political objectives and in concert with other services. 
World War I 
Britain's naval doctrine prior to World War I stressed combined arms and 
was practiced in frequent battle maneuvers.33 A good deal of flexibility was 
demonstrated by the fleet during the war, but upon occasion battle squadrons 
were tied to synchronized movements en masse, as they had been in the 
eighteenth century. September 1 9 1 4  marked a return to commanders in chief 
having overall cognizance over the fighting instructions. New instructions, 
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some hundred pages in length. entitled Grand Fleet Battle Orders. were issued 
over the signature of Admiral Earl John Jellicoe.34 These fighting instructions 
attempted to provide guidance for all eventualities and offered the unit com­
mander very little opportunity for initiative. They were reissued several times 
during the war by Jellicoe and by his successor. Admiral Sir David Beatty.35 
Open discussions on doctrine became more difficult during the World War 
I era. Discussions now took place within the Naval War Staff and involved all 
of the issues that one would have expected: the proper method to meet the 
challenge of an invasion. commerce protection. amphibious warfare. and fleet 
engagements. Churchill was dissatisfied with anything that reeked of passive 
defense. but he had no specific doctrine for how his preferred offensive was to 
be carried out. His offhanded political direction often distressed the Admiralty. 
In one such case. Rear Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock found himself 
facing a superior force commanded by Admiral Graf Maximilian von Spee.36 
Although his mobilized reservist crews lacked training. Cradock sought an 
engagement against the Germans; he was promptly defeated at the battle of 
Coronel ( 19 14). Churchill did not respond to Cradock's cable. which implied 
he would engage a superior force. nor did he dispatch sufficient forces for 
Cradock to deal with the threat. The Admiralty attempted to salvage the 
situation at the last minute. but it was left to a relief effort at the battle of the 
Falklands ( 19 14) to redress the loss. 
Cradock's decision to engage the Germans was probably influenced by 
public opinion that demanded something be done about German Navy raiders 
as well as by the ongoing court-martial of one of his colleagues who failed to 
engage a marginally superior enemy force. If the Nelsonian legacy of aggres­
siveness. as informal doctrine or new strategic culture. could ever be carried 
too far. it probably was at Coronel. 37 Far better to have massed sufficient forces 
to have dealt with von Spee than to have suffered a humiliating defeat in the 
first major sea battle since Trafalgar. The "cult of the offensive" can be 
disastrous for naval forces-the defense is an honorable alternative when 
appropriate. and at Coronel it would have been. 
The pre-war Frenchjeune ecole and the new technologies allowing impres­
sive amounts of firepower to be massed in smaller. swift. expendable forces 
had an impact on the employment of the Channel Fleet during the war. When 
faced with the humiliating loss of three cruisers only six weeks after the 
outbreak of the war (all of which were sunk within one hour by the same 
submarine) as well as the ever-present threat of the High Seas Fleet in mortal 
combat. the Royal Navy wisely chose a distant. vice close. blockade. Simply 
put. navies could not allow their principal fighting machines to be whittled away 
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by throw-away strike forces. Essentially, the Royal Navy was replicating the 
fleet-in-being strategy first employed by Admiral Lord Herbert Torrington in 
1690. 
In the long-awaited clash between Jellicoe's Grand Fleet and Vice Admiral 
Reinhard Scheer High Seas Fleet off Jutland ( 1 9 1 6), the Royal Navy paid the 
price for not having instilled initiative in the minds of its admirals. When Scheer 
executed the gejechtskehrtwendung (or, battle tum-away together), inde­
pendently acting battle squadrons trained to seize the initiative might have taken 
advantage and turned the battle into a decisive victory for England. Jutland was, 
therefore, a strategic-level success for the allies, but Jellicoe is forever doomed 
to be second-guessed for having failed to send the High Seas Fleet to the bottom. 
Jellicoe, of course, was operating within approved doctrine when he turned his 
fleet away from torpedo threats and declined a night engagement. 
On the other hand, after years of concentration on decisive fleet engage­
ments, the Royal Navy fell somewhat short in their doctrine for amphibious 
operations. While a landing in Gennan East Africa was neutralized, the dis­
astrous attempt at Gallipoli resulted in a Royal Commission of investigation. 
The analysis did not really get to the heart of the matter, however, and it was 
not until after the beginning phase of the next world war that amphibious 
doctrine was no longer discredited but mastered. 
Despite years of unofficial doctrinal writings on the proper method of 
safeguarding the sea lines of communication, the Navy failed absolutely to 
organize and maintain convoys for its vital shipments coming by sea. Parlia­
ment had been the driving force behind convoys as early as 1650, 1708, 1792, 
1 798, and 1 803, and it now fell to the political leadership to force the Navy to 
adopt convoys-three years after the commencement of hostilities. 38 An inter­
nal study by younger officers in the Admiralty came to the correct conclusions 
but failed to convince their seniors.39 They did convince Admiral William S.  
Sims, U.S .  Navy, who had been sent to Britain to  study ways in which the U.S. 
Navy might be employed as part of the Grand Fleet. Sims, in tum, had the 
opportunity to present his views on the value of convoys to Prime Minister 
Lloyd George. The prime minister forced the change.40 
Initiative was not defunct in the Royal Navy. The old spirit of Nelson lived 
in the operation of submarines, Q-ships, and the flotilla craft of the Dover Patrol. 
These commands, however, were held primarily by junior officers; for the most 
part, the navy's senior leadership had lost the lessons of history and relapsed 
into conservatism. 
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The Interwar Years 
Attempts to influence doctrine in the Royal Navy were also undertaken by 
an outspoken insider, a critical officer who managed to remain upwardly 
mobile-Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond.4l Richmond was a friend and con­
fidant of Corbett, and as Assistant Director of Operations on the Naval War 
Staff, he established his bone fu:ks as a serious scholar and then led the "young 
Turks" reform movement prior to World War I. Richmond also challenged the 
decisive battle orthodoxy of the navy and managed to remain in active service 
until an enforced retirement in 193 1 .  Richmond did not change the battleship­
dominated doctrine of the day (nor, for that matter, did the opening days of 
World War m, but he left as his legacy the Naval Society and its journal, The 
Naval Review, founded in 1 9 1 2.42 One could write in the pages of this journal 
the most heretical of articles, since authorship need not be disclosed and 
distribution was restricted. The lessons of the Royal Navy's difficulty in 
abandoning the battleship-dominated decisive engagement doctrine betoken 
that sound doctrinal development must contain a forum for free and open 
discussion that is external to official channels. 
Within the Royal Navy, a study of the combat experiences in the past war 
was undertaken at all levels of staff and at the appropriate training and 
educational institutions.43 Indeed, although many have argued that the navy was 
obsessed with refighting the Battle of Jutland, there is good evidence of tactical 
innovation.44 Some of this effort realized the desired effect, that of revisiting 
certain established doctrinal principles such as the avoidance of night actions. 
The Grand Fleet Battle Orders were duly revised in 1924 and 1928- 1929. 
The fleet experimented with alternative doctrines for war at sea during the 
interwar years.45 Combined arms were used in an exercise off Bombay in 1 924, 
and Admiral Sir A. Ernie M. Chatfield used aircraft for the long-range strikes 
in fleet maneuvers in the early 1 930s. Blind faith was placed in the improved 
anti-aircraft guns (hence self-defense fighters were not sought in great numbers) 
and in the Asdic detection system for fmding submarines. 
The new fighting instructions continued to emphasize surface engagements 
and convoys. Although the global system of naval intelligence and the similar 
global system of Naval Control of Shipping (NCS) had been kept active from 
its World War I days, the Navy awaited German actions at sea before 
implementing the convoy system after the outbreak of war in 1939.46 Convoy 
duty was seen as an attrition-oriented defensive style of warfare during an era 
when the culture of the navy emphasized the offensive and annihilation warfare. 
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Of the assumed possible enemies, the navy concentrated its planning against 
Japan and the reinforcement and relief of Singapore. A sound doctrine for war 
was developed in this area of operations, one that made full use of Dominion 
resources, distant water offensive mine laying, and minesweeping. Fleet exer­
cises in the Mediterranean were models for planned engagements in Southeast 
Asia.47 
Of the criticism that can be ascribed to the British armed forces during the 
interwar years, the Royal Navy may claim the least blame, given the greater 
success that it had in the initial stages of the next war.48 Compared to the Royal 
Air Force's (RAP} shortsightedness in regard to strategic bombing and the 
army's noncentralized doctrine and approach to training, the navy did 
remarkably well in preparing for World War 11.49 All of the services, however, 
had poorly developed joint military doctrine and planning. 50 
World War II 
Prior to the war, the navy was often criticized for relying more on new 
technology as the solution to combat problems than on thinking through better 
ways to fight. 5 1  Yet in subsequent battles, these new technologies would prove 
critical. In many ways, the navy demonstrated far more success than the army, 
due in part to a systematic approach to doctrine and training. 
In 1939, a new set of Fighting Instructions, again stressing battle fleet 
concepts, was issued by the commanders of the Home and Mediterranean fleets, 
with a preface stating that they were not mandatory. 52 On the other hand, the 
disaster of the small squadron that initially met the German surface raider 
Bismarck can be attributed in part to strict conformance with those fighting 
instructions. Local commanders never again repeated that error, and most 
subsequent naval operations were conducted using the fighting instructions as 
a guide-not as compulsory directions. Perhaps it was the assimilation of 
aircraft into fleet operations that fmally ended the navy's reliance upon the 
fighting instructions that had been born in the age of sail. In general, Royal 
Navy commanders fought surface engagements on the offensive and with a 
great deal of flexibility. 
The introduction of aircraft into the Royal Navy is a story fraught with 
important doctrinal lessons. 53 One cannot fault the Admiralty for not recogniz­
ing the potential of the airplane when it was first proposed-most military 
services were similarly blind. Doctrinal development for fleet aviation was 
shaped disastrously by a decision during World War I that the naval wing of 
the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) form the first line of defense against German 
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Zeppelin attacks. Although individual aviators fought bravely, it set the tone 
for fleet aviation to perfonn auxiliary and defensive duties. 
The loss of the Fleet Air Ann to the Royal Air Force (RAF) during the 
interwar years is a story that has been well told elsewhere. 54 The transfer led to 
air power doctrine being developed by another service, whose preoccupation 
was not maritime operations. Fleet officers relied on a small cadre of aviation 
officers to help them understand how to integrate their low-perfonnance 
airplanes into battleship-dominated navy doctrine.ss The culmination of these 
efforts was the successful combined-anns Battle of Cape Matapan ( 194 1 ), in 
which aircraft were used as long-range strike assets (predating the same role of 
the U.S. Navy at the Battle of the Coral Sea). 
At the last major fleet-versus-fleet battle of the Royal Navy, off Cape 
Matapan, Admiral Andrew Brown Cunningham demonstrated the requisite 
initiative and decisiveness to qualify him to be heir to the Nelson mantle. S6 
Cunningham had the advantage of air cover, radar, and Ultra. The Italians had 
the advantage of speed, and they managed to avoid a total rout in their first and 
last attempt to challenge control of the Mediterranean during World War n. 
Perhaps due to a series of prewar exercises that experimented with naval aircraft 
as strike platfonns, Cunningham managed to master combined operations and 
made good use of his assets. Upon recognizing the value of air power, the 
Mediterranean Fleet changed its standard tactical fonnation from the battle line 
to an antiaircraft circular fonnation. 
Following Matapan, the influx of new Lend-Lease aircraft and pilots trained 
in the United States resulted in the British Pacific Fleet's (BPF) wholesale 
adoption of American naval doctrine. The BPF was molded into an American 
fast carrier task force that operated in support of amphibious landings, ground 
forces ashore, and in independent strikes against land targets. Because they 
lacked a similar logistical train and differed in the complement of the air wing, 
the BPF generally operated in its own area of operations rather than as an 
integrated player in the U.S. Pacific Fleet. It had taken nearly forty years and 
two world wars for doctrine in the Royal Navy to shift its prime focus from the 
battleship to the aircraft carrier. 
Not all transfer of doctrinal infonnation flowed from the U. S .  to Great 
Britain, however. In the area of antisubmarine patrols, it would take the 
U . S .  Navy its own trial by fire to conclude that offensive antisubmarine 
operations were not the most effective way to ensure that convoys reached their 
destination. S7 In an interesting contrast to its preoccupation with the destruction 
of surface raiders with offensively oriented hunting groups, the Royal Navy 
published the defensive Atlantic Convoy Instructions in 194 1  and 1 942, which 
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set forth the doctrinal principles for the safe arrival of convoys via escorts and 
for attrition warfare. These instructions were fmally accepted by the u.s. Navy 
as well as other allied navies. Of note is the late date of publication, there being 
no established written doctrine prior to that. 
Doctrinal Development during the Cold War58 
Immediately after the war, some purely national doctrinal publications were 
produced that capitalized upon the knowledge gained during the war.S9 
Cooperation between the allied navies during World War II had set the stage 
for drawing to a close the uniquely British way of war at sea, replacing it with 
allied doctrine. By the end of the war, the Royal Navy had shifted its primary 
striking and sea control force to the aircraft carrier, and the u.s. Navy had 
begrudgingly accepted (but only temporarily) the value of convoys. Naval 
planning shifted from a national function to an allied response, and doctrine 
had to be accepted by all of the nations participating at sea in the North Atlantic 
Alliance. The new Atlantic Striking Fleet would fulfill the role previously 
played by the Grand Fleet and Home Fleet of the two previous world wars. 
British ships operated within standing naval forces in the Atlantic, in the 
Channel, and in the Mediterranean. An alliance "concept of maritime opera­
tions" set the tone for subordinate standardized allied tactical pUblications 
(ATPs) and other similar manuals. 
In the 1950s, the British and Americans once again debated maritime 
doctrine,c)() including the proper way to ensure that North American materials 
and supplies arrived in Europe in the event of war. The Americans wanted to 
fight NATO's navy forces on the offensive. The British remembered the lessons 
of two world wars. Finally, the Royal Navy published a defmitive Naval Staff 
History study on the value of convoys: The Defeat of the Enemy Attack upon 
Shipping. 1939-1945: A Study in Policy and Questions ( 1957), which settled 
the matter.61 Other doctrinal debates occurred over the role of aircraft carriers 
and amphibious warfare. 
With the residual responsibilities of the Empire, the Royal Navy maintained 
a capability for limited overseas crisis response (warm wars) and peacetime 
presence outside of the NATO context. Attention was paid to amphibious 
warfare and assault by helicopter from the sea. Over time, the naval out -of-area 
presence was reduced, to be increased only during actual combat operations, 
such as during the Falklands War. Obviously, combat experience during 
national emergencies benefited the NATO alliance in the form of doctrinal 
lessons learned.62 
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The introduction of nuclear weapons into the Royal Navy similarly followed 
allied and American doctrine, although the British made it clear from time to 
time that a national decision on release might precede that made by the Alliance. 
Initial planning centered on allied nuclear use, whose primary purpose was 
ashore. On the other hand, when Americans appeared to become preoccupied 
with ballistic missile submarines off their own shores, it was British efforts that 
pushed the U.S. Navy into an offensive doctrine that would catch these 
submarines before they left home waters. 
The close integration of the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy in the Cold War 
era, especially with the U.S.  Navy 's maritime strategy, continues in the present 
era. As with the doctrinal renaissance in the U.S . Navy, there is a similar effort 
by the British to once again look at centralized navy doctrine.63 This develop­
mental effort is taking place in a doctrinal void within the context of the United 
Nations, NATO, and the Western European Union-sanctioned maritime opera­
tions in the Mediterranean. Efforts are being made within European nations to 
fill that void, and it would appear that the doctrinal renaissance will occur on 
both sides of the Atlantic. 
T
his brief overview of the development of doctrine in the Royal Navy 
demonstrates that there is a consistent history of more than four hundred 
fifty years of combat doctrine in that service. Doctrine in the Royal Navy has 
existed in every conceivable form-from formal written centralized fighting 
instructions to additional written and verbal instructions by regional fleet 
commanders in chief and local squadron commanders. While doctrine has 
helped the Royal Navy win in tactical combat, from time to time it has also been 
the source of major problems. 
The Royal Navy has emphasized development in tactical doctrine, which has 
contributed partly to the long years of successful combat by the fleet. That is 
not to say that strategic and operational-level military doctrine have been totally 
overlooked, but that the Royal Navy, like the French Navy, has primarily 
devoted its attention to the development of service-unique doctrine at the 
tactical level of warfare. This is somewhat surprising, since Britain was in­
volved in global conventional war and numerous major regional contingencies 
against France and other nations for many years. The Royal Navy did not have 
a coherent doctrine at all levels of warfare. Only in more recent times has it 
given preeminent attention to strategic and operational-level multinational 
doctrine, specifically NATO doctrine, and even more recently to unilateral joint 
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doctrine. Due in part to these higher level doctrinal deficiencies, fighting at the 
strategic and operational levels of warfare was affected unfavorably as well. 
Perhaps because doctrine focused on the tactical level of warfare, it was often 
issued by the fleet commander in chief rather than the Admiralty. Even 
Admiralty-issued doctrine generally could be modified by the fleet com­
mander-thus there appears to have been some recognition that doctrine for a 
worldwide fleet might vary due to different locations, assumed enemies, and 
preferences for combat as intended by the local commander. The focus on 
tactical-level doctrine also resulted in less than full development of doctrine for 
more complex multinational operations. 
It was a perceived void in multinational doctrinal development that in some 
measure caused the u.s. Navy to challenge the doctrinal leadership of the Royal 
Navy during the early days of the NATO alliance. The U.S. Navy did not win 
all these bureaucratic battles, however, and British views drove NATO concepts 
in a number of key areas-especially with favor toward convoy defense rather 
than offensive operations against attack submarines using hunter-killer groups. 
Independent British doctrine continues, in addition to NATO navy doctrine, to 
govern nationally mandated operations taken outside of the multinational 
environment. 
The naval doctrine adopted by the British has been shaped by the nature of 
their government, geographic position, the assumed threat, the overall strategy 
being pursued, the seafaring character of their people, their unique strategic 
culture, and oftentimes, but not always, the lessons learned from history. During 
the twentieth century, doctrine has been implemented more successfully in the 
Navy than in the Army-leading to the conclusion that the higher competence 
shown by the fleet can be attributed to the Royal Navy's better understanding 
of and adherence to doctrine. 
There have also been important negative lessons learned from British naval 
doctrinal development. The ever-present search for the heir to the throne of 
Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson led to the myth that superior combat performance 
is primarily a result of an aggressive and offensive doctrine oriented towards 
naval warfare of annihilation (decisive battles)-when history has shown 
clearly the need for the wise commander to select the defense and attrition 
warfare when it is most appropriate. As long as the u.s. Navy continues to view 
its roots as being those of the Royal Navy, American officers will need to come 
to grips with both the positive and the negative aspects of the heritage of Great 
Britain's doctrine-including overemphasis on the offensive. 
Nelson's "touch" included his charismatic personality, audacity, and bold­
ness in the face of the enemy, pre-battle meetings with his "band of brothers" 
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to share the commander's intent, and also (and Nelson knew this at the time) 
an enemy who was not on par with his own fmely honed forces. Nelson deserves 
all of the credit that he earned, but as time has passed, we have forgotten the 
effects of the Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte on the French Navy. Naval 
doctrine based upon the mindless "cult of the offensive" will doom a fleet just 
as it doomed millions of soldiers in the trenches during World War I. 
Perhaps the greatest lesson to be learned from the British experience is how 
difficult it is to change doctrine. The battleship's reign survived through World 
War I, the long interwar years, and the initial stages of World War ll. From 
British naval history, it should be obvious that a system is needed to ensure that 
success in the fleet resulting from actions taken outside of established doctrine 
produces timely changes in the established orthodoxy. It will take the dedicated 
officer much time and effort to apply both the positive and negative lessons of 
the history of doctrine in the Royal Navy to the issues facing navies today. We 
dare not ignore history. 
32 
Notes 
1 .  Carl H. Builder, The Anny in the Strlltegic Plllnning Process: J.Vho Shllll Bell the Cllt? 
(Santa Monica, Calif: The RAND Corporation, Arroyo Center) , R-35 1 3-A, p. 46. Prepared 
for the U.S.  Army, April 1 987. An expanded version of this study was published as The M/lSks 
of Wllr: Amerielln Militllry Styles in Strlltegy Ilnd A nillysis (Baltimore, Md. and London: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 989) , p. 32. 
2 .  This opinion was shared by one of the first U.S. Navy officers to formally advocate 
naval doctrine. See Dudley, W. Knox (Lieutenant Commander, USN) , "The Role of 
Doctrine in Naval Warfare, ' U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March-April 1 9 1 5, pp. 344-5. 
3. The age of sail and other sections of this paper are based heavily upon S.S. Robison 
(Rear Admiral, USN, Retired) , A History ofNllvll1 Tlleticsftom 1530 to 1 930 (Annapolis, Md. : 
Naval Institute Press, 1 942) ; E.B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz (Fleet Admiral, USN) , eds., 
Sell Power: A Nilvill History (Englewood Cliffi, N.J. :  Prentice-Hall, Inc. ,  1960) ; John Creswell, 
Bn'tish Admirills of the Eighteenth Century: Tilctics in &ttle (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
Ltd., 1 972); Clark G. Reynolds, Commllnd of the Sell: The History Ilnd Strlltegy of Milritime 
Empires (New York: William Morrow & Co. ,  1 974); Helmut Pemsel, A History of Wllr Ilt 
Sell: An A tl/lS Ilnd Chronology of Conjlict Ilt Sellfrom Ellr/iest Times to the Present, trans. i .G.D.G.  
Smith (Major) (Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute Press, 1 977) [translation of Von Slllllmis bis 
Okinllwll, first published in 1 975] ; Brian Tunstall, Nilvill Wllifllre in the Age of Sllil: The Evolution 
of Fighting Tilctics, 1 650- 1 8 1 5, Dr. Nicholas Tracy, ed. (Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute 
Press, 1 990) ; and Geoffrey Till, Milritime Strlltegy Ilnd the Nuc/ellr Age, 2nd ed. (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1 984) , pp. 23-4, 39-49. 
4. Alonson de Chaves, Qulltri partitu en cosmografia prlletiell, also known as Espejo de 
navegantes (Madri: Instituto de Historia y Cultura Navar, 1 983 [original version written from 
1 520 to 1 538] . 
5. "Traditional tactics, 1 530: • A book of orders for the war .. . '  written by Thomas Audley 
at the command of Henry VIII, ell 1 530," inJohn B. Hattendorf et al. ,  British Nilvill Documents: 
1204- 1 960 (Hants, UK: Scolar Press [for the Navy Records Society] , 1 993) , pp. 83-4. There 
is some evidence of a previous doctrinal publication, the British Blllck Book, issued in the age 
of oars. See William Ledyard Rodgers (Vice Admiral , USN, Retired) , Nilvill Wllifllre under 
Oars: 4th to 1 6th Centuries--A Study of Strategy, Tlletics and Ship Design (Annapolis, Md. : 
Naval Institute Press, 1 939) , p . 105.  
6 .  The numbers of cannon at  sea during major fleet engagements is  an often overlooked 
point. For example, at the Battle of Trafalgar (1 805) , the gun power of Admiral Lord Horatio 
Nelson's fleet exceeded that massed by Napoleon Bonaparte at Waterloo (1 8 1 5) by a factor 
of six. See John Keegan, The Price of A dmirillty: The Evolution of Nilval Waif are (New York: 
Viking Penguin, Inc. ,  1988) , p. 47 
7. Stephen Wentworth RoskilJ (Captain, RN, Retired) , The Strategy of Sea Power: Its 
Development Ilnd Appliclltion [based upon the Lees-Knowles Lectures delivered at Cambridge 
University, 1961]  (London: Collins, 1 962) , p. 39. 
8 .  "Fighting instructions, 1 636, "  in Hattendorf et a1. , British Nilvill Documents, pp. 1 60--1 .  
9 .  Historians are constantly refining these dates as they discover additional materials .  
These dates serve to illustrate the point that doctrinal development was on-going and 
constant. 
1 0. Such a formal division of opinion into two schools of doctrinal thought is not clearly 
documented in history. On the other hand, from a review of history, it is reasonably clear 
that there were often two relatively distinct views on doctrine as demonstrated by fleet 
engagements and courts-martial. Historians have provided names to two "schools" which 
may not have existed in fact, but probably did exist in spirit. 
1 1 . Keegan, The Price of Admiralty, p. 45. 
1 2 .  Alfred Thayer Mahan (Captain, USN) , The Injluence of Sell Power upon History, 
1 660- 1 783 (Boston: Little , Brown & Co. ,  1890), p. 356. 
13. John Clerk of Elden's book was republished with additional materials and notes by 
senior naval officers. For example, see John Clerk, Esq. of Elden, An Esslly on Navill Tilctics, 
Systemlltielli Ilnd Historiell  with Expillnatory Pilltes, in Four Pllrts, 3rd. ed. , with notes by [Admiral 
The Newport Papers 
George Brydges] Lord Rodney and an introduction by a naval officer (Edinburgh, Scodand: 
Adam Black, 1 827) . 
1 4. This battle is known simply by its date since, unlike most batdes fought in the littoral 
during the age of sail, it occurred well out to sea, some 400 miles off the coast of Europe. 
1 5 .  Alfred Thayer Mahan (Captain ,  USN) , The Lifo of Nelson: The Embodiment oj the Sea 
Power of Great Britain (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1 897 [1943 reprint] , p. 239; and 
Admiral of the Fleet of the Italian Navy Giuseppe Fioravanzo, A History oj Naval Tactical 
Thought (Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute Press, 1 979) [original manuscript prepared in 1 956], 
p . 96. 
16. "Naval tactics, 1851 : Captain Alexander Milne, a Lord of the Admiralty, to 
Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker, Commander in Chief Mediterranean, 4 October 1 85 1 , "  
i n  Hattendorf e t  al . ,  British Naval Documents, p. 629, n.2. 
17. Keegan, The Price of Admiralty, pp. 37-8. 
1 8. Mahan, The Life of Nelson, pp. 294, 297 . 
1 9 .  "Trafalgar: the order of battle, 1 805, "  in Hattendorf et al. , British Naval Documents, 
p . 425 . 
20. Michael A. Palmer, "Lord Nelson: Master of Command, "  Naval War Col/ege Review, 
Winter 1 988, pp. 105-1 6.  I am indebted to Michael A. Palmer for additional analysis which 
will be found in the prologue, "A Regular Confusion, "  to his forthcoming book: Command 
at Sea: Naval Command and Control since the Sixteenth Century, draft dated February 1 994. 
21 . William Koenig, "Navarino, "  Epic Sea Battles, S.L. Mayer, ed. (Secaucus, N.]. :  
Chartwell Books, Inc. ,  1 975) , pp . 62-83. 
22. The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI) annual essay contest 
for a Gold Medal often results in follow-on publications of a doctrinal nature by j unior 
officers. For example ,  see Lieutenant Charles Campbell, RN, Essay on Tactics in an Action on 
the Open Sea with Existing Weapons (London: Harrison,  1 880) . 
23 . Basil Greenhill and Ann Giffard, The British Assault on Finland, 1 854- 1 855: A 
Forgotten Naval War (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1 988) , p. 80. 
24. Norman H. Gibbs, "The Origins of Imperial Defence, " Maritime Strategy and the 
Balance oj Power: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century, John B. Hattendorf and Roberr 
S . Jordan, eds. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1 989) , p. 25 . 
25. Gwyn Prins and Robbie Stamp, Top Guns & Toxic Hlhales: The Environment & Global 
Security (London: Earthscan Publications, Ltd.),  pp. 1 46, 1 50-1 . 
26. Andrew Gordon, Conflict of Style: Jutland and British Naval Command, draft manuscript 
circa November 1 994, chapters I I ,  1 3 ,  and 16.  
27 . Arthur ]. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher 
Era, 1 904- 1 9 1 9, Volume I: The Road to War, 1 904- 1 9 1 4  (London :  Oxford Univ. Press, 
196 1 ) ,  p .  2 1 2. 
28. See Donald M. Schurman, "Julian Corbett's Influence on the Royal Navy's Percep­
tion of Its Maritime Function," Mahan Is Not Enough : The Proceedings oj a Coriference on the 
Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, James Goldrick (Commander, 
RAN) and John B. Hattendorf, eds. (Newport, R . I . :  Naval War College Press, 1 993) , pp. 
5 1 -63 . 
29. In his introduction to a recendy re-issued version of Some Principles oj Maritime Strategy, 
Eric ]. Grove argues the case for Corbett's influence on the Royal Navy, including assistance 
in the drafting of the 1 9 1 4  Grand Fleet Battle Tactics. See Julian Stafford Corbett, Some Principles 
of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, Md.:  Naval Institute Press, 1 988) , p. xli. 
30.  Barry D. Hunt, "The Strategic Thought of Sir  Julian S. Corbett," Maritime Strategy 
and the Balance of Power, Hattendorf and Jordan, eds. ,  p . 1 1 1 . 
3 1 .  An opinion shared by Knox in "The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare, " pp. 328-9. 
32. "The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have given the Author access to official 
documents in the preparation of this work, but they are in no way responsible for his reading 
or presentation of the facts as stated, " disclaimer found opposite tide page of Sir Julian Stafford 
Corbett, Naval Operations: History of the Great War Based on Qfficial Documents (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co.,  1920) . 
34 
Tritten * Great Britain 
33. Paul Kennedy, "Britain in the first World war, " Military Effectiveness, Volume I: The 
First World War, Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds . (Boston: Unwin Hyman, for 
the Mershon Center, Ohio State Unive rsity, 1 988) , pp. 3 1 -79. 
34. Roski11, The Strategy if Sea Power, pp. 1 01-42 is the basis of the section on World 
War I .  
3 5 .  Stephen Wentworth Roski11 (Captain, RN , Retired) , Naval Policy between the Wars, 
Volume I: The Period of A nglo-A merican Antagonism, 1 9 1 9- 1 929 (London: Collins, 1 968) , p .  
533. 
36. William Koenig, "Coronel and Falkland," in Epic Sea Battles, Mayer, ed. , pp. 1 44-59. 
37.  The search for an heir to Nelson within the Royal Navy can be seen in books such 
as John Horsfield, The Art if Leadership in War: The Royal Navy from the Age if Nelson to the 
End if World War II (Westport, Conn. :  Greenwood Press, 1 980) . A similar search in the U.S. 
Navy is evidenced by Charles Benedict Davenport, Naval Officers: Their Heredity and 
Development (Washington, D.C. : The Carnegie Institution, 1 9 1 9) . 
38. See Owen Rutter, Red Ensign: A History if Convoy (London: Robert Hale, Ltd. , 
1 943) . 
39. "The adoption of convoy, 1917 :  ' Some suggestions for Anti-Submarine Warfare' by 
Major Maurice Hankey, R.M.A.,  Secretary of the War Cabinet, 1 3  February 1 9 1 7 , "  in 
Hattendorf et aI . ,  British Naval Documents, pp. 761-6 .  
40. See especially Peter Baron Hill-Norton (Admiral o f  the Fleet, RN, Retired) and 
John Dekker, Sea Power: A Story if Warships and Naviesfrom Dreadnoughts to Nuclear Submarines 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1 982) , pp. 1 1 8-9, 1 70.  The authors make the case that ave rsion 
to convoying was alive and well in the Royal Navy at the time of the writing. 
4 1 .  See also Daniel A. Baugh, "Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond and the Objects of Sea 
Power" in Mahan Is Not Enough, Goldrick and Hattendorf, eds . ,  pp. 1 3-49. 
42. James Goldrick, (Commander, RAN), "The Irresistible Force and the Immovable 
Obj ect: The Naval Review, the You ng Turks , and the Royal Navy, 1 9 1 1-193 1 "  in Mahan 
Is Not Enough , Goldrick and Hattendorf, eds . ,  pp. 83-1 02. 
43.  Roski11, Naval Policy between the Wars, Volume I, p .  533. 
44. Jon Tetsuro Sumida, " 'The Best Laid Plans': The Development of British Battle-Fleet 
Tactics, 1 9 1 9- 1 942," The International History Review, November 1 992, pp. 661 -700. 
45 . Credit should be given for the use of carrier-based aircraft as long-range strike assets 
in the Mediterranean Fleet exercise of July 1 928. The attacks, however, were against 
"enemy" aircraft carriers and not against the main battle flee£. Similarly, Combined Staff 
exercises and planning during the interwar years included air strikes from the sea against the 
shore. Geoffrey Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy, 1 9 1 4- 1 945: A Historical Su"'ey (Lo ndon: 
Jane 's Publishing Co. , 1 979) , pp. 162-3, 1 66.  
46.  Marc Milner, "Anglo-American Naval Co-operation in the Second World War, 
1 939-45," in Maritime Strategy and the Balatue if Power, Hattendorf and Jordan eds . ,  p .  244; 
and "The protection of trade, 1 937: Memorandum for the Committee of Imperial Defence 
by the Chiefs of Suff Sub-Committee, 2 February 1 937," in Hattendorf et al., British Naval 
Documents, pp. 781-7.  
47 .  Roski11, Naval Policy between the Wars, Volume I, p. 538. 
48. B rian Bond and Williamson Murray, "The British Armed Forces, 1 9 1 8-39," Military 
Effectiveness, Volume II: The Interwar Period, Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds. 
(Bosto n: Unwin Hyman, for the Mershon Center, Ohio State University, 1 988) , pp. 98-1 30. 
49. For an extremely well-developed case study of the difficulty in changing doctri ne , 
see Harold R. Winton, To Change an Anny: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Annored 
Doctrine, 1927- 1938 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1 988) , especially pp. 238-40. 
50. See especially Barry R. Posen, The Sourres if Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and 
Gennany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y . :  Cornell University Press, 1 984) , pp. 1 59-63. 
5 1 .  Williamson Murray, "British Military Effectiveness in the Second World War, " in 
Military Effectiveness, Volume III: The Second World War, Allan R. Millett and Williamson 
Murray, eds. (Boston: Unwin Hyman, for the Mershon Center, Ohio Stale Unive rsity, 
1 988) , p. 1 1 4. 
35 
The Newport Papers 
52. Roskill, The Strategy of Sea Power, pp. 170, 247-8, is the basis of the section on World 
War II .  
53. See James J.  Tritten, "Introduction of Aircraft Carrien into the Royal Navy: Lessons 
for the Development of Naval Doctrine," The Naval Review, July 1994, pp. 260-7; and 
Norman Friedman, Thomas C. Hone, and Mark D. Mandeles, "The Introduction of Carrier 
Aviation into the U.S. Navy and the Ro;yal Navy: Military-Technical Revolutions, 
Organizations, and the Problem of Decision,' draft report prepared for the Director, Net 
Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 12 May 1994, pro l l G-63. 
54. Geoffrey Till, "Airpower and the Battleship in the 1920 s, " in Technical Change and 
British Naval Policy, 1860- 1 939, Bryan Ranft, ed. (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishen, 
Inc . ,  1977) , pp. 108-22; and Bernard Acworth (Captain, RN) , The Navies of Today and 
Tomorrow, (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, Ltd., 1930), especially chapter 14. 
55. "Functions of fleet aircraft, 1936: Admiralty Memorandum on Fleet Air Arm tactics 
and equipment, December 1936," Hattendorf et al. , British Naval Documents, pp. 948-9. 
56. William Koenig, "Matapan," in Epic Sea Battles, Mayer, ed. , pp. 1 82-97; and Martin 
Stephen, "The Battle ofMatapan," in Sea Battles in Close- Up: World War 2, Eric Grove, ed. 
(Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute Press, 1991) ,  pp. 48-69. 
57. Milner, "Anglo-American Naval Co-operation in the Second World War, 1 939-45" 
in Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power, Hattendorf and Jordan, eds., pp. 251-4; and Eliot 
A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Miifortunes: The Anatomy of FailurE' in War (New York: 
The Free Press, 1990), pp. 59-94. 
58. Eric ].  Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War 11 (Annapolis, 
Md.:  1987) ; and Eric Grove and Geoffrey Till, "Anglo-American Maritime Strategy in the 
Era of Massive Retaliation, 1 945-60" and Joel J. Sokolsky, "Anglo-American Maritime 
Strategy in the Era of Flexible Response, 1960-80," both in Maritime Strategy and the Balance 
of Power, Hattendorf and Jordan, eds. ,  pp. 271-303, 304-29. 
59. For example, two manuals were published immediately after the war: Naval Control 
of Shipping in War (1948) and Naval War Manual, B.R. 1806 (1 947) . 
60. These debates should also be seen in the context of Britain attempting to reestablish 
its role in the world as a global and fint-ranking power. Many of the doctrinal debates 
revolved around command. For evidence of the depth of these debates, see the declassified 
papen of Admiral Arleigh Burke found in the Operational Archives of the Naval Historical 
Center. One such example is an undated/osition paper, " United States/United Kingdom 
Differences of Opinion. "  I am indebte t o  Captain Peter Swartz, USN (Retired) for 
providing me with a copy of this paper. 
61 . Naval Staff History [Commander F. Barley and Lieutenant Commander D.W. 
Waten], Second World War, The Defeat of the Enemy AttiJCk upon Shipping, 1939- 1 945: A 
Study in Policy and Operations, Vol. IA (Text and Appendices) B.R. 1 376(51)  ( 1A) ,  and Vol. 
IB (plans and Tables) B.R. 1 376(51) (lB) (London: Admiralty Historical Section, 1957) 
[declassified] ) .  See also "The anti-submarine war, 1 939-45: Appendix 3 of the Report of the 
Maritime Air Defence Committee to the Chiefs of Staff, 3 October 1950," in Hattendorf et 
aI. ,  British Naval Documents pp. 873-5. 
62. Department of the Navy, Lessons of the Falklands, Summary Report, February 1 983. 
63. "The Practical Application of Maritime Doctrine," fint draft, 22 April 1 994; "The 
Foundation of British Maritime Doctrine," second draft, 23 September 1994. 
The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not necessarily represent those 
of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Navy. The author is indebted 
for comments by Eric Grove, Department of Politics, Univenity of Hull; Professor Geoffrey 
Till, Department of History and International Main, Royal Naval College, Greenwich; 
Professor Michael Palmer, East Carolina U nivenity; and Commander James Goldrick, RAN. 
36 
Navy and Military Doctrine in France 
James J. Tritten 
If N A MAJOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCY fought some years ago, in­
lL digenous ground forces converged on a narrow peninsula in the southern 
part of their country, where they cut off part of the army of a foreign occupation. 
The foreign commander had planned to disrupt indigenous transportation from 
a small seaport, anticipating additional support or, if necessary, evacuation by 
sea. His navy was one of the best in the world; the invaded country, which had 
essentially no navy of its own, had sought assistance from France, a major sea 
power. 
France, which had already provided the indigenous forces with combat-ex­
perienced ground officers and modern military equipment, now landed a major 
ground force in the northern part of the country, while her fleet sailed in support 
from a forward-deployed location. The French naval commander detached a 
small portion of his fleet to land additional troops and also to blockade the 
occupied seaport. When the enemy navy forces arrived, they were surprised to 
fmd the numerically superior French. The enemy admiral, who had assumed 
command only recently, was without benefit of having met with his subor­
dinates to outline his personal doctrine or to conduct work-up exercises. 
The French fleet commander, operating within an established navy doctrine, 
knew that if he remained in a defensive posture near the seaport, he would doom 
another French squadron that was due to arrive soon with additional troops, 
artillery, and other supplies. In keeping with his main objective, the French 
commander seized the initiative and tactically maneuvered his forces to meet 
the enemy fleet far enough out to sea to permit the safe arrival of the French 
resupply squadron. The enemy met the French challenge but was unable to gain 
an advantage. The French fleet commander engaged the enemy but husbanded 
his own assets without a serious decisive engagement, keeping the enemy fleet 
"in play" for four days. 
Ships from the French resupply squadron landed their troops and equipment 
safely and then sailed north. embarked coalition ground forces. and brought 
them to the area of the occupied seaport. Coalition forces massed around the 
seaport and engaged in bloody but ultimately successful warfare against an 
entrenched enemy. The enemy capitulated in the face of the repeated assaults 
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and no possible escape or hope for reinforcement. The French fleet maintained 
station and provided security for the victorious coalition forces by deterring a 
second. belated attempt by the enemy to reinforce. resupply. or evacuate forces 
at the seaport. 
The above actions were taken by the French. British (the enemy). and 
Americans (indigenous forces) off the Virginia Capes and at Yorktown in 1 78 1 .  
The United States owes the French Navy a great deal for this military victory 
over Great Britain. which resulted in the independence of the United States. It 
is appropriate. therefore. to review the legacy of the defensive navy and the 
French military doctrine employed during these decisive battles; perhaps there 
is something from which naval forces today can benefit. I 
Doctrine of the plume 
Although most histories of French naval thought begin with the seventeenth 
century. there is at least some record of prior activity. 2 Gilles de Rome. an 
advisor to King Philip IV (the Fair) who ruled from 1285 to 1 3 14. proposed 
some novel tactical ideas in a book entitled De regimine principum .  A much 
later record is the book Debat sur Ie heraut d 'armes ( 1455). which responds to 
English claims to control of the seas. A few decades later. Philippe de Cleves 
published his Instructions sur Ie jait de Ia guerre. which addressed the potential 
of the tempo of artillery fire to dominate tactics in the same way that speed 
affects strategy. and he recommended maneuvering to harass the enemy and 
repel his attack. In 1 5 1 6  (or 1520). Antoine de Conflans published Lesjaisz de 
Ia marine et de 1a navigaie. During the reign of Henry II. from 1 547 to 1 559. 
there appeared Stoionomie (or Traite contenant Ia maniere de dresser, fournir, 
equiper et entretenir en tout temps en bon ordre une armee de mer consacree 
aux galeres). It was. however. with the final expulsion of England from the 
Continent that France began to address the development of its navy in earnest. 
The events ashore that influenced the development of French Navy doctrine 
cannot be overlooked. During the Thirty Years ' War ( 1 6 18- 1 648). in which 
France became the dominant power on the continent of Europe. Marshal Henri 
de la Tour d' Auvergne. Vicomte de Turenne. forced the withdrawal of Holy 
Roman Empire forces from Freiburg and then chose not to exploit the victory 
with a pursuit. In a subsequent encounter, Turenne maneuvered William 
Frederick, the Great Elector of Brandenburg. out of Alsace without engaging 
him in battle.3 Thus the inception of elements of a maneuver warfare philosophy 
in Europe are found in the French military-and later in navy doctrine. 
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Annand Jean du Plessis, Cardinal de Richelieu, the all-powerful Chief 
Minister, beginning in 1 624, was the founder of the pennanent navy of France 
and author of a seminal doctrinal book- Testament politique.4 In 1 626 he 
arranged for himself an appointment as Grand Maitre, chef et surintendant 
general de Ja navigation et commerce de France. Richelieu organized a 
centralized navy from the surviving remnants of feudal France-four inde­
pendent admiralties whose admirals rarely went to sea. Richelieu's efforts 
created a strong corps of administrative officers, the plume (the pen), who had 
more power and influence than the actual body of warfighting seamen-the 
epee, or the sword. The friction between these two types of officers constitutes 
a theme for the study of French Navy doctrine.s 
France was one of the first modern sea powers to examine fonnally past sea 
battles to garner lessons learned. Jean-Baptiste Colbert, under Louis XIV, 
instituted a naval program that took advantage of what the Royal Navy had 
learned in its wars with the Dutch ( 1652-1674) . The French quickly changed 
their preferred tactical fonnations to capitalize on the lessons learned by the 
English in combat. 
Credit for doctrinal development in the French Navy belongs to Admiral 
Anne-Hilarion de Costentin, Comte de Tourville. Tourville proved his charis­
matic combat leadership against the combined English and Dutch fleets at 
Beveziers (Beachy Head) in 1690 and against the large multinational Smyrna 
convoy in 1 693.6 He was the impetus behind the development of the French 
Navy into a modern fighting force. Tourville drilled his fleet into a disciplined 
fonnation that responded to his command. His Signals and Instructions, issued 
before Beveziers, was the first such written French Navy doctrine, and it was 
credited, in part, for his victories. These instructions were reissued and revised 
between 1 69 1  and 1 693. 
The French sailing and fighting instructions, signals, and orders of sailing 
issued by Tourville were superior to those of the English in the area of fleet 
organization and signalling. A strength of the French system was to issue 
separate books for fighting and sailing instructions; in this way, advances in 
one area were not held hostage to the other. Tourville's instructions of 1690 
included an innovative pocket-sized signal book with an index.  English and 
British commanders laler copied and employed successfully some of the French 
sailing fonnations of this era. 
The War of the League of Augsburg (1688-1697) exhausted the French 
treasury, leaving a dearth of resources available for the fleet and for doctrinal 
development. General respect for the fleet also declined tremendously 
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following its defeat at the Battle of La Hougue in 1692 and the subsequent 
slaying of its survivors in full view of the French Anny watching from the shore. 
Because they were unable to invade England, the French chose guerre de 
course-commerce warfare-as their strategy for fleet employment. Guerre 
de course had been favored by two successive ministers of the navy under Louis 
XIV and Louis XV. It also had been the subject of an influential pamphlet, 
Memoire de 1a course (also known as Memoire sur 1a caprerie), by the famous 
engineer Sebastien Le Prestre, Marquis de Vauban. Vauban, a Marshal of 
France (a reward for his work with coastal and northeastern frontier fortifica­
tions), advocated sending small squadrons to raid the rich commercial sea lines 
of communication as a way to replenish the national treasury. His recommen­
dations were highly influential due to his stature in France.7 Vauban's vision, 
however, included neither control of the seas nor contesting control of them. 
To a large degree, war at sea was turned over to privateers, such as the famous 
Jean Bart, who operated successfully under Vauban's doctrine of guerre de 
course. 
Pere Paul Hoste, a professor of mathematics at the Royal Naval College at 
Toulon and a Jesuit priest with twelve years of sea duty and service as a chaplain 
to Tourville, was influenced by the latter to write the first major French 
scholarly book on naval tactics, L 'Art des armees navales ou traite des 
evolutions navales ( 1697).8 This work codified such geometric fleet formations 
as the line ahead, the line abreast, and the line of bearing. Although Hoste's 
emphasis was on precision and control, his book also demonstrated to the officer 
corps what was possible with strict control of limited assets. Hoste addressed 
the respective advantages of fighting from windward and leeward and the 
question of whether a fleet of inferior strength should or could fight, and he 
tried to compare the doctrine of warfare at sea to that of warfare ashore. Hoste 
praised Tourville for his ability to prevent engagements. The Art of Evolutions 
was republished in 1727 and was still being used as a text toward the end of the 
eighteenth century; it was translated into Dutch, Greek, and twice into 
English-being published in London in 1762 and 1 834. 
Although these early French doctrinal efforts reduced the chaos of battle and 
allowed the fleet to fight as a disciplined whole, the administrative officers, the 
plume, biased navy doctrinal development in favor of the more controllable 
defensive. Warfare ashore was influenced by the maneuver warfare philosophy 
and the science of fortifications advanced by Vauban. Warfare at sea was made 
similarly geometric and precise; chance would be eliminated by control. Fight­
ing seamen, those of the epee, held an opposing view. In this aspect of the 
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standing tension between these two types of officers during this period, the 
plume was generally dominant. 
Defense and control, rather than offense and the milie (or close engagement 
at discretion) were stressed, although Hoste did address breaking the enemy's 
line. The English maintained a strict battle line; their perfonnance against the 
combined Franco-Spanish fleet off Malaga in 1704 reaffmned the defensive 
doctrine favoring control, as advocated by Hoste. Facing an economic crisis 
and invasion from the northeast, France laid up its larger ships and returned to 
guerre de course. In a larger sense, guerre de course was a fonn of attrition 
warfare in which pain was to be applied over time rather than in one decisive 
battle, i.e., a war of annihilation. In attrition warfare, a major engagement is not 
sought. 
Although unintentional, these early doctrinal endeavors precluded the initia­
tive of the individual commanders and their ability to seek to profit from 
unexpected opportunities. The French Navy continued to use Tourville's signal 
book and doctrine until the Seven Years' War ( 1756- 1 763) . During that 
conflict, individual fleet commanders began to issue their own local instructions 
to supplement the centralized doctrine. 
French Navy commanders sailing on the offensive against a convoy were 
obligated to capture merchants rather than attempt to sink enemy warships. In 
a major convoy action in October 1707, a French squadron of privateers under 
Rene Duguay-Trouin ignored this doctrinal principle and concentrated its attack 
on the five defending British escorts under Commodore Richard Edwards. 
Although Rene Duguay-Trouin succeeded in sinking a major escort and cap­
turing three of the remaining four, the tactical victory was not complemented 
by achievement of the overall objective. The French only took about ten percent 
of the convoy-some twelve ships. 
In the Battle off Toulon ( 1744), a French fleet, under Admiral La Bruyere 
de Court, successfully escorted a Spanish squadron under Don Jose Navarro 
through a blockading English fleet under Admiral Thomas Mathews. De Court, 
under orders not to fire unless attacked, offered to intennix his ships amongst 
the Spanish. Navarro refused, and although the subsequent tactical engagement 
was indecisive, the Spanish squadron . made its way to Cartagena, where 
Navarro was decorated with the title of Marques de la Victoria. The elderly 
(seventy-eight years old) de Court, on the other hand, was relieved of command 
for leaving the deck with only superficial wounds. 
French Navy doctrine also addressed defensive interactions with mer­
chantmen. Convoy escort commanders were subject to severe penalties for 
deserting the convoy that they were to protect, and merchant shipmasters could 
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be fmed heavily for refusing to sail in convoy. If a friendly convoy could be 
protected with a maneuver rather than ftrepower. this would be done. In battles 
where the French Navy fought to defend convoys. escort commanders and 
captains often fought gallantly. For example. during the Second Battle off Cape 
Finisterre (1747). a signiftcantly smaller escort force under Commodore 
Desherbiers. Marquis de Utenduere. was defeated by Rear Admiral Edward 
Hawke's attack, but his convoy of 250 merchants escaped. The French escort 
under Utenduere damaged the British to such a degree that they could not 
pursue the merchants. Utenduere thus distinguished himself as an inspirational 
combat leader against one of the most aggressive and successful of English 
commanders, even though he did not follow French Navy doctrine precisely. 
Unfortunately. Utenduere's force was France's last combat-experienced con­
voy escort squadron. and its loss diminished France's ability to ensure further 
safe delivery of seabome shipments. Hence. Utenduere's selection of aggres­
sive tactics not in confonnance with doctrine suggests that such departures are 
not necessarily in the best interests of the nation as a whole. however stirring 
their accounts in history books. 
In an interesting interpretation of intemational law. a defensive alliance with 
Spain obligated France to provide warships to Spain during the latter's War of 
Jenkins's Ear (1739-1743) with England. A French squadron of twenty-two 
ships operated essentially as part of the Spanish fleet and convoyed a division 
of Spanish ships to North American waters. This massing of forces, and the 
presence of French warships within them. deterred a British attack. Otherwise 
during this war. France claimed the rights and privileges of a neutral. although 
cooperative interaction between the French and Spanish fleets was extensive 
enough over the years to lead eventually to the development of multinational 
naval doctrine. 
The French fleet at Minorca in 1756 operated in accordance with a defensive 
doctrine for maritime support of ground forces wherein the object of the tactical 
action between fleets was to protect the beachhead and not necessarily to sink 
enemy ships. The French victory under Lieutenant-General Roland-Michel 
Barrin. Marquis de La Galissonniere. was not only a great triumph but resulted 
in major problems that plagued the defeated Royal Navy commander. As a 
result of a campaign for Minorca. 150 transports landed successfully some 
15,000 troops who eventually took the island. Unfortunately. the subsequent 
disaster at Quiberon Bay (1759) once again ended France's dreams to invade 
England and forced her to ftght the remainder of the Seven Years' War at sea, 
off her own shores, on the defensive. 
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Doctrine of the epee 
Under Louis XV's Minister of Marine, Etienne Fran�is, Duc de Choiseul, 
naval doctrine was removed from the province of the plume and brought directly 
under the control of the epee. After assuming the ministry in 176 1 , Choiseul 
issued formal fighting instructions and created a training squadron as well as a 
marine corps modeled after the British. Despite his many reform efforts and 
excellent theories, Choiseul served a reluctant sovereign who had competing 
fmancial and political needs and chose not to bolster the fleet.9 In the absence 
of a vast overseas empire, France turned her attention inward, sentencing her 
fleet to become a force for coastal defense and war by attrition. Raiding was 
once again turned over to privateers. 
The two leading figures in the reforms instituted under Choiseul were 
Sebastien Fran�ois de Bigot, Vicomte de Morogues, and Jean Fran�ois de 
Cheyron, Chevalier du Pavillon. 10 Neither of these officers altered the fun­
damentally defensive nature of French Navy doctrine of war by attrition, and 
both sought to minimize risk. Morogues believed also that combat at sea would 
hardly be decisive in the overall war effort. France's particular geographical 
position made this true at the time. Morogues' bias, however, tended to drive 
naval doctrine further towards the defensive and escape as an honorable 
alternative to battle. 
Morogues put together a textbook for cadets of the academy at Brest. 
Tactique navale ou traite des evolutions et des signaux ( 1 763), which was 
published after the end of the Seven Years' War, contained the ideas that had 
been circulating among the officer corps for some time. Although modeled 
somewhat upon Hoste's work, Morogues wrote as a naval officer for naval 
officers, and his tactical ideas tended to be more practical than theoretical. 
Morogues' signalling system was far more complete than any other in practice. 
Interestingly, he accepted the role of elan, bravery, and experience as necessary 
ingredients for success when a smaller force faced a larger one. He even 
accepted the concept of outflanking and breaking the enemy battle line, al­
though only in special cases where one had a superior force or where it was 
necessary to seize easy targets or to exploit a break in the line created by the 
enemy. 
Morogues' combat experiences at Quiberon Bay ( 1759) reinforced his strong 
bias in favor of the defensive form of warfare and control and his belief in the 
futility of actions between forces of equal strength. Morogues argued that one 
should mass strength against weakness. Unfortunately, for a variety of political, 
economic, and cultural reasons, French governments did not normally envision 
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supporting a fleet that would be able to face the Royal Navy on an equal basis, 
regularly. 
Tactique navale ou traite des evolutions et des signaux was published 
privately and was not in confonnance with the official French Navy signal book. 
Though it was reprinted once, translated by the British, and published in 
Holland in 1779, it is difficult to establish how much impact it had on combat 
in the French fleet. Yet Morogues' book must have had influence there; it was 
a textbook at the academy, was widely read, and reinforced an emerging 
appreciation for innovation during battle and the idea that control and defense 
were the answers to British offensive power. 
Captain Jacques Bourde de Villehuet, an officer in the service of the French 
East India Company, wrote I.e manoeuvrier ou essai sur la thiorie et la pratique 
des mouvements du navire et des evolutions navales in 1765 . This book included 
sections on the preparation of the crew for battle, boarding tactics, engaging 
enemy ships, and shifting from sailing formations used during transit to those 
employed in battle. 1 1  It was published in several editions and was translated 
into English and Dutch. Another 1765 publication, Ordonnance du roi, also 
emphasized control in reference to local freedom of action. 
The second leading figure during the Choiseul reforms was Jean Fran�ois 
du Cheyron, Chevalier du Pavilion. Pavilion developed a set of signals that was 
accepted by the French Navy following two meetings of flag officers. one in 
1773 and the other in 1775. The signals were given trial during fleet exercises, 
published in 1776. and authorized for fleet use in 1778. But. individual com­
manders apparently were given the option to adopt them or not, as in the Royal 
Navy. 
French Navy doctrine formula was to "exercise rigid tactical control over 
their fleets throughout the whole action by means of an excellent system of 
signals. The French used one particular flag to represent each digit. and by 
hoisting combinations of flags could quickly indicate any signal in the num­
bered signal book. " 1 2  The French made a science of naval warfare. creating an 
incredibly complex system of manuals and accompanying signal books that 
were retained until after the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Unfortunately. the 
direction of the battle signals available was not towards the actual defeat of the 
enemy fleet. 
The French victory under the command of Admiral Louis Guillouet. Comte 
d'Orvilliers, at Ushant ( 1778) over Admiral Augustus Keppel. provides an 
excellent opportunity to review the effectiveness of existing doctrine in 
both navies. Keppel operated under the centralized Royal Navy fighting 
instructions, supplemented by his own. D 'Orvilliers used instructions prepared 
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and influenced by his chief of staff, the Chevalier du Pavilion. Keppel engaged 
d'Orvilliers without first having properly fonned a battle line, and the resulting 
attack was ragged. The French fought generally on the defensive, and their 
immediate objective was to impair enemy mobility by damaging masts and sails 
rather than taking prizes. D'Orvilliers achieved this, generally getting the better 
of the British. Keppel and one of his subordinates were court-martialed after 
the battle for, essentially, failing to do their utmost, but both were found 
innocent. The same complaint could have been lodged against d'Orvilliers, 
since French mobility was impaired to a much lesser extent, but the French 
seemed less inclined than the British to initiate legal proceedings following lost 
or indecisive battles. 
A combined French and Spanish fleet operated during 1 779 to gain control 
of the English Channel. Overall commmand was exercised by d 'Orvilliers, who 
issued a newly revised set of signals and instructions for use in both fleets-in 
effect, multinational navy doctrine. Although the fleets had not operated 
together previously, some Spanish ships were eventually able to act success­
fully as integral parts of French squadrons in addition to forming their own 
national squadron of observation, which would join the battle once the enemy 
was engaged. Other attempts to combine assets, such as in the Caribbean, were 
less successful. 
French naval command was, at times, given to anny officers. Jean-Baptiste 
Charles Henri Hector Theodat, Comte d 'Estaing, an infantry officer during the 
Seven Years' War, was promoted to lieutenant-general, and he was sub­
sequently and simultaneously appointed governor-general of San Domingo and 
the first Chef d'Escadre des Annees Navales (commodore). At the Battle of 
Grenada ( 1 779), his opponent, Vice Admiral the Honorable John Byron, failed 
in an offensive attack, leaving himself vulnerable to counterattack or destruc­
tion of his convoy. The Comte d'Estaing, in tum, failed to use his superiority 
and seize upon the opportunity, being content to have prevented the British from 
landing troops. Regular French Navy officers, such as then-Captain Pierre 
Andre, Bailli de Suffren-Saint Tropez, criticized this decision and the resulting 
inaction. 
Failure to capitalize on their superior ability to control their forces and order 
them to respond promptly to signals was demonstrated during Commodore 
Destouches ' victory over Admiral Mariott Arbuthnot off the Virginia Capes in 
March 1 78 1 .  Destouches blunted a British attack on his ships, broke off, and 
withdrew from the shores of Virginia rather than exploit fully the victory or 
land troops destined to support Major General Marie Paul Roch Yves Gilbert 
Motier, Marquis de Lafayette. Destouches was subsequently criticized at court, 
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and by some of his officers. At the end of the battle, Arbuthnot's forces 
remained between the French ships and Virginia. 
The same criticism could have been levied against Rear Admiral Fran�ois 
Joseph Paul, Comte de Grasse-Tilly (another former army officer), who 
maneuvered boldly from the Caribbean to the Virginia Capes (September 
178 1),  but in his subsequent victory over Admiral Lord Thomas Graves, failed 
to act in a daring manner during the first day of the Battle of the Saints ( 1 782) . 
Of course, Admiral Lord George Brydges Rodney's failure to exploit the 
victory over de Grasse on the second day of the battle is the subject of 
controversy and proof that this problem was not limited to only one navy. 
Despite his subsequent humiliation due to his losses and capture at the Battle 
of the Saints, Admiral de Grasse is remembered by a grateful America for his 
support and success off the Virginia Capes and its resulting impact on coalition 
military operations ashore at Yorktown. 
The one French Navy officer in whom both sides acknowledged an innova­
tive, offensive fighting spirit was Pierre Andre, Bailli de Suffren-Saint Tropez. 
Then-Commodore Suffren engaged in a series of five battles against Admiral 
Sir Edward Hughes in the East Indies between 1782 and 1783. Suffren, admired 
as one of the greatest tactical innovators of naval history, is generally credited 
as the first to order his captains to attempt to break the enemy's battle line-al­
though in fact this had been done earlier by de Grasse, under whom the Balli 
de Suffren had served. Suffren issued both written and verbal plans before each 
battle-sometimes exhorting his captains to do the best that they could under 
the circumstances. His personality, however, lacked the magnetism of Admiral 
Lord Horatio Nelson, nor did he command the devotion of his men as did 
Tourville. When necessary, Suffren replaced less effective captains with those 
who were bolder, but there is also no indication that he devoted a great deal of 
time to the preparation of formal standing fighting instructions. 
Because his Indian Ocean squadron was of limited size and was essentially 
on its own without the ability to count on reinforcements or replacements of its 
battle losses, Suffren was forced to be content with the immediate tactical 
victory. Hence, he was compelled to forgo the exploitation phase of battle in 
order to conserve assets. 13  Upon returning to France, Suffren was promoted, 
rightly, to vice admiral, but one should recall that he never commanded a great 
battle fleet. 
With its major victories over the British at Ushant and in the American War 
of Independence, France rested comfortably on the success of its naval doctrine 
and signals. Essentially, Pavilion's system seemed vindicated, and new 
doctrinal development now slowed considerably. All subsequent signal books 
46 
Tritten * France 
were further adaptations of the existing system. Naval commissions were 
fonned to study the question of signals, and they reported that there was no 
need for further development. Two tactical books that appeared in 1787, 
Memoire sur la tactique navale by Commodore Verdun de la Crenne and 
Tactique navale by Captain Buor de la Charouliere, advanced no new ideas in 
doctrine. 
There were a few exceptions to this general rule, such as L 'art de la guerre 
sur mer, ou tactique navale ( 1 787) by Chef de Division (commodore) Iurien, 
Vicomte de Grenier, a short book about navy tactics that did advance some new 
concepts. 14 This succinct work is based upon combat experience and is very 
much oriented towards battle, not control. Grenier stressed massing strength 
against weakness, much as had Morogues. He exposed the weaknesses of the 
French line-ahead battle plan, attributing its successes to British ineptitude 
rather than to the virtue of this fonnation. Despite some rather innovative 
suggestions for tactical disposition of the fleet, L 'art de la guerre sur mer, ou 
tactique navale was still essentially biased toward defense and wars of attrition. 
Although this book was written by a serving admiral, it had little impact on the 
French Navy. It was translated within a year into English, into Dutch in 1 799, 
and it was apparently used by the Spanish. 
Another exception that advanced new ideas in doctrine was Tactique navale, 
ou traite sur les evolutions, sur les signaux et sur les mouvements de guerre 
( 1 788) by Admiral Clause Fran90is, Comte d' Amblimont. Tactique navale was 
also based upon combat experience but stressed innovation; d' Amblimont 
promoted breaking the fleet into separate pelotons, or tactical groups, with 
different functions. Subsequently Nelson used this device successfully at 
Trafalgar ( 1 805). Tactique navale advocated the unrestricted offensive, but this 
opinion was not shared by the fleet officers. 
Generally, French Navy doctrine during the years of war with Great Britain 
was such that the objective of an engagement with enemy ships was to cripple 
their mobility. IS Although this doctrine would result perhaps in fewer shots per 
engagement, it usually would not result in the elimination of the subsequent 
threat. British warships were neither taken prize nor sunk, thus allowing their 
subsequent refitting and eventual return to battle. According to French doctrine, 
the ultimate purpose of naval warfare was not necessarily to engage enemy 
ships. Indeed, a leeward escape to fight another day was an honorable alterna­
tive to battle. The overall strategy was to expand control over new areas of the 
globe rather than to contest other European powers in battles at sea. There were 
obvious exceptions to the rule, and in fact some British commanders used the 
French model rather than attempt to capture or destroy the enemy. 
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French tactics were nonnally to fight on the leeward side and fire their 
cannon on the upswell so as to maximize "mobility kills" by damage to masts 
and rigging rather than attempt to sink the ship by aiming at the hull. For the 
most part, except when led by Suffren, the French Navy fought from the 
defensive when engaging an enemy fleet of equal strength. The French Navy 
thus adopted a doctrine of battle avoidance and war by attrition. When coupled 
with their generally better built ships, sound training, and a well-fonned tactical 
line, the French frequently bettered the more offensive Royal Navy who sought 
the decisive engagement. As discussed above, these successes included: Beachy 
Head (B6veziers) in 1 690; the Second Battle off Cape Finisterre in 1 747; 
Minorca in 1 756; Ushant in 1 778; and the Virginia Capes in September 1 78 1 .  
French naval writings during the years of war with Britain included many of 
the sophisticated doctrinal issues that were being debated in all navies. One 
issue was the question of correct placement of the fleet commander. Should the 
admiral ride in the van, at the center, in a heavily anned ship of the line or in a 
fast frigate? Shifting the flag to a frigate had been tried by British Admiral Lord 
Richard Howe off Rhode Island in 1778, and Admiral Sir George Rodney did 
the same off Martinique in 1780. Following the capture of de Grasse at the 
Saints ( 1782), French Navy doctrine was changed to require that commanders 
in chief fight from frigates; a flag officer embarked in a frigate could see better 
and his signals could be seen better. Fighting from a frigate resembled the 
placement of the general officer overlooking the battlefield. The policy was 
later abandoned by the new government. 
Although naval doctrine under the French monarchy was extremely 
thorough, it was biased by factors beyond the control of naval officers. Tech­
nology remained essentially the same during this era, and the major modifica­
tions to doctrine were based upon geography, strategic culture, available 
resources, and government policy. The impending change in the type of 
government was to have a dramatic impact on naval doctrine, including the loss 
of rich tradition and lessons learned by monarchist navy officers who had paid 
for their lessons in blood. 
Doctrinal Collapse with the First Republic 
As the French became preoccupied internally with their own revolution in 
1789 and its aftennath, neither the aristocratic officer corps (Ie grand corps) nor 
the new Republican leadership was overly concerned with advancing the fmer 
points of naval doctrine. Many of the good ideas proposed by Grenier and 
d' Amblimont had simply arrived at the wrong time, and many of the valuable 
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lessons were lost on the guillotine. Instead, the navy of the Republic went to 
war in 1793 using the basic naval doctrine of the ancien regime against the 
British, who had been experimenting and exercising their new tactical doctrine, 
based in part on the innovations advanced in the dying days of the French 
monarchy. Similarly, doctrinal development ashore stagnated, and the French 
Army preserved the same drill regulations until 183 1 .  Even Napoleon 
Bonaparte's army used the regulations of 1 79 1 . 16 
What the navy of the Republic lacked in doctrinal development, it made up 
for in spirit. The Battle of the Thirteenth Prairial in 1 794 (known in Britain as 
the Glorious First of June) was one of the greatest convoy battles in naval 
history. Rear Admiral Louis Thomas, Comte de Villaret de Joyeuse, com­
manded the Brest fleet in an engagement some four hundred miles out to sea. 
Villaret de Joyeuse's objective was to ensure the safe arrival of a 1 30-ship 
convoy with supplies from America. The loss of the Brest fleet was an 
acceptable price to pay for the safe arrival of this convoy. To his credit, Villaret 
de Joyeuse accepted combat against the well-trained and recently exercised 
Channel Fleet under Lord Howe, one of the most skillful tacticians then in 
command. Although the Brest fleet was severely mauled during the battle, it 
succeeded in the overall objective and gave an extremely good accounting of 
itself. Despite his losses and his being of noble birth, Villaret de Joyeuse was 
neither court-martialed nor guillotined. 17 
On the other hand, in one of his subsequent engagements with the British, 
Villaret de Joyeuse, with the bulk of the Brest fleet off Belle lie in 1 795, failed 
to capitalize on a clear advantage over a British squadron. He allowed himself 
to be bluffed by the British commander, Rear Admiral Sir William Cornwallis. 
Within one week, Villa ret de Joyeuse suffered a humiliating defeat, the 
debandade de Groix off the tie de Groix. Clearly the French Navy was to pay 
a heavy price for the loss of an institutional ability to advance how it would 
fight in war. This era marks the low point of the French Navy. 
By the end of 1 795, the Committee of Public Safety resolved that the navy 
would henceforth send out only small divisions, whose goals would be guerre 
de course and raiding distant colonies. With this official government policy 
accepted subsequently even by Napoleon, doctrinal development could not help 
being affected. Navy reforms were initiated under a former royalist lieutenant, 
now Minister of Marine, Vice Admiral Jean Fran�ois Truguet. But all reforms 
were within the context of the assumed role of raiding-not major fleet 
engagements. 
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The Napoleonic Era 
Much has been written about the French loss at the Battle of Aboukir Bay, 
also known as the Battle of the Nile ( 1798). Suffice it to say that Vice Admiral 
Fran�ois Paul Brueys d' Aigai1liers demonstrated that he did not know how to 
fight at anchor, thus indicating a basic failure in doctrinal understanding and 
development. In his correspondence with Napoleon, Brueys expressed in­
decision over whether to fight at anchor or under sail if attacked. Brueys' ships 
could have formed into a stronger defensive position and amassed firepower 
against the attack; anchored closer together; loaded their guns on both sides; 
and opened fire at maximum rather than minimum range. His captains lacked 
necessary experience and there was no doctrine to address these tactical issues. 
In 1 802, a former naval officer, Audibert Ramatuelle, published a major book 
on naval tactics, Cours eLementaire de tactique navale, didii a Bonaparte. IS 
To his credit, Ramatuelle analyzed Nelson's success at Aboukir. Unfortunately, 
he did not take advantage of the lessons of the d 'Orvilliers at Ushant and Suffren 
in the East Indies or the writings of Grenier and d' Amblimont (although he did 
embrace d' Amblimont's concept of the peloton). Ramatuelle stated that the 
central point of war was to hold land rather than to capture enemy ships; this 
reflected the strategic culture of France and its inability to come to grips with 
how to defeat Great Britain. Napoleon saw victory as a result of defeating the 
enemy 's army rather than defeating the enemy 's center of gravity. 
A major result of the French Revolution was that it showed that men could 
be motivated to fight for an idea and that such men could be fielded into armies 
in numbers never before seen. With such numbers, commanders now had new 
tactical, operational, and strategic opportunities. I9 Although this was obvious 
in warfare ashore, it was not so clear at sea. 
Napoleon's expertise in naval matters certainly is subject to question. His 
ill-fated plan to invade England in 1 80 1  would probably have proved disastrous 
if attempted. There had been no serious doctrinal development for such an 
undertaking, since there had been no effort even to build a force that could 
contest the Royal Navy for control of the Channel. Even the types of craft 
selected for the invasion crossing were not the most seaworthy. The subsequent 
expedition to San Domingo was a success from the perspective of the navy 
covering force, but a military disaster ashore. When Napoleon became aware 
of the crude submarine that had been designed by the American Robert Fulton, 
his admirals dismissed it as uncivilized. 
By August 1805, however, Napoleon apparently had learned what was 
required. He ordered his various fleets to sea and instructed them to join together 
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but to avoid combat until they had massed-keeping in mind the ultimate 
objective. The renewed plans to invade England were frustrated by Vice 
Admiral Pierre Charles lean-Baptiste Silvestre, Comte de Villeneuve, who was 
commanding the largest fleet that was to support the transport force. Villeneuve 
had been engaged in extensive operations in which he sought to avoid engaging 
the British while he sought union with the rest of the French fleet. The British 
had maneuvered a large force in the Channel, and because Villeneuve felt that 
he could not possibly succeed in contesting control there, he was less than timely 
in his response to support the Grande Annee. When presented with false 
information about the location and strength of the British, Villeneuve aban­
doned the field and sailed to Cadiz. Without naval support, Napoleon turned 
his back to the sea and his attention to Continental enemies. 
To understand the subsequent actions of the combined Franco-Spanish Fleet 
at the Battle of Trafalgar ( 1 805), we must keep in mind the objective of its 
commander. Villeneuve was under orders to sortie from Cadiz, join with ships 
at Cartagena, and transport embarked troops to support an attack on Naples­
Napoleon having now abandoned his invasion of England. Villeneuve knew 
that Nelson awaited him, but nothing in his order said that he was to engage or 
defeat the British fleet. Nelson was viewed as an obstacle to be overcome rather 
than an object with which he had to deal. 
Villeneuve was a brave man, but he also understood the limitations of the 
combined fleet in training and the quality of its ships.2o His misgivings were 
shared by officers in both fleets, as they met in a pre-battle council of war. 
Villeneuve, who held the advantage of being able to observe Nelson's block­
ading, chose to emerge from the harbor when a squadron of British ships were 
detached for logistical duties. The combined fleet commander thought, incor­
rectly, he had the numerical advantage over Nelson and had even organized a 
separate squadron of observation from what he believed to be his excess. 
Villeneuve's final instructions, issued on the day of the battle, foretold accurate­
ly Nelson's tactics but did not provide advice on how to combat them.2 1  In short, 
French Navy doctrine did not have constructive guidance to offer him. 
Once at sea, Villeneuve failed to provide for tactical reconnaissance and 
gained essentially no significant information on Nelson's actual strength until 
the morning of the battle when he hastily reintegrated the observation squadron 
into the main fleet. A series of poorly executed signals and missed opportunities 
doomed the combined fleet to fight on the defensive. Villeneuve even issued a 
general signal: "Every ship which by her present position was not engaging [is] 
to take any such steps as would bring her as promptly as possible into action. "22 
In the hands of Nelson's captains, such a signal would have had meaning. For 
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the combined fleet, the lack of combined doctrine, training, and sound ships 
made the signal only an interesting footnote to history. The footnote is all the 
more curious because, since the signal was addressed to no one in particular, 
neither the French nor Spanish captains took any action based upon it. There is 
no question, however, of the bravery of the men of the combined fleet who 
fought at Trafalgar with honor. 
The End of the Age of Sail 
Following the defeat at Trafalgar, Napoleon ordered the fleet to resume 
guerre de course and overseas raiding. Privateers supplemented the standing 
fleet initially, which did attempt to engage the British in distant operations being 
fought over colonies and which also occasionally fought the Royal Navy in 
home waters. A few tactical-level defensive victories did little to stem the tide 
of ruin under Napoleon. Sailors from the Brest fleet were landed to serve with 
the army, and even commerce-raiding efforts were unsuccessful. Despite 
Napoleon's dismissal of the Battle of Trafalgar, he ordered the following words 
to be painted prominently aboard surviving French men-of-war: "France ex­
pects that every man will do his duty.,,23 
The French introduced their own version of the British telegraph system in 
1 8 1 3  as a supplement to the official signal book. In 1 8 15,  a French Navy 
lieutenant, the Chevalier de la Rouvraye, published the Traiti sur I 'art des 
combats de mer, advocating a true offensive spirit and stressing the respon­
sibilities of the individual captain to carry on the battle even if outnumbered. 
Unfortunately, the book arrived in an era when the new governments questioned 
even the need for a navy. In 1 8 19, the newly restored monarchy published a 
new signal book reinstating the traditional signals of Pavilion and Morogues. 
In that same year, Father de Pradt published an Appel a La nationfranfaise au 
sujet de sa marine, in which he concluded that the downfall of the French empire 
was due to wasting resources on the navy. In 1 8 19 the government decided to 
support a navy-but the overall employment of the fleet would be guerre de 
course. 
In 1 82 1 ,  a French artillery officer, General Henri Joseph Paixhans, wrote 
Idies pour Ie blindage du baneries jlonantes, advocating modem ironclads 
mounting only a few large guns. In 1 822, he wrote Nouvelle force maritime, 
which recommended the quick building of a modem steam navy that would 
render Britain's existing fleet irrelevant. In the Journal des sciences militaires, 
a series of articles by a naval commander, Jacques Merigon de Montgery, 
proposed ships of iron with watertight compartments as well as the use of mines, 
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torpedoes, and submarines. These ideas were well ahead of their time, and they 
had no effect on fleet building programs. 
Some twelve years after Waterloo, a French squadron fought side-by-side 
with British and Russian squadrons in an overwhelming and decisive defeat 
of the Turks at Navarino ( 1 827). The Turkish fleet, commanded by 
Admiral Ibrahim Pasha (with the advise of a group of French Navy officers 
led by Captain Jean-Marie Letellier) was anchored in fixed, semicircular 
defensive formation. The Europeans fought a mobile offensive under written 
orders that were identical to Nelson's at Trafalgar, and at the end of the battle, 
sixty Turkish ships had been destroyed without the loss of a single European 
ship. 
Rear Admiral Jean Baptiste Grivel explained his concepts for fleet doctrine 
in his 1 832 Considerations navales en reponse d la brochure de Monsieur de 
Pradt. Gri vel was one of the first to attempt to deal with the overall concept of 
maritime power. His recommendations, however, followed existing govern­
ment policies-guerre de course. Grivel stated that this would strike at the heart 
of British power. It was a doctrine of necessity, since it was clearly foolhardy 
to meet the Royal Navy head-on in a decisive battle. Then-Lieutenant Louis­
Narcisse Chopart prepared a tactical textbook for sailing ships in 1 839, which 
was translated into English in 1 859 and used at the U.S.  Naval Academy. 
The French military, in general, has always considered elan to be one of its 
national strengths and incorporated fighting spirit into its military and naval 
doctrine. The wars of the age of sail, however, indicated that spirit alone will 
not compensate for material and training deficiencies. Early doctrinal decisions 
to fight at sea reflected disdain for the crude broadside employed by the British; 
unfortunately, the alternative method of more specific attacks and attempts at 
mobility kills did not always yield the desired results. On the other hand, a 
doctrine that included escape as an option allowed for some advantages over 
the British, whose formal doctrine was biased in favor of avoiding defeat. 
Doctrine in the Age of hmovation and the Ironclad 
The pioneering work of Stanislas Dupuy de LOme in the 1 840s served to 
introduce the ironclad into the world's navies. The first screw-driven ship of 
the line participated in the multinational naval operations in the Black Sea 
during the Crimean War ( 1 853- 1 856). This war also stimulated French 
development of rifled artillery. Naval attention returned to fleet engagements, 
due to the Peace of Paris which outlawed privateering, thereby turning French 
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Navy emphasis away from guerre de course. After much effort. La Gloire. an 
open-ocean steam battleship. was launched in 1 859. 
Admiral Louis Bouet-Wittaumez wrote a series of publications that 
pioneered advances in French Navy doctrine. His Batailles de terre et de mer 
( 1 855) was attached to a project de tactique navale-outlining provisional 
tactics for screw-propelled steamships. This doctrine included ensuring a 
superior force with a combined effort at the decisive point. Bouet-Willaumez 
annexed to his book a plan of attack with eight main orders. 
Bouet-Willaumez's work was then adopted by the Ministry of Marine under 
the doctrinal title. Provisory tactics ( 1 857) . The Ministry also published Tacti­
que navale that same year. outlining doctrine for ships of sail and steam. 
Tactique navale was an official naval doctrinal publication whose contents 
junior officers were expected to master for promotion examinations. Bouet­
Willaumez's new doctrine was tested in the fleet. reviewed by the Ministry of 
Marine. and officially sanctioned in a new signal book in 186 1 .  Admiral 
Bouet-Willaumez was well-experienced with the fleet-he finished his service 
as commander in chief. 
These early doctrinal writings followed. rather than led. the introduction of 
new technologies. They were paralleled by the Second Empire, under Napoleon 
ill; the emperor kept his naval programs in check so as not to irritate the British, 
who dominated at sea. In 1 863 an experimental submarine was developed but 
abandoned due to technical difficulties. In 1 864 Russian Admiral Gregoire 
Boutakov published a book on naval tactics which was translated by a French 
Navy officer and then published by the French Ministry of Marine for domestic 
use under the title Nouvelle bases de tactique navale. In 1 866 the Revue 
Maritime et Coloniale provided an unofficial forum for the discussion of new 
doctrine and other naval matters outside of official circles. 
Bouet-Willaumez's writings, such as his Tactique supplementaire d l 'usage 
d 'une flotte cuirassee ( 1 865), had an impact outside of the French Navy. 24 
Similarly, the offensive tactics of Austrian Rear Admiral Wilhelm von Teget­
thoff in 1 866 off the island of Lissa (now Vis) in the Adriatic, in the first battle 
between annored fleets, had an impact on the doctrinal development of the 
French Navy. Admiral Jurien de la Graviere took command of the squadron of 
evolution (charged with tactical development) in 1 868, and after studying the 
Lissa battle he embraced the ram, the milie, as well as the "charge" employed 
by Nelson at Trafalgar and by Tegetthoff at Lissa. There was a worldwide 
debate as to which was supreme, the ram or the gun, with virtually every major 
navy embracing the ram. 
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Naval operations in support of other overseas major regional contingencies 
generally followed the pattern of the Crimean War.2S The navy's role was to 
transport troops to foreign locations, ensure their resupply, and participate in 
blockades and attacks on fortifications. With no enemy at sea and operations 
confmed to the littoral, there was little glory in duty at sea, although the French 
fleet in 1 870 was the second most powerful in the world. Defeat during the 
Franco-Prussian War ( 1 870- 1 87 1), in which sailors again served ashore as 
ground forces and received national recognition for their efforts, turned French 
military concerns back toward land warfare. After all, how could the fleet obtain 
the return of the lost provinces? 
La grande guerre versus jeune ecole 
French doctrinal development during the mid-to-late 1 800s continued to 
include the peloton and to form tactical groups as parts of larger fleets. In the 
1 890s, France led the world in the development of the submarine as a practical 
weapon of war. The naval ministry supported research into alternative methods 
of contesting British domination of the seas. The French submarine Narval was 
launched in 1 899, whereas the British Admiralty did not place orders for 
submarines until 190 1 .  On the other hand, although the submarine received 
development in France, its full potential was not recognized. At ftrst it was 
thought of as a submerging torpedo boat suitable for coastal defense. French 
Navy matters turned to expansion of the empire and to military operations other 
than war. 
French naval thought flourished again at the end of the nineteenth and 
beginning of the twentieth centuries.26 After years of defeat by the British, the 
legacy of a defensive navy doctrine, and preference for guerre tk course and 
attrition warfare over warfare of annihilation and decisive battle, the French 
Navy considered some different ideas. Its Ecole superieure tk guerre tk La 
Marine-the French Naval War College-was founded in 1 895. La grande 
guerre concept, favoring the decisive battle and deep-sea warfare (guerre tk 
haute mer) in order to achieve command of the sea, was the centerpiece of a 
number of French Navy offtcers' writings in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. 
Writings that supported La grande guerre included: Admiral Jurien de la 
Graviere, "La marine aujourdhui," Journal o/the RUSI (Royal United Services 
Institute for Defence Studies), 1 874; Vice Admiral Gabriel Darrieus, La guerre 
sur mer ( 1 907);27 and then-Commander Rene Daveluy, Etutk sur La strategie 
navale ( 1 905), Lefons de La guerre russo-japonaise, La Iutte pour I ' empire tk 
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/a mer ( 1 906) and L '  esprit de /a guerre navale in three volumes ( 1 909- 19 1 0).28 
These writings paralleled those of the American Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer 
Mahan. Although they were not official doctrine, they fonned a point of 
departure for official debates over navy doctrine and programming. The 
mainstream of thought by the French naval officer corps supported concepts 
found in these writings. 
The Naval Banle: Studies of the Tactical Factors ( 1 9 1 0),  by Lieutenant 
Adrien Edouard Baudry, was translated into English for use by American and 
Royal Navy officers. Indeed, the writings of Darrieus, Daveluy, and Baudry 
were provided to ships' libraries by the U.S.  Navy Department. Unfortunately, 
thought about /a grande guerre and /a guerre de haute mer found a skeptical 
audience following the defeat of France in 1 870- 1 87 1  in a war wherein sea 
power was clearly secondary. 
An alternative view was championed by another group of officers and 
civilian thinkers whose movement became known as the jeune ecole. These 
were, primarily, Vice Admiral Baron Richild Grivel (son of Rear Admiral Jean 
Baptiste Grivel), De /a guerre maritime avant et depuis les nouvelles inventions, 
etude historique et strategique ( 1 869); Admiral Hyacinthe-Laurent-Theophile 
Aube, La guerre maritime et les portsfranfais ( 1 882), A terre et a bord, notes 
d'un marin (1884). and De /a guerre navale (1 885); the journalist Gabriel 
Channes, La reforme de /a marine ( 1 886); Commander Gabriel Fontin (pseu­
donym H. Montechant) and Lieutenant Paul Vignot (pseudonym Commandant 
Z). &sai de strategie navale ( 1 893). The jeune ecole did not represent 
mainstream naval thought and should be interpreted as a temporary sidetrack 
resulting from the introduction of, and opportunities afforded by, new tech­
nologies in an austere fISCal environment. 
The jeune ecole argued that capital ships were becoming vulnerable with 
advances in technology and that a well-designed fleet of inexpensive commerce 
raiders could strike at the heart of British (an assumed enemy) prosperity and 
cause British shippers and manufacturers to demand peace from their govern­
ment. Coastal defenses should also be emphasized. Pertinent historical navy 
battles were offered to prove the inadvisability of contesting a superior force at 
sea in /a grande guerre and /a guerre de haute mer. Grivel in particular argued 
that naval battles at sea were rarely decisive for the overall war effort as were 
many ground battles. 
The jeune ecole must also be understood in the context of the political and 
economic situation at the time. French governments lacked the political impera­
tive to devote significant resources to the fleet. Professional officers like Aube 
and Grivel were trying to develop concepts of operations based upon these 
56 
Tritten * France 
political and fISCal realities?9 Grivel understood especially that his government 
would be unwilling to compete with the British in naval force structure and was 
looking for an alternative theory for support for the fleet. 30 Naturally govern­
ments were attracted to doctrinal developments that promised the required 
political objectives at low cost. 
The doctrine of the jeune ecole was offensive (at the tactical level), but the 
associated force structure was much less capable than that required for guerre 
de haute mer. The new high-speed torpedo boat epitomized the type of ship 
conceived of by thejeune ecole. As Minister of Marine, Aube argued that these 
torpedo boats could sortie from port and attack British ships in their own 
harbors, thus making squadron engagements between main battle forces more 
successful. These smaller ships were to be used as well in coastal defense 
(guerre de cote) -indeed defense of France from blockade by the Royal Navy 
was the major objective of fleet engagements. Aube also had great hopes for 
guerre de course both to scatter the Royal Navy, making possible squadron­
sized engagements near France, and to strike at the basis of British power. 
Essentially Aube argued that France should take advantage of new technologies 
and that the fleet's doctrine should be based upon a division of labor.3 1  
With such a force, an offensive capability at the operational or strategic levels 
of warfare was impossible. If France were to fight a war of revenge against 
Germany (another assumed enemy), it would be fought primarily on land. 
France began to build torpedo boats and a system of bases on the northern and 
southern shores of the western Mediterranean. Admiral Aube's vision was that 
of a far-flung network of French bases, all linked by the Panama Canal being 
built by French engineers.32 Since the French Navy had been the administrator 
of most overseas colonies, the views of the jeune ecole were thus entirely 
consistent with existing government policy. At the height of the influence of 
the jeune ecole, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia abandoned 
their battleship-building programs and even the British Admiralty appeared 
embarrassed by its continued development of large surface vessels. 
During the thirty years between 1 87 1  and 1 90 1 ,  France had thirty ministers 
of marine. With such changes in government, consensus on a coherent naval 
program was extremely difficult, as was agreement on "how to fight" doctrine. 
After some thirty years of debate, wild oscillations in government policies, and 
a shift in the threat from the British to the Germans, Italians, or Russians, the 
French government settled on the need to contest command of the sea by 
engaging an enemy battle fleet and then conducting operations against the 
enemy shoreline. 
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France's need for a high seas fleet was validated by its embarrassment during 
the Fashoda Incident ( 1898), the Gennan naval building program, the un­
reliability and vulnerability of the less expensive forces demonstrated in fleet 
maneuvers, and the experiences of Russia and Japan in the Battle of Tsushima 
(1905). In addition, the low-cost option was coupled entirely to a single scenario 
that fell apart in the face of a multitude of possible enemies and missions. Vice 
Admiral Fran�ois-Emest Fournier dissented from this approach in La flotte 
necessaire: ses avantages strategiques, tactiques et economiques ( 1 896), argu­
ing that the battleship itself need not be built to obtain sea control, but that larger 
torpedo boats and armored cruisers would suffice. Official naval doctrine soon 
returned under the influence of Admiral Gabriel Darrieus and professional 
officers attached to the tcok superieure de guerre de Ia Marine, but the ideas 
of the jeune ecole surfaced in France and in other nations from time to time. 
Certain government ministers were weary of the years of debate and the 
impotence of the nation; hence the Ministry of Marine ordered the wholesale 
retirement of active flag officers. This second "decapitation" of the navy's 
leadership had a disastrous effect. Future admiral Raoul Victor Patrice Castex 
lamented in 1908 that the navy lacked a general staff dedicated to the develop­
ment of defLnitive navy doctrine. 33 
The new Minister of Marine, Vice Admiral Augustin Boue de Lapeyrere, in 
1909, ordered a new building program that was to be completed in 19 19.34 
Unfortunately, in its desire to save money and in its preoccupation with a 
vulnerable border with Gennany, the French government failed to pay suffi­
cient attention to its navy prior to World War I; the French fleet slipped in world 
ranking from second to fifth place.3$ How much of this situation was due to the 
debate over doctrine is open to speculation. 
Twentieth Century World Wars 
During the First World War, the fleet's initial primary task was to maintain 
the sea lines of communication (SLOes) with Algeria and then to patrol French 
maritime frontiers. The SLOes were the vehicle that would enable a half-million 
colonial soldiers and two hundred thousand workers to assist France in her hour 
of need. Hence the navy's contributions were strategic in nature, although it did 
not engage in decisive battle with the Gennan High Seas Fleet. Without a major 
guerre de haute mer role, there was no way to validate prewar decisive-battle 
doctrinal development from actual performance in combat. Due to the French 
Navy's lack of compatibility with the Royal Navy and inability to operate with 
the Grand and other allied fleets, the Mediterranean theater was split into 
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national zones of responsibility, with the French Navy assigned the lion's 
share.36 The resulting over-commitment of naval resources to the Mediter­
ranean theater was a direct result of the inability to fonn an allied fleet, although 
the French Navy did operate with the British in the Dardanelles. As in previous 
wars, a naval brigade, the Brigade desfusiliers marins, fought ashore. 
Following World War I, the French Navy became influenced by the 
writings of Admiral Raoul Castex, whose influence endures today. His five­
volume Theories stratigiques is perhaps the most complete theoretical survey 
of maritime strategy ever.37 A sixth volume, Melanges strategiques, was 
published in 1976 after his death. Castex completed an additional eighteen 
major works and more than fifty journal articles. His Les idees militaires de La 
marine du XVIIre sieck: De Ruyter a Suffren ( 1 9 1 1) makes major contribu­
tions with respect to the differences between official doctrine and actual tactical 
practices. The essence of Castex's work can be found in a summary of some 
2,600 pages of original text in French, translated into 428 pages of English in 
Strategic Theories.38 His conclusions were that decisive naval battles were rare 
in history and that the enemy fleet was not always the main object of an 
operation or battle. Castex believed that naval doctrine should be offensive and 
oriented toward a decisive battle. Suffren was Castex's professional role 
model-standing doctrine should be abandoned if warranted by the tactical 
situation. 39 
On the other hand, Castex recognized that his task was to provide doctrine 
for a second-ranking navy, one that would never hope to challenge the British. 
Thus he fonnulated the concept of Laforce organisee, a main force that could 
be mustered for a limited counteroffensive against a superior enemy. There is 
some similarity between this concept and some of the ideas of Julian Corbett 
in Britain.40 Castex gave significant attention to commerce raiding, raids, 
blockade, mine, and amphibious warfare. The centerpiece of his writings is 
strategic manoeuvre, not battle. Castex wrestled with the influences of technol­
ogy on doctrine but concluded that the aircraft did not signal the end of the 
surface ship. In the final analysis, Castex is a blend of La grande guerre and the 
jeune ecole. 
Castex's writings appear to have had only modest direct impact on the 
behavior of French governments.41 On the other hand, his writings played the 
same role as did those of Admiral Mahan in the United States and elsewhere in 
the world-they were used as textbooks and points of departure for internal 
government position papers-and Castex is credited with saving the battleship. 
One can also trace ideas from Theories strategiques to the creation of the new 
College des Mutes etudes de defense nationale in 1936. The existing Ecok de 
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Theories strategiques was translated into Japanese and, for the Argentine 
Navy, into Spanish. Various sections were translated into Serbo-Croatian, 
Greek, and Russian. It has been widely used in Latin America and Mediter­
ranean countries. In 1 943, the renowned American strategic thinker, Bernard 
Brodie, recognized Castex in hisA Layman 's Guide to Naval Strategy by stating 
that .. the underlying value of the teachings of men like Mahan, Corbett, and 
Castex is still largely intact...42 
A few other French Navy officers had some influence during World War I 
and the interwar years. Rear Admiral Jean-Baptiste Degouy wrote a series of 
articles and books which, although illogical , nonetheless demonstrated a fun­
damental failure of the naval officer corps to come to grips with the issue of 
offensive versus defensive warfare. Others wrote articles and books in which 
the failure of the battleship to obtain a decisive victory at Jutland was, incor­
rectly, attributed to the submarine and concepts previously advocated by the 
jeune ecole. 
French Navy policy during the interwar years was also influenced by 
Admiral Rene Daveluy, who, along with Naval Minister George Leygues 
(minister from 1 925 to 1933), became concerned with coastal defense and 
implementing the various naval arms control treaties that would make large­
scale battles at sea obsolete. On the other hand, for the first time since the Second 
Empire, France had a coherent navy policy and doctrine.43 Daveluy wrote Les 
enseignements maritimes de la guerre anti-germanique ( 1 9 19), which pulled 
no punches and admitted that the battleship had failed to deliver as expected in 
the previous war. This book, however, had no real influence in France. Even­
tually Daveluy advocated an all-submarine fleet and a policy of "sea denial" 
rather than sea control-but his recommendations were ignored. 
It was not until 1 938, under Fleet Admiral Fran�ois Darlan, that a naval 
construction program began in earnest. That program, however, paid insuffi­
cient attention to naval aviation, antiair warfare, and antisubmarine warfare. 
France had over-committed herself with the promise to defend overseas pos­
sessions. Honor prevailed, and resources that could have been devoted to a 
defense of France herself were squandered on naval forces that neither saved 
colonies nor contributed to protection of the homeland. 
The French Navy participated in a number of brief operations with the Royal 
Navy in the very early days of World War ll. Those forces of the French Navy 
(the fourth largest in the world at the time) that remained loyal to the Vichy 
government were never put into a position where they would engage in major 
combat actions against their former allies.44 Hence there was generally no 
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opportunity on either side to validate the prewar navy doctrine developed from 
the thoughts and writings of Castex on general warfare. In 1940, the French 
force de raid at Mers-el-Kebir (Oran), Algeria, refused to sortie to allied, 
neutral, or Caribbean ports, and Vice-Admiral Marcel Gensoul rejected an 
ultimatum since it would have contravened the conditions of the armistice with 
Germany. His force was dealt with effectively in port by the British Force H 
under Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville. The Frenchforce X at Alexandria, 
Egypt, under Vice Admiral Rene Godfroy, was demilitarized, and elements in 
the West Indies remained out of the war. Vichy forces fought off a British and 
Free French invasion of Dakar later that same year. In short, the French fleet 
was dismantled.4S 
The value of the French Navy, however, can be measured by the efforts of 
former allies to ensure that the fleet remained out of Axis hands. These efforts 
must have been due to a healthy respect for French Navy capabilities, which 
were, in part, a measure of French Navy doctrine. During the years of the Vichy 
government, all doctrinal development ground to a halt. The French general 
staff forbade the updating of doctrinal manuals, fearing that changes would be 
interpreted by the Germans as being directed at them. This forced doctrinal 
development to be done in secrecy. The fleet performed no major training 
exercises, nor was it integrated into either the Italian or German force structure. 
Germany negotiated for the use of the French Navy for some time, but the bulk 
of the remaining French fleet at Toulon was scuttled at the end of 1942 when 
the Germans tried to seize it. 
French forces that escaped the German occupation and chose to continue the 
war operated outside normal political control. Eventually, most of the Fighting 
Free French forces operated with the permission of General Charles de Gaulle 
but under the operational control and as an integral part of allied forces. Their 
experiences while operating with foreign forces was to forever alter French 
military and naval doctrine. Eventually French Navy forces participated in 
integrated convoy escorting and amphibious assaults. Fighting Free French 
forces operated at the same level of combat efficiency as their allies. 
Doctrine during the Cold War 
Free French Navy forces had been quick to adapt to allied naval doctrine 
during the war, but where there was a choice between allies, the French were 
usually more likely to accept the American way of war rather than the British 
way. Simply put, the bitter aftertaste of Mers-el-Kebir was to last many years. 
For example, following World War II France turned a good deal of its attention 
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to the recovery and defense of overseas colonies. Most of this effort did not 
require forces for fleet-versus-fleet interaction, yet the French concepts for 
operations from the sea, using aircraft carriers, were based upon American 
doctrine rather than the extensive British history. 
One of the more interesting authors on naval matters during the 1950s was 
Vice Admiral Pierre Barjot. Admiral Barjot embraced the American method of 
antisubmarine defense (offensive striking forces) and not the British (convoys). 
Admiral Barjot wrote a number of substantive documents that were strategic, 
doctrinal, and programmatic in nature.46 An unabashed supporter of aircraft 
carriers and naval aviation, Barjot authored Vers la marine de l 'age atomique 
( 1 955) and Histoire de la guerre aeronavale ( 1 96 1).47 Admiral Adolphe 
Lepotier prepared some excellent articles for publication in the Revue de la 
defense nationale as well as two books, Mer contre Terre and La guerre dans 
les trois dimensions. Unfortunately, these works were never followed up with 
additional in-depth strategic thought. 
On the other hand, France developed her own doctrine for naval diplomacy. 
Rather than having large numbers of overseas-stationed combat forces as the 
Americans did, or the "swing-through" doctrine of the Royal Navy, the French 
often achieved the same political purpose with station ships of limited combat 
potential. Although France still maintains the limited ability to intervene 
overseas, the formal Force Amphihie d'Intervention was disbanded in 1 969.48 
France was an original member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
and even though it did not routinely participate in its military command 
structure during most of the Cold War, the French Navy developed into a serious 
combat force with the most modem implements of war. Technological innova­
tion continued, with France leading the West in development of surface-to-sur­
face cruise missiles. France did not attempt to challenge the superpower navies 
of the United States or the Soviet Union but rested comfortably with its status, 
which was equivalent essentially to that of Great Britain. French Navy doctrine 
was developed for interactions against fleets of minor powers or to deny a major 
power the full use of its fleet. 
The commitment by various governments to maintain a navy portion of the 
force defrappe limited France's development of conventional warfighting 
capability.49 A lack of resources precluded both a nuclear and a serious 
conventional warfighting capability. The French recognized that nuclear war­
fighting at sea might be required if nuclear weapons had already been used 
ashore. The only major role for conventional naval forces might be to sweep 
the seas ahead of a missile-firing submarine to ensure that it would get to its 
launch position unaffected by enemy antisubmarine forces. so The aircraft 
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carrier represented a pre-strategic but nuclear-capable force that pennitted 
some operational flexibility. 
Admiral Marcel Duval 's new courses at the Ecole superieure de guerre de 
Ia Marine enhanced doctrinal development. Then-Commander Michel Tripier 
completed the "Fondements et principes de strategie maritime" ( 1 977), but this 
paper was circulated within only navy circles until an extract appeared in 1990 
in the journal Stratigique.51  Rear Admiral Hubert Moineville, French Navy 
(Retired), published an excellent book, La guerre navale ( 1982), which was 
translated into English.52 Although most of the book is devoted to overall 
military strategy, the last three chapters deal with choices to be made in advance 
of naval actions and the problems in conducting them. La guerre navale 
examines many of the doctrinal issues that were being debated during the Cold 
War, among them the issue of using conventional, or general purpose, forces 
to ensure the combat stability of nuclear missile submarines. 
Admiral Moineville correctly concludes that the introduction of long-range 
nuclear-armed missiles into navies has altered fundamentally the role of flrst­
rank navies. For example, he reasons that the threat of using nuclear weapons 
is now inherent in grand-scale naval warfare. His analysis of nuclear naval 
warfare was in keeping with the thinking of most admirals and navies-nuclear 
war at sea must be deterred because one weapon detonation would result in the 
loss of a ship, if not an entire fonnation. 
Old French patterns of interest in guerre de course can be found in 
Moineville's  appreciation for the economic vulnerability (especially with 
respect to oil) of modem nations. In general, Moineville appreciates the 
widening political role of naval forces but, like most naval officers, fails to get 
into the doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons when used against shore targets. 
In 198 1 Admiral Pierre Lacost published Strategies navales du present, 
which was well received in France. A more recent work outlining the history 
of naval thought in France and elsewhere is L 'evolution de Ia pensee navale, 
edited by Herve Coutau-Begarie ( 1 990- 1993). Although not on doctrine direct­
ly, L 'evolution de Ia pensee navale provides an excellent source of doctrinal 
history and should be translated into English for the wider audience that it 
deserves. Finally, Vice Admiral Michel Tripier completed Ie Royaume 
d 'Archimede in 1993, just prior to his untimely death.53 
Military Doctrine in the French Anny 
The French model would not be complete without an analysis of doctrine in 
the French Anny.S4 The Belgian-invented and French-developed Montigny 
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mitrailleuse (machine gun) was introduced by the French Anny during the 
Franco-Prussian War of 1 870- 1 87 1 .55 Although the mitrailleuse increased the 
effective firepower on the battlefield over the rifle by an order of magnitude, 
its introduction failed to turn the tide of that war in favor of the French. The 
reasons were that the French Anny guarded their new capability too well and 
were caught up on the technical details of development; it failed to devise an 
effective doctrine for the new weapon or to test various tactics. Furthermore, 
the mitrailleuse was assigned to artillery units, where it was viewed as only a 
rather short-range weapon that was extremely vulnerable to counter-battery 
fire. Although the introduction of the mitrailleuse alone might have swung the 
war in favor of France, its operational employment was disastrously ineffective. 
The machine gun, however, was rapidly assimilated into the German and 
Russian ground forces. 
At the outbreak of World War I, the French Army was committed to the 
defense of France, which would occur via a decisive engagement fought under 
an offensive doctrine. The moral superiority of the offensive would yield an 
eian that would be decisive. The defense of France would be achieved by a 
clash against the German armed forces fought on foreign soil. An offensive war 
of annihilation was thought to be short, cheap, and more effective than the 
defensive, but a correct analysis of the technology available at the time would 
have concluded that the defensive was the proper doctrine to follow. (In 
fairness, the same criticism can be made of the Union army during the American 
Civi! War.)56 
When the war did not develop as planned, and the defense of France required 
a defensive doctrine, the army proved incapable of adapting, and millions of 
men died in military operations that had no significant political purpose. The 
French Anny had a virtually inexhaustible supply of troops that it could throw 
into mindless attacks-a by-product of the French Revolution.57 This same 
army was governed by a doctrine that did not allow for individual judgment to 
resolve crucial questions and assumed that preplanned violence was enough to 
overcome the enemy. 58 
The conduct of the First World War on the ground has led some scholars to 
conclude that "military professionals . . .  usually incline toward the offensive. �9 
There is the obvious need to motivate troops in the face of obstacles.60 When 
the political leadership of a nation assumes that the military is an acceptable 
tool to obtain decisive political results, the military themselves will probably 
be forced to favor an offensive doctrine from which decisive and positive results 
will be obtained.61 Perhaps another lesson from World War I is that eian can 
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and should be exhibited at the tactical level of warfare, but it need not exclude 
fighting on the operational and strategic defensive. 
The catastrophic and unexpected failure of the French Anny in the early days 
of World War n can be attributed, in great part, to their strategy, and doctrine 
for war.62 In general, the strategy and doctrine were compatible, but the French 
Anny doctrine was based upon a fatally flawed strategy, and the strategy was 
based upon an obsolete operational concept. Simply put, the French Anny 
attempted to fight an attrition-styled war based upon defense, firepower, 
centralization, and control in a series of sequential, methodical battles, while 
the Gennan Anny had adopted a maneuver warfare doctrine of one continuous 
battle that made the French response inadequate and self-defeating. Unfor­
tunately, due to the nature of French Anny doctrine, there was no alternative. 
When the need for change was recognized after defeats in the first phase of the 
war, it was, simply, too late. 
Essentially, France created an anny that could not cope with the unexpected 
or respond to limited threats. One of the very few officers who dared to criticize 
the overall plan for defense, General Charles de Gaulle, found his opinions 
subsumed by political necessity. French military doctrine in the interwar years 
became too pedantic and too theoretical; it was impractical, more suited for the 
classroom than the battlefield. Yet in the classroom, officers were rewarded for 
repeating huge quantities of rote data rather than for innovation. 
The French Anny had in fact changed its doctrine from that of the annihila­
tion-based approach ofW orld War I to that of attrition, but did not do so quickly 
or thoroughly enough. Technological developments in France were not viewed 
as "revolutions in military affairs" but rather as minor modifications on the 
existing consensus. Perhaps because the Gennan Anny had to divest itself of 
equipment following World War I, it was better able to view the essence of the 
new technological opportunities. 
French Air Force doctrine was similarly deficient. Not only had the Air Force 
failed to prepare a correct doctrine for the war, it overlooked significant voids 
for employing existing forces in the war for which the anny prepared. France 
simply did not have the right type or a sufficient number of aircraft to contest 
local air superiority. During the interwar years, the air force and anny had 
engaged in a bitter struggle over whether the proper role for aviation was 
annihilation by independent strategic bombing or by cooperating tactically with 
the land forces engaged in attrition warfare. The result of this struggle was a 
compromise force that was supposed to do both, but could do neither. 
Blame for the fall of France can be laid at the feet of the political leadership 
for its improper preparation of the anny (poor high command structure, tenns 
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of service, and the size of the active duty officer and non-comrnissioned officer 
corps), although the officer corps as well deserves censure. The military 
leadership of France was more concerned with bureaucratic details than with 
the development of strategy and doctrine and with asking hard questions. 
E
ven this brief review of over three hundred years of French Navy and 
military doctrine in France reveals a treasure trove of lessons that should 
have been learned. As the Royal Navy has, so the French Navy has emphasized 
the development of tactical-level service-unique doctrine. That is not to say that 
other forms of military doctrine have been ignored, but this is clearly where the 
emphasis has been. There are many interesting lessons to be learned also by 
contrasting the differences as well as noting the similarities between French 
and British navy doctrine. 
Contrasting French and British navy doctrine is somewhat unfair-an un­
fairness compounded if we rely upon only traditional English language sources 
that stress Britain's offensive victories. The French monarchy had a sophisti­
cated concept of attrition warfare and defensive doctrine for its fleet. The Royal 
French fleet achieved levels of success that were appropriate for France's 
geography, strategic culture, overall strategy, and available resources. The fact 
that the French naval doctrine would not have been appropriate for the Royal 
Navy of Great Britain is immaterial and misleading. 
Quite frankly, the hubris displayed by many American officers and scholars 
in rebuffmg French Navy doctrine because of the lack of combat victories by 
the French Navy during the Revolution or under Napoleon is shocking. We 
should be looking for the lessons of doctrinal development and not prejudging 
its value based upon what happened ashore or the actions taken by anny officers 
or governments who set policies for the navy. To disregard the lessons of the 
French Navy based upon such reasons is extremely poor scholarship and 
considerably shortsighted. In the words of a well-respected scholar, "France 
has had little just cause to be ashamed of her navy: the navy may have had some 
just cause to be ashamed of France . ..63 
When the Comte de Grasse came to the aid of an embryonic United States 
fighting for independence. his decisions off the Virginia Capes in 1 78 1  were 
shaped by a defensive doctrine that gave primary importance to the protection 
and support of actions ashore rather than the taking of enemy ships as prizes. 
It is because of those decisions and actions that de Grasse supported success­
fully General George Washington and earned that officer's praise. America 
remembers the strategic and operational-level vision of Admiral de Grasse, a 
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fonner anny officer, rather than his modest tactical abilities at sea, defeat at the 
Battle of the Saints, and eventual humiliation. 
A review of French Navy doctrine practiced by a variety of commanders 
reveals the strengths and weaknesses of defensive doctrine and warfare by 
attrition. Reviews of French Anny warfare of both annihilation and attrition, 
and offensive and defensive doctrine, also demonstrate the inherent weaknesses 
and strengths of these four methods. These positive and negative lessons have 
value today-most importantly, that there is no one correct military doctrine 
for all times and all places. French soldiers have paid heavily for their search 
for the one correct doctrine that could ensure victory-"a cult of the correct 
military doctrine." The search for such enduring and eternal principles can 
discourage the adaptability and flexibility that is required in successful doctrine. 
Doctrinal rigidity can also impede appreciation of potential technological 
improvements.64 
Unlike doctrinal development ashore, France had few such major doctrinal 
debates at sea-there was general consensus on the defensive doctrine and 
guerre de course-although doctrine continued to evolve, even while technol­
ogy remained relatively constant. Even with a defensive doctrine, at times 
France was able to meet Britain as an equal at sea, while devoting her primary 
attention to events ashore. The defensive doctrine andguerre de course warfare 
of attrition employed by the navy often allowed significant victories at minimal 
cost-a conservation of effort at sea. This was highlighted in the years 1780-
1782 with convoy victories and Suffren's operations in the Indian Ocean. 
France also deserves credit for pioneering work on successful multinational 
naval doctrine, major innovation in fleet organization as an aid to unity in action, 
as well as for accepting the concept of fighting spirit, elan, as part of combat 
potential. Clausewitz noted the valuable contribution of elan to the Grande 
Annee of Napoleon Bonaparte; however, the unfortunate consequence of the 
concept of elan was an unwarranted faith by French governments that supe­
riority in spirit would make up for material and training deficiencies. Further­
more, the history of French military doctrine reveals the dangerous 
consequences if elan, as a concept to motivate warriors, is transferred from the 
tactical level of war, where it belongs, to the operational and strategic levels or 
to programming, where it does not. 
One of the more interesting differences between French naval and military 
doctrine was their treatment of elan. The navy fully accepted the fighting spirit 
as part of a defensive doctrine that would lead to strategic level victory, while 
anny general officers, especially prior to World War I, assumed that a defensive 
doctrine would signal moral weakness and lead to strategic defeat. Naval history 
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suggests that fighting spirit and initiative can be an integral part of a defensive 
doctrine-meaning that these tenns do not necessarily need to be synonymous 
with offensive warfare. 
That the individual field commander ashore was often not granted the degree 
of judgment accorded the commander at sea is another significant difference 
between the French land and sea forces. To some extent, this can be explained 
by the lack of modem long-range communications systems, but perhaps it was 
due also to the lack of familiarity with warfare at sea by the governments ashore, 
which resulted apparently in far less oversight and fewer courts-martial of naval 
officers by French governments than were suffered by officers in the Royal 
Navy. 
The brutal effects wrought on doctrine by the changing governments in 
France following the Revolution or during and after World War n may still be 
instructive today. During the drastic changes in French governments, the officer 
corps, in general, suffered greatly. When the corporate memory of an officer 
corps is lost, the potential arises for both wholesale change (as during and after 
World War m and a period of danger. During the first years of the Republic 
and Napoleon, the French Navy fought without benefit of the experience gained 
by its royalist warriors-experiences that had yet to be reflected in official 
written doctrine. Had the French monarchy not been overthrown and its military 
leadership not decapitated, subsequent naval battles against the British might 
have ended quite differently. A lesson worth leaming here is that military 
services should bridge drastic changes in governments as well as wholesale 
doctrinal modification. 
On the other hand, the speed with which great changes occurred in navy 
doctrine during and after World War n were probably possible only because of 
government changes brought about by that war. Although the changes in 
government resulted in massive losses of corporate military knowledge, the 
ability to rapidly substitute new ideas also unfolded. Today, when we witness 
the wholesale release of combat-proven officers into civilian life, we risk losing 
the corporate knowledge of how to fight unless we take the time to document 
that knowledge in formal written doctrine, but we also have the opportunity for 
major doctrinal change. It is well to note that doctrinal change is most easily 
feasible when there is a change in a government or during events that lead to 
massive disruption of an officer corps. 
Without combat to stimulate doctrinal development, we must tum to other 
sources for such kindling. One source of doctrinal stimulation is new technol­
ogy. Generally, new technologies are often thought to lead automatically to 
improvements in combat potential. The jeune ecole, however, teaches us that 
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unless the full implications of new technologies are explained to governments, 
there is a good chance that governments will seize the opportunity to reduce 
force structure (and therefore capability), resulting in impaired military ser­
vices. Today we face similar challenges. 
Force structure reductions may nonetheless come about if governments are 
told that a new technology also allows attainment of political objectives at 
reduced cost. In short, before revealing new technologies to government, 
military specialists ought to well understand the potential negative consequen­
ces. On the other hand, many of the officers of the jeune ecole have earned an 
unfair reputation for being short-sighted when, perhaps, they were trying to do 
the best that they could under the reality of their political and fiscal circumstan­
ces. 
The governments of France have generally issued specific orders for the 
overall missions of their fleets. Navy missions rarely, if ever, have included the 
enemy fleet as the main objective. As at Trafalgar, the enemy fleet was an 
obstacle to be overcome, not an objective. One problem of such a system is that 
it assumes that the top governmental leadership understands what fleet missions 
should be. Generally, however, governments consist of "landlubbers" with no 
real knowledge of fighting at sea. Whose responsibility is it, then, to ensure that 
the fleet is properly tasked? 
The history of the French Navy is one of mismanagement by governments 
who could have known better. If the navy itself does not educate its government, 
then who will? If it is the role of the navy to educate its governments, then there 
may be a need for officers who are skilled in administrative tasks and 
bureaucratic maneuvering within the shore establishment and at the head­
quarters level. There is a rich history of such officers in the French Navy, but 
there is no clear-cut answer as to which efforts were more successful in doctrinal 
development, those of the administrative officer or those of the warfighter. 
Perhaps it would be more correct to view the relationship between administra­
tive and combat officers as a partnership that makes a complete whole. Clearly, 
doctrine must be acceptable to those at sea, but there is a long history of superior 
warriors who departed the field of battle without leaving behind a legacy of 
doctrine or even lessons that were worthy of their triumphs. 
The French and British navies operated under formal doctrine during 
the better part of their histories. They faced similar concerns but used 
different approaches in their attempts to solve doctrinal issues. By compar­
ing and contrasting the history of doctrine in these two great navies, we can 
examine doctrinal issues that all navies undoubtedly need to address, regardless 
of the technologies involved or the government being served. Simply put, a 
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comparative approach to the history of naval doctrine yields the process 
common to both. 
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Doctrine in the Spanish Navy 
James J. Tritten 
T
HE FIRST WRITfEN NAVY DOCTRINE was issued in Spain in the year 
1270 by the king of Castile. I Ten laws fonned the legal code of maritime 
warfare, the first of which stated that warfare at sea and warfare ashore are 
different and that each requires its own type of individual. The code also 
recognized two basic forms of naval warfare-that between major fleets and 
that between only a few ships. The second law discussed the types of men 
required for maritime warfare. The third through the sixth dealt with the 
necessary qualifications and selection of admirals, ships' captains, navigators, 
and other officers. The seventh law considered what types of ships are to be 
employed for warfare at sea, and the eighth drew a comparison between the 
support requirements of ships and horses. The ninth law stated that ships must 
be supplied in order to fight, and it established what stores warships were to 
carry. The last law readdressed the differences between land and sea warfare; 
it also explained how to divide the profits of victory. 
Early Years-Close Aboard Battle 
The union of Castile and Aragon in 1479 fonned the embryonic modem state 
of Spain. The next substantive work of navy doctrine was written by Alonso de 
Chaves between 1 520 and 1 538, during the reign of Carlos I (and during two 
wars with France- 152 1 - 1 529 and 1 535- 1538).2 De Chaves advanced the 
concepts of squadron fonnations, the use of artillery, and the taking of the 
weather gauge (i.e., the upwind side) during battle. This is the earliest written 
record that we have of fighting fonnations and tactical principles. De Chaves' 
work was adopted and modified by King Henry VIII of England and became 
the first written navy doctrine issued in Britain.3 
De Chaves argued that when two fleets meet, one fonnation is usually better 
than the other. With this in mind, he recommended battle fonnations that would 
maximize combat potential. His concept called for close-order engagement 
based upon galley tactics. But de Chaves failed to take into account the 
uncertainty of seamanship with ships of sail and assumed mistakenly that 
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relative positions could be maintained easily. In other words, navy doctrine 
failed to account for the new technological environment. 4 
The navy was fmally separated from the army in 1 586, and from the 
mid-sixteenth through the seventeenth centuries Spain maintained divisions and 
squadrons of naval forces in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific. 
In addition to operational missions, the divisions performed administrative and 
logistical functions. The Capitan General de la Mar Oceano held overall 
command of the Atlantic division, an ocean-going fleet of three subordinate 
squadrons based at Vizcaya, Guiplizcoa, and Portugal, as well as the Guard of 
the Straits of Gibraltar. The Atlantic division also included an independent 
squadron at Dunquerque (which maintained station in los Paises Bajos [the low 
countries]) and an independent Armada de Barlovento based in the Antilles. 
The Capitan General de la Mar commanded the Mediterranean division, which 
consisted of subordinate squadrons in Spain, Naples, Sicily, and Genoa. The 
Pacific division consisted of the Armada de Peru (also known as the Armada 
del Mar del Sur) as well as task groups of various sizes that were deployed to 
the Philippines. 
From 1568 to 1648 Spain and England fought the Eighty Years' War (otherwise 
known as the Dutch War of Independence), largely over control of Holland. In 
1588, the one hundred thirty ships of the Spanish Armada, manned by 30,000 men 
(two-thirds of whom were soldiers), attempted to invade England. The concept of 
operations for the Armada was to fight a close-in battle at sea, which would enable 
the Spanish to use their superiority to board enemy ships. After all, Philip II's 
brother, Don John of Austria, had used this same galley-oriented doctrine to win 
at the recent Battle of Lepanto ( 1571), as had Philip's own forces, who achieved 
success over the French in the Battle of Punta Delgada in the Azores ( 1582). The 
overall tactical obi:tives in these battles were to select an opponent and board in 
a general milie. The battle of 1582 in the Azores, under the command of 
Captain-General Don Alvaro de Bazan. Marques de Santa Cruz, reinforced the 
need for sailing ships that could engage in distant water combat. The undefeated 
Santa Cruz planned the Armada and would have been its commander had he not 
died (in 1588).6 Copies of the instructions that Santa Cruz issued at sea in July 1587 
to govern the fight near the island of San Miguel in the Azores are housed in the 
national archives at Simancas.7 The instructions to the Armada from Philip II in 
April 1588 are also stored there. 8 
The English recognized that the sailing skills of the Spanish, the size of their 
forces, and their tactics gave them the advantage. The ships of England therefore 
kept their distance and used long-range artillery to wreak havoc on the defensive 
galley-oriented formations of the Armada. The English held a logistical 
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advantage, being close to their ports for reprovisioning, and while the 
Spanish commander, Don Alonso Perez de Guzman, Duke of Medina 
S idonia recognized this , his written sailing orders made clear that he 
expected Spai n ' s  relig ious and moral superiority to overcome that 
advantage.9 The previous destruction of twenty-three merchant ships at 
Cadiz in 1 587 and the failure of the Annada in 1 588 began a major naval 
decline in Spain. As a result of a combined Anglo-Dutch effort in 1 596, 
Cadiz was occupied and the Spanish fleet again neutralized. 
Combat instructions used by the fleets of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries were modified to abandon galley concepts. These changes were 
contained in various books and instructions issued by local commanders 
throughout these years. The fundamental source of navy doctrine through the 
eighteenth century was Bernardino de Mendoza's Theorica y practica de 
guerra ( 1 596). It contained the basic fundamentals of theories of war, including 
warfare at sea, for the Spanish. 
During the Eighty Years' War, Spain battled France ( 1 635- 1 659) and 
suffered naval defeat at the hands of the French embryonic fleet. The Spanish 
battled the Dutch throughout the Eighty Years' War, but it was the Battle of the 
Downs ( 1639) that conflnned Spain's naval eclipse. The consequences of a 
subsequent Anglo-Spanish War ( 1 654- 1659) were also unfortunate for Spain. 
After years of war with England, Spain found it essential to devise a method 
that would ensure the security of treasure ships, and in the mid-sixteenth 
century it introduced the concept of convoy escorts. 10 These escort ships were 
essentially armed merchantmen, and although they were stable gun platfonns 
because of the large cargo capacity of their hulls, they lacked maneuverability, 
even with improved designs. 
Command of Spanish ships of the line was divided: one officer was in charge 
of the soldiers at sea, and another commanded the ship's company. This system of 
dual command lasted for nearly a hWldred years. The command and manning 
policy reflected a naval doctrine that called for a warship to be both a platfonn for 
small-arms shooting by troops as well as a platform for artillery fire by seamen. 
This result was that Spanish crews were generally half of marines and half of 
seamen-consequently they could do the job of neither kind of platform very well. 
French Influence 
In 1700, under Philip V (the fll'St Bourbon king, a Frenchman and a descendent 
of Louis XIV), a true national navy, the Armada Real, was organized in Spain. 
Early on, during the War of the Spanish Succession ( 170 1 - 1 7 14), this new 
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national navy did not have a particularly successful record. A Spanish treasure 
fleet escorted by a French squadron under Admiral Chiteaurenault was attacked 
successfully in port at Vigo in 1 702 by the Dutch and the English. The 
engagement of the Dutch and English against the combined Franco-Spanish 
fleet off Malaga in 1704 reaffmned the defensive control-oriented doctrine 
advocated by the French naval theorist Pere Paul Hoste, I I  who influenced 
Spanish Navy doctrine until the early nineteenth century. 12 Spain could not 
prevent an army from landing in Catalonia, and Madrid was subsequently 
captured. The War of the Spanish Succession at sea was largely a guerre de 
course; both sides lost some 1 ,500 merchantmen. 
The Bourbon rule in Spain instilled many bureaucratic and administrative 
refonns in addition to the creation of a national navy. There was the important 
provision in 17 17  that midshipmen would serve as the Royal Company of 
Marine Guards. This young national fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral 
Antonio Gaztaiieta y de lturribalzaga, was virtually destroyed by British 
Admiral George Byng at the Battle of Cape Passaro ( 17 1 8) (also known as the 
Battle of Messina). The defeat at Passaro, a battle that was initiated just prior 
to the formal declaration of the War of the Quadruple Alliance ( 1 7 1 8 - 1 720), 
resulted in Spain's further loss of control of the Mediterranean Sea and the 
subsequent inability to defend her coastline from disastrous English raiding 
attacks. Although the defeat of the escorting force at Cape Passaro did not 
interfere with the arrival of the 340 transports with 33,000 troops that recaptured 
Sicily, it did affect Spain's ability to support a distant army. The defeat at Cape 
Passaro and the end of the wars with the Quadruple Alliance resulted in a 
resurgence in Spanish naval construction. 
Founding a Modem Navy 
Admiral Gaztafieta, who had fought at Passaro, was the father of modern 
Spanish Navy shipbuilding methods. He wrote Proporciones de las medidas 
mas esenciales ... para lajtibrica de los navios y fragatas de guerra, que pueden 
montar desde ochenta canones hace diez . . . ( 1 720), an excellent book on 
warship design. Gaztafieta also served as the First Director of Naval Construc­
tion. Spanish fleet construction shifted to warships designed to provide convoy 
escorts rather than fight decisive engagements against an enemy battle fleet. 
Francisco Cornejo's Instrucciones y ordenes ( 1732) furnished naval doctrine 
and planning for an amphibious operation at Oran between June and November 
1732. A Spanish fleet of some fifty escorts and five hundred transports brought 
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an anny of 30,000 men who captured a large fortified city being defended by 
Bey Hassan. 
Jose Patmo, the father of the modern Spanish Navy, was Intendent and later 
Minister of the Navy-one of the Bourbons' better appointments. His early 
service to the crown was with the anny as an administrator. Patmo's main task 
was to rebuild the navy and develop shipyard locations that could be defended, 
thereby making them safer and less vulnerable to British attack from the sea. 
Under Patmo the fleet expanded its capabilities with ships of the line that were 
designed for decisive sea battle. At the time of his death in 1736, Spain 
possessed a professional fleet of considerable strength. 13  
In an interesting interpretation of international law , a defensive alliance with 
Spain obligated France to provide warships to Spain during the latter's War of 
Jenkins's Ear ( 1 739- 1 743) with England. A French squadron of twenty-two 
ships operated essentially as part of the Spanish fleet and convoyed a division 
of Spanish ships to North American waters, deterring a British attack on the 
Spanish. Otherwise during this war France claimed the rights and privileges of 
a neutral. Cooperative interaction between the French and Spanish fleets over 
the years led eventually, however, to the development of multinational navy 
doctrine. 
The worst defeat the British suffered at the hands of the Spanish in the 
eighteenth century was the abortive amphibious invasion of Cartagena de 
Indias, led by Admiral Edward Vernon and General Wentworth between 1740 
and 174 1 .  The defending Spanish naval commanders-Vice Admiral Bias de 
Lezo and General Sebastian Eslava, Viceroy of New Granada-fought with 
6,000 sailors and troops in their defended fortifications against 30,000 troops 
and 120 ships. Admiral de Lezo, a Basque, fought with courage and tenacity. 
He had served at Oran in 1732 and put his knowledge into practice in the 
subsequent defense of Cartagena; he fought the English at the outer fortifica­
tions and refused to surrender. His personal presence was reminiscent of 
Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson; Admiral de Lezo fought with one leg, one arm, 
and one eye. He had lost the leg fighting at Velez-Malaga in 1 704 and his eye 
at Toulon. 14  
The Spanish Navy again demonstrated its strength against the English during 
the War of the Austrian Succession ( 1740- 1748), in actions off Cape Sicie 
( 1744), near Toulon. In that battle, a French fleet under Admiral La Bruyere de 
Court escorted a Spanish squadron under Don Juan Jose Navarro through a 
blockading English fleet under Admiral Thomas Mathews. De Court, who was 
under orders not to fire unless attacked, offered to mix his ships amongst the 
Spanish. Navarro refused and, although the subsequent tactical engagement was 
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indecisive, the Spanish squadron made its way to Cartagena, where Navarro 
was decorated with the title of Marques de la Victoria. Spain remained neutral 
during the Seven Years • War (1756- 1763), although she took advantage of the 
opportunity to recapture Minorca from the British. 
In 1759 Carlos ill took the throne and ushered in another era of administra­
tive reform. In 1776, then-Lieutenant Jose de Mazarredo Salazar wrote a tactical 
treatise for junior officers. IS Rudimentos de tdctica naval para instruccion de 
los oficiales subalternos de marina contained only minimal sections on how to 
actually fight an enemy, but it did introduce innovative methods for breaking 
the line and using ftreShips. Mazarredo later wrote a signal book that bore the 
strong influence of French works by Jean Fran�ois de Cheyron, Chevalier du 
Pavilion. This signal book was prepared for use in combined operations of the 
Franco-Spanish fleets; it was far simpler than the French book that was actually 
used. The close cooperation between the French and the Spanish fleets was no 
doubt a result of common Bourbon rule. 
A combined Franco-Spanish fleet in 1779, during the American War of 
Independence, prompted the issuance of French Navy doctrine for both fleets. 
Admiral Louis Guillouet, Comte d'Orvilliers, was given overall command, and 
he prepared a revised instruction and signal book to be used by both fleets. 
Spanish ships were integrated within the French fleet as well as maintained as 
a national force in a separate Squadron of Observation that would join the battle 
once the enemy was engaged. 
Under the command of Admiral Lord George Brydges Rodney, a consider­
able portion of the British Channel Fleet seized the opportunity to attack a 
Spanish convoy and then a Spanish squadron under the command of Admiral 
Langara, at the Battle of Cape of Santa Maria <also known as the "Moonlight 
Battle," or the Battle of Cape St. Vincent, 1780) . British convoys were lost in 
subsequent strikes by the combined fleet, and in 1780 and 178 1 Admiral of the 
Fleet Luis C6rdoba y C6rdoba inflicted two of the most destructive attacks on 
English convoys. In the 1780 victory by a combined fleet under Spanish 
command, fifty-five British ships, 3,000 sailors, and weapons and supplies 
bound for Jamaica were captured. Between 1779 and 1782, Spain unsuccess­
fully engaged in a siege and an amphibious campaign against the British at 
Gibraltar. On the other hand, between 1779 and 1782 Carlos ill supported the 
American and Spanish forces, capturing eastern Florida < 1780) and the 
Bahamas (178 1). In 1 782 the Spanish once again recaptured the naval base at 
Minorca from a British garrison. 
Spanish Navy doctrine was now influenced by two additional French 
theoretical works. 16 The fll'St was L 'art de la guerre sur mer, ou tactique navale 
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( 1 787) by Commodore Jurien, Vicomte de Grenier. This succinct work was 
very much oriented towards battle, not control. Grenier stressed massing 
strength against weakness. Despite some rather innovative suggestions for 
tactical disposition of the fleet, he was essentially biased in favor of defense 
and wars of attrition. Admiral Clause Fran�ois, Comte d'Amblimont, wrote in 
1788 an influential book, Tactique navale, ou traite sur les evolutions, sur les 
signaux et sur les mouvemens de guerre, which also emphasized innovation. 
D' Amblimont advanced the idea of breaking the fleet into separate pelotons, 
or tactical groups, with different functions. 
Toward the end of his reign ( 1 759- 1788), Carlos ill ordered the fonnation 
of "working-up squadrons" to train crews in navigational exercises and tactics. 
Retired senior officers with proven combat experience provided their services 
to the two squadrons that were eventually fonned. Because of the humiliation 
he had suffered at the hands of the Royal Navy in 1744 while King of Naples, 
Carlos ill now gave a great deal of support to the Spanish Navy. In 1785 the 
navy was officially christened IA Armada Espanola (a title it retains today 
despite the subsequent frequent changes of government). In 1793 navy regula­
tions were issued to prepare ships for battle-a battle that was to occur 
immediately; 17 France declared war on Spain in 1793. By 1 795 the two nations 
had made peace with each other, but one year later Spain and France were once 
again at war, with Britain. 
Development during the French Revolution 
While they had excellent signal books and tactical manuals, the Spanish fleet 
during this era was not well trained and was wanting in men and supplies. As 
a consequence, an escort under the command of Vice Admiral Don Jose de 
Cordoba y Cordoba, accompanying an extremely valuable convoy, suffered a 
crushing defeat against the well-trained British Mediterranean Fleet at 
the Battle of Cape st. Vincent ( 1 797). The British had benefited from the 
experiences of frequent combat against the French and were thus fighting at the 
height of their combat potential. Fortunately for Spain, the British commander 
at Cape St. Vincent, Rear Admiral John Jervis, did not understand the value of 
the convoy to the Spanish economy and concentrated his attack on their 
warships rather than on the capture of their transports. 18 
Admiral Jose de Cordoba's report following his defeat at Cape St. Vincent, 
which was published in the Gaceta de Madrid ( 1 797), indicates that he was 
quite unprepared for command and battle fleet maneuver. During this era, 
the Spanish Navy was inundated with officers who had little experience in 
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aggressive sea duty. This was in direct contrast to the leadership and command 
qualities of the Royal Navy officers, whose practical knowledge drew from 
longer periods at sea and longer periods of combat engagement. 19 Under­
manned ships with crews that lacked camaraderie compounded Spain's 
problems. 
Jose de Mazarredo Salazar, whose next publication was Advertencias para 
caso de combale ( 1 797), achieved a fme combat record and eventually rose to 
the rank of vice admiral. He was never defeated at sea, but because he publicly 
expressed concern over the condition of the fleet and its lack of combat 
capability, he was never entrusted with major fleet command at a critical 
moment during Spain's history. Mazarredo also criticized the Spanish method 
of manning ships, which denied interchangeability of tasks among crew mem­
bers by devoting a large part of the crew to one task (marines shooting small 
arms) and the other crew members to another task (sailors manning long-range 
cannon). Mazarredo also had the audacity to question Spanish foreign policy. 20 
Commodore Cosme Damian Churruca y Elorza was another fme combat 
officer and superb seaman. He wrote Instruccion sobre punteriLJS para el uso 
de los baxales del Rey, a publication that attempted to deal with the problems 
of naval artillery, advanced mathematics, and navigation. He served as a 
consultant on seamanship to the French Navy, and had he not died at Trafalgar, 
he certainly would have been destined for higher leadership in the navy. 
Tratado de seflales de dia y noelle, e hipotesis de ataques y defensas, 
dispuesto por el &tado Mayor de Marina para auxiliar III instruccion de este 
ramo ( 1804) is one of the most sophisticated tactical and signalling books ever 
produced. This official navy doctrine book excelled in its analysis of battle 
tactics and clearly put the offensive ftrst. An extremely complex signalling 
system allowed the commander to indicate some 576 signals by flag. The book 
also includes a translation of two of the major doctrinal ftghting and signalling 
works published by British Admiral Lord Richard Howe as well as summaries 
of the extremely innovative works of Grenier and d' Amblimont. 
Napoleonic Era 
During the Napoleonic Wars ( 1 803- 1 8 1 5), Spain again fought the British, 
and at times Spain also fought the French. At the Battle of Trafalgar ( 1 805), the 
Spanish and French fleets operated as a combined force, although in separate 
national squadrons. Prior to the battle these two navies had not exercised as a 
combined fleet and therefore had not attempted to tack thirty-three warships 
from south to north, a maneuver made all the more awkward by light winds that 
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prevented the fonnation of a solid defensive battle line?l Admiral Don Federico 
Gravina, perhaps more pliant and diplomatic than the cantankerous Mazarredo 
(who probably would have made a more effective commander), was unable to 
override the defensive doctrine of the French Navy and put into practice the 
new offensive Spanish doctrine outlined in Tratado tk seflales.22 Mazarredo 
certainly would have objected to his ships being manned with crews that were 
combined of marines and other infantrymen, which resulted in a close-aboard 
battle rather than engagement of the British at a distance. The bravery of the 
Spanish officers and men at Trafalgar cannot be questioned, and we can only 
speculate on what the outcome might have been had the Spanish fleet operated 
under their new navy doctrine and under a proven combat leader such as 
Mazarredo. Given Gravina's role as a diplomat in France prior to Trafalgar, his 
selection as the commander of the Spanish fleet is understandable. The disaster 
at Trafalgar, however, resulted in another major decline in Spanish naval 
preparedness. 
The immediate threat was from the French forces that crossed the border in 
1 808. As with France's preoccupation with the Gennans later in the nineteenth 
century, neither the French nor the Spanish fleets could affect the outcome of 
more important threats from across the border. cadiz, from which the combined 
fleet sailed, became the hotbed of resistance to French occupation forces and 
the seat of the government in exile. The Bourbon king abdicated in 1 808 and 
was replaced by Joseph Napoleon-Bonaparte's brother. By the next year, 
France had conquered most of Spain. 
With the loss of her overseas colonies, Spain faced the immediate need to 
resolve the problem of lost income. Using her limited naval forces, Spain 
attempted to pacify her American colonies during the Spanish-American wars 
of independence ( 1 8 10- 1 824) but was unable even to protect them from 
privateers. Her weakened navy proved incapable of supporting such a major 
undertaking.23 Great Britain, which used its fleet to thwart Spain's attempt to 
regain the colonies, thus secured for itself a favorable trade status. The newly 
independent Latin American republics secured the services of foreign seamen 
who successfully defended their new status. 
Napoleon was defeated in 1 8 1 4, and the Bourbon monarchy was reinstated. 
Civil unrest in Spain followed and resulted in another French invasion to quell 
the unrest. Spain turned increasingly inward during the nineteenth century and 
undertook to set up a constitution to address various uprisings and separatist 
movements; the first Spanish Republic was proclaimed by 1 873. During this 
era, which introduced the ironclad, there could hardly have been consistent 
advancement in navy doctrine. 
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The Spanish Navy followed the doctrine advocated by Mazarredo and 
contained in Tratado de senales until Lobo Malagamba prepared a revised text 
on naval tactics in 1 862.24 This first such doctrine for Spanish Navy steam ships 
was the basic doctrine for fleet employment during the campaign in the Pacific 
in 1 866 against Chile and Peru, under the command of Rear Admiral Mendez 
Nunez.25 
The next two doctrinal publications were written by Federico Ardois in 
1 884-Cuaderno de evoluciones and COdigo de escuadra. These two publica­
tions governed fleet actions during the Spanish-American War ( 1 898) and were 
kept as the basic doctrine for the fleet (with modifications in 1929 and 1935) 
until the end of World War II. The absence of continuous combat (it was also 
true for the British Navy) appears to have discouraged naval thought. 
The Spanish-American War 
Spain's major combat at sea following Trafalgar was the war with the United 
States in 1 898. Two major maritime campaigns were fought in the Spanish­
American War. In the Philippines Campaign, Rear Admiral Patricio Montojo 
recognized the inferiority of his forces and planned to fight at anchor, sup­
plementing his naval guns with artillery from shore batteries. The crew's 
inadequate practice in gunnery, the ships' anchorage beyond the range of most 
shore batteries, and a surprise attack at night by Admiral George Dewey, U.S. 
Navy, made the Battle of Manila Bay a one-sided contest-though Dewey 
himself congratulated Montojo for the bravery of the Spanish sailors. Respon­
sibility for the debacle can be assigned to the government that sent the ill­
prepared forces and to the colonial leaders in Manila who would not allow a 
retreat. Montojo's error was primarily in allowing the Americans to enter the 
bay unopposed, much the same as had the Turks at the Battle of Navarino 
(1827). Had Montojo fought at the outer part of the bay, he might have 
succeeded in forcing the Americans to blockade rather than engage. Montojo 
was court-martialed but exonerated-due partially to the support that he 
received from Admiral Dewey!26 
The Caribbean campaign was more interesting and controversial, starting 
with the recommendations of Admiral Pascual Cervera, who recognized that 
the offensive strikes and blockade ordered by the government were beyond the 
capability of his small fleet. Cervera believed that his forces were capable of 
merely defending the homeland. Despite this, he was ordered, and at least 
attempted, to defend Puerto Rico. Cervera outmaneuvered the American fleet 
and managed to enter the harbor at Santiago, Cuba, where he maintained a 
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fleet-in-being. The Americans eventually drew out the fleet as a result of joint 
actions taken ashore and at sea. and Cervera was defeated in the resulting 
battle.27 
The Twentieth Century 
Spain remained neutral during the First World War. Spanish naval actions 
during the Civil War ( 1936- 1939) consisted primarily of blockading and 
breaking blockades. After years of constitutional and governmental upheaval, 
some degree of stability arrived with the rule of General Francisco Franco, who 
maintained Spanish neutrality during the Second World War. After 1945, the 
navy accepted an American light aircraft carrier into her fleet. Spain undertook 
a major revision in navy doctrine in 1966 with efforts by the National War 
College faculty and an ad hoc group of senior officers.28 Most of their work 
appears to have been programmatic in nature-deftning future navy require­
ments rather than basic battle doctrine. With Franco's death on 20 November 
1975, a constitutional Bourbon monarchy was restored. While Spain entered 
into NATO in 1982 and adopted Alliance navy doctrine, there remain a few 
national concerns that are outside NATO's area of operations and for which 
Spain must maintain her own separate concepts of operations, such as defense 
of North African territories. 
Establishing doctrine was easy for the Spanish Navy. The predominance of 
Catholicism in the nation may be an explanation for why the average officer 
accepted easily the concept of doctrine. Indeed, professional writings in the 
United States have noted this parallel between doctrine and religion.29 As in 
other navies, doctrine was not the province of just the warrior; it often involved 
participation of those outside the navy. Perhaps the most important lessons to 
be learned from Spain's experiences with written navy doctrine are: 
• It took a very long time to change doctrine in the Spanish Navy, that is, to 
shift from close-aboard battle to long-range artillery engagements and to update 
basic steamship doctrine, which remained unchanged until the end of World 
War n. 
• Doctrinal development moved along an oblique path, due to the frequent 
changes in Spain's government as it gradually became a modem nation. 
• Close doctrinal cooperation between France and Spain during the age of 
sail was a disaster for true Spanish interests-a result of political rather than 
military considerations. 
• Successful innovation was virtually impossible without a champion at 
court. 
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• Doctrinal innovation does not build and develop without frequent combat. 
• And, fmally, for reasons of history, officers of the Spanish Navy take for 
granted that there will always be written navy doctrine. 
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The History of Italian Naval Doctrine 
Vice Admiral Luigi Donolo, Italian Navy (Retired) 
M
ILITARY DOCfRINE AND NAVAL DOCTRINE are tenns used only 
rarely by Italian authors. and when used, they often mean military art, 
naval art, and sometimes, strategy. To consider, therefore, what is meant by 
military or naval doctrine in Italy. it is necessary to address first these concepts 
of military and naval art and strategy.  
To Italians, art is the combination of techniques or methods used to achieve 
goals (for example in a profession or in a business). Military art, therefore, is 
the complex of knowledge, techniques, and methods acquired through study or 
experience and used to prepare the military instrument. The purpose is to obtain 
a sound decision-making instrument and an effective combat leadership. The 
goal is victory. 
Lieutenant General Raimondo Montecuccoli, an Italian, fought for the 
Austrian Hapsburg empire in the seventeenth century. He won more than forty 
battles and wrote extensively on military art. His major work was Trattato della 
guerra (Treatise on War). The quality and originality of his thoughts deserve 
to be mentioned, as they have a dignity equal to that of Clausewitz.1 The military 
art of Montecuccoli is the art of fighting well to win. 
Another interesting definition of military art has been proposed by Rear 
Admiral Luigi Fincati in his book Military Aphorisms ( 1 882). Military art for 
him was "the complex of knowledge and capacities needed to coordinate, move, 
and lead a group of armed men against the other side, obtaining the best from 
each element and maintaining the group's cohesion at the same time . .. 2 
According to Admiral Giuseppe Fioravanzo, in his A History of Naval 
Tactical Thought ( 1956), military art is a combination of strategy and tactics, 
wherein strategy is defmed as "the art of conducting war" and tactics as "the 
art of fighting war . .. 3 This latter definition of military art, which seems incom­
plete and excessively general, shows how difficult it is to circumscribe the 
meanings of some words. In Italian usage, the tenn doctrine has also meant 
tactics when referring to tactical-level doctrine. 
Strategy in Italy is generally understood as the concept of using the battle 
for the purposes of war, or using military means in support of politics. Today's 
military strategy is usually defmed as the element of general strategy that 
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specifies the way the military should act to achieve the objectives of national 
military politics, an alliance, or a coalition. 
The tenn military politics is commonly used to denote a distinct component 
of general politics. It is based on the nation's historical and social background 
and is driven by a current situation and the resources available. Military politics 
establishes the general objectives to be achieved by the military to fulfill the 
needs of the country, associated international institutions, or alliances. It must 
operate to preserve, support, and integrate the overseas policies where and when 
relationships have been established. 
According to current Italian interpretations, the tenn doctrine is the whole 
of notions or principles, organically elaborated and ordered, to be considered 
either as an object to study or as a standard for theory and practice, or the whole 
of knowledge acquired and coordinated through study, which forms the culture 
of a person or of an organization. Doctrine, therefore, can be either fmnly 
prescriptive, as in religion or in a political ideology, or basically descriptive. 
As a complex of principles, military doctrine may deal with more than one area. 
It is therefore acceptable that this tenn be used as a substitute for military 
politics, strategy, or tactics. 
In Italy, therefore, the tenn military doctrine is controversial and allows 
several interpretations. Many writers believe it should be mainly descriptive, 
leaving the necessary freedom of action to deal with particular events or 
exceptional situations. For the purpose of this study, it is sufficient to consider 
military doctrine as the collection of rules and principles that specify how to 
conduct military operations with the aim of fulfilling strategic objectives. 
Doctrine takes into account the lessons of history, the decisions in military 
politics, and the strategies chosen to deal with crises, conflicts, and so on. This 
definition places military doctrine on a level of hierarchy that stands below 
military politics and strategy, and above tactics. 
Doctrine is closely connected to military art. A graphical representation 
could be a circle wherein lie military politics, military strategy, military 
doctrine, naval doctrine, and tactics, connected sequentially but also linked with 
one another by lines indicating reciprocal influence and dependence. 
Synonymous with naval thought, doctrine includes the preparation of assets and 
their planned use in war or in emergencies. Doctrine impacts on the navy's 
organization and administration, training of personnel, naval strategies and 
tactics, and the procurement of annaments. Hence, the core of naval doctrine 
is the set of principles (as well as beliefs and values) that guides a naval 
organization in war or in carrying out other maritime operations in peacetime 
or during crises. These rules indicate what the navy must be, who or what it 
92 
Donolo * Italy 
must represent, how it must behave, and for what future contingencies it must 
prepare itself. It must also consider all fonns of cooperation with other services 
and allied nations, all possible missions, as well as associated specialized 
doctrine for cooperation with air forces and doctrine when operating under 
NATO or United Nations Organization auspices. 
Naval doctrine, therefore, represents the essential link between strategy and 
tactics: if there is no doctrine, strategy cannot be translated into tactical actions. 
Doctrine generally has a long lifetime, while strategy and tactics are more 
dynamic. Naval doctrine is also subordinate to military doctrine and must be a 
guide and reference point for the navy on all occasions and for all undertakings. 
In reconstructing the history of naval doctrine in Italy, it is well to bear in 
mind that, while military literature on land operations boasts a very rich ancient 
bibliography, there is little treatment of naval doctrine. This lack of doctrinal 
literature probably resulted because events at sea were not suitable to academic 
inquiry, and naval operations were often seen as complementary and paralleling 
those ashore. With this in mind, we will undertake to ascertain the navy's actual 
doctrine through observations of its behavior and from examples of the litera­
ture that codified the doctrine. 
Early Italian Navies 
Some of the greatest medieval battles were fought in the Mediterranean by 
the maritime republics of Genoa, Pisa, and Venice. A fourth republic, Amalfi, 
had a merchant navy tradition. The maritime tradition established by these 
republics has been kept alive, and their coats of anns have been carried on the 
Italian Navy flag since the republic was established in 1 946. 
The battle of Meloria in 1284 (between the Pisans and the Genoese), Curzola 
in 1298 (between the Venetians and the Genoese), and Bosphor and Loiera in 
1 352 (between the Genoese and a coalition led by the Venetians) provide 
examples wherein tactical art was written "at sea" by successful admirals in the 
age of oar. Fireanns were used aboard ships at the Battle of Zierikzee in 1304, 
where the Genoese admiral, Ranieri Grimaldi, defeated the Flemish. 
At the Battle of Curzola, Genoese Admiral Lamba Doria's superior tactics 
resulted in the defeat of the numerically more powerful Venetian fleet. The 
admiral's tactics were, essentially, to close in on the enemy quickly, break 
through their defensive formation, concentrate his force against only a part of 
the enemy line, and then commit his reserves at the height of battle. Reserves 
were considered so important that they were maintained even at the expense of 
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this doctrine. Their attacks were always carned out at the right moment, in a 
very decisive way, and using stratagems such as hiding the reserves. 
Written fighting instructions were issued occasionally by various naval com­
manders operating in Renaissance Venice. The earliest of these efforts was the 
Orders and Signals of the Venetian Fleet in 1365.4 These orders included specific 
operational fonnations as well as signals to indicate the fleet commander's intent 
By the time the Battle of Lepanto ( 1571 )  occurred, the primarily unwritten 
doctrine and tactics of galley warfare in the Mediterranean had been perfected 
to the degree that each side could have been considered a master of the naval 
art. Indeed, the battle was fought much the same as a joust between knights, 
with all of the fonnalities accorded gentlemen under anns. Although the 
Christian commander at Lepanto, Don John of Austria, was Spanish, many 
ships were from Italian city-states, the largest contribution coming from Venice. 
The Christian fleet numbered well in excess of two hundred galleys, galleasses, 
and subsidiary ships of sail, and the Turkish fleet had roughly the same strength. 
The Christians, who held superiority in numbers of cannon (roughly 2.4: 1), 
fought as an integrated multinational force. Overall political objectives were 
set by Pope Pius V and Philip II of Spain. 
Before sailing, each Christian captain received written orders from Captain­
General Don John outlining specific cruising and battle stations. The overall tactical 
objectives were to select an opponent, ram, and then board in a general milie. The 
Turkish commander in chief, Ali Pasha, fought a brave hattie but in the end lost 
his life, and his force was defeated. In part, this was due to Christian superior 
firepower, technology (ship construction, providing protection for the crew, and 
personal armor), new ship design (galleasses), favorable winds, and doctrineftac­
tics (galleasses placed ahead of the galleys and cannon used more freely and at 
point blank range). Lepanto signalled the virtual end to traditional galley tactics 
and the age of oared ships, and the superior ships of sail were ushered in. 
The general concepts of doctrine were rarely described by the admirals or 
routinely codified on paper during medieval times. Doctrine at that time was 
deduced from events that happened at sea. One significant exception to this rule 
was Pantero Pantera, who was an academic and a ship commander of the 
Pontiffs navy. His L 'armata navale (The Naval Fleet), in two volumes ( 16 14), 
managed to condense all that was known about the art of warfare at sea. � 
Pre-Unitary Navies: 1 750- 1 86 1  
During most of this period, pre-unitary navies carried out independent 
campaigns and rarely fought as a single fleet. It is important to examine their 
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histories separately, up to the birth of the Italian Navy after the establishment 
of the Kingdom of Italy in 1 86 1 .  
Among the navies of the Italian peninsula, those of Naples and the Kingdom 
of Sardinia were most significant, although they were minor in comparison to 
great oceanic navies such as those of England, France, and Holland. Most of 
the time, the navies of the Italian peninsula were used in cooperation with the 
British or French fleets to counter piracy in North Africa or contain wars in 
progress in the Mediterranean. Warfare at sea consisted primarily of combat 
involving single ships or squadrons, naval blockades, and off-shore bombard­
ments. 
The frequent foreign invasions and the ever-present political instability in 
the numerous states affected the preparedness of the fleets. Navy personnel. 
especially the officer corps, were often recruited from the army. from other 
Italian states, or from foreign nations. A truly national consciousness of a 
national navy would have to await unification. 
Neapoli.lan Navy. The history of Naples is intertwined with that of Spain. hence 
Neapolitan Navy doctrine has a strong Spanish influence. In the mid- 1 700s. 
the situation in the fledgling Kingdom of Naples's navy was anything but good. 
It was not well organized. and it had no recognized doctrine for the employment 
of its forces. The arrival of the British adventurer, Admiral John Edward Acton, 
in 1 779 marked a clear turning point. Acton. who was summoned by Bourbon 
King Charles m. had served previously in the French Navy and with Tuscan 
naval forces. He started a thorough renewal program with the objective of 
providing the navy with more wide-ranging international experience. Acton 
brought experienced foreign officers and skillful engineers to Naples. and he 
sent Neapolitan officers and technicians to other countries to be trained. Several 
Neapolitan officers embarked on Spanish and French ships and took part in the 
American War of Independence. 
Acton 's concept of naval force employment went beyond coastal defense; it 
counseled an active role in distant-water multinational operations. Neapolitan 
ships were active and successful during the hostilities between Spain and 
Algeria in 1 784 as well as in other circumstances. In a few years, the Neapolitan 
fleet reached the level of capability needed for the political role to which the 
Kingdom of Naples aspired. At that time Naples was the major coastal state in 
Italy. 
With the outbreak of the French Revolution, Naples fought bravely with 
Britain to defend Toulon. In 1 795 the Neapolitan Navy fought at Capo Noli 
with a British squadron commanded by Admiral Lord William Hotham. against 
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the French fleet led by Rear Admiral Pierre Martin. One British ship was 
commanded by Horatio Nelson and a Neapolitan frigate was commanded by 
Admiral Francesco Caracciolo. 
Naples was subsequently conquered, and King Ferdinand IV escaped to 
Palenno, Sicily, on board one of Nelson's warships, escorted by a Neapolitan 
naval division commanded by Admiral Caracciolo. The remainder of the fleet 
was burned to prevent its capture. After this mission, Caracciolo returned to 
Naples. He was disappointed by the surrender of his king and turned against 
the British. Caracciolo was eventually captured by Nelson, court-martialled, 
condemned, and hanged on board the Neapolitan corvette Minerva that he once 
commanded when he held the rank of commander. 
Despite various contrasting evaluations, Caracciolo is considered a patriot 
by many. This episode reveals how the doctrines of the Royal Navy and the 
Neapolitan Navy differ in duty and loyalty. Nelson was governed by his duty 
as a cotnmander to maintain absolute loyalty to his sovereign under all condi­
tions and in all situations. Caracciolo, however, could no longer be inspired 
with duty and loyalty toward a sovereign who had abandoned the capital under 
foreign threat; Caracciolo felt that supporting the new ideals of liberty , equality, 
freedom and justice was his first duty as a citizen and as a soldier. 
This sense of perceiving and interpreting is found again in the history of the 
Neapolitan and Italian navies. In this period, the old Neapolitan Navy was 
divided in two-fighting each other. A small Neapolitan Navy was allied to the 
French, while the larger Sicilian Navy was allied to Britain. The conduct of the 
Neapolitan Navy was very aggressive and they showed determination against 
a far more powerful British fleet. 
In 1 8 14, an interesting book by Giulio Rocco (who had served in the Spanish 
Navy), titled Riflessioni suI potere marittimo (Considerations on Maritime 
Power), was printed in Naples. Considerations on Maritime Power introduced 
the tenn maritime power, which was nearly unheard of at that time. The book 
defmed the tenn's most important elements and the relationships between those 
elements. 
After the defeat of Napoleon in Russia, the Bourbons returned to Naples 
( 1 8 15) and once again the navy was reorganized. Maritime responsibilities were 
shared between three maritime areas (Naples, Palermo, and Messina) and new 
doctrine was established. Admiral Acton's doctrine was updated with the 
publication of the Regulations of the Royal Navy, which was also influenced 
by French and Spanish doctrine. 
For example, as contained in earlier Spanish doctrine, some Neapolitan 
officers (vessel officers) were tasked to fight, while others, known as pilots, 
96 
Donolo * Italy 
were responsible for seamanship. Vessel officers were predominantly of noble 
origin, while the pilots came from all classes. Enlisted specializations were 
similarly split into artillery cannoneers, whose duty included vigilance over 
the ship, and sailors who handled the sails and other seamanship duties. The 
Neapolitan Navy had a fleet with good material condition, but one that was 
not particularly useful because of the poor level of training for officers and 
crews. Military and patriotic spirit were lacking, and the cannoneers were not 
convinced either of the sailors' good will toward them or of their own good 
chances for survival. 
During the periods 1 820- 1 830, the Neapolitan Navy became aware of the 
new technical possibilities in propUlsion. In the 1830s the Kingdom of the Two 
Sicilies (Naples and Sicily) built many steamships of excellent quality. In 1 825 
Neapolitan ships had carried out a bombardment against Tripoli to convince 
the Bey of Tripoli to suspend his piracy activities. A similar operation was 
carried out in 1 833, in conjunction with Sardinian ships, against Tunisia. 
The Neapolitan Navy did not normally deploy outside their national waters. 
The government feared that crews could be contaminated by liberal thinking, 
and given the 1 820 revolt in Naples as well as elsewhere in Italy, its fears were 
probably justified. One exception to this rule was its deployment of ships to 
Brazil and to the Rio della Plata in 1843. 
In 1 848 the Neapolitan Navy deployed with some sections of the army to 
the Adriatic Sea where they joined Sardinian and Venetian ships to defend a 
new republican government in Venice against Austria. This campaign was led 
by Admiral Raffaele de Cosa. Later, after facing a revolt in Naples, the king 
withdrew his ships and troops and sent them to attack republican secessionists 
in Sicily. This withdrawal created severe problems of conscience for Admiral 
de Cosa, who was tom between obedience to the king 's orders and his desire 
to participate in events that were crucial to the independence and unity of Italy. 
De Cosa resigned from the navy in a situation similar to that faced by 
Francesco Caracciolo. 
The Neapolitan Navy operated for the last time in 1 860 in an unsuccessful 
opposition to the landing in Sicily of General Giuseppe Garibaldi and his corps 
of volunteers. The navy also supported the abortive attempt to retake the island. 
During the conquest of Sicily, Garibaldi set up a small but aggressively trained 
Sicilian navy. It created its own regulations and was equipped with crews and 
ships that were mostly from the merchant navy. The Sicilian Navy captured 
Neapolitan ships and supported landing operations which resulted in the even­
tual capture of Naples. 
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Sardinian-Piedmontese Navy. The island of Sardinia also has a mixed heritage, 
with Spanish ancestry. Piedmont is located near the French border in the region 
of Turin. These two regions were once combined as the Kingdom of Sardinia. 
The establishment of a Sardinian-Piedmontese navy, or Sardinian navy, took 
place sometime after the founding of the Kingdom of Sardinia under the 
leadership of Savoy (part of Piedmont). It was originally a small navy with light 
units, dedicated mainly to battle with the pirates infesting the coasts of Sardinia. 
By 1 764, this navy had grown to include frigates that could be operated at a 
considerable distance from the shoreline. Crews were composed mainly of 
Ligurians (Genoa's region). The service was managed in the British custom, 
and commands were given in French. This small navy also had a naval infantry 
that was used more to defend coastal areas than for offensive tasks. 
Sardinia defended itself successfully against French attacks under Napoleon. 
In 1 796, the king, Carlo Emanuele IV of Piedmont, escaped to and obtained 
refuge in Sardinia. The navy continued its primary activity of coastal defense 
and actions against pirates-but now in cooperation with the British. Napoleon 
could not tolerate having Sardinian ports available to the British and attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to prevent their use of Sardinian waters. 
After the Napoleonic wars (Vienna Conference, 1 8 1 5), Sardinia reclaimed 
Piedmont and acquired Liguria. The Sardinian Navy became better regulated, 
and a new navy commander, Admiral Giorgio des Geneys, established two 
naval infantry regiments that included their own organic artillery. The maritime 
areas of Genoa, Villafranca, and Cagliari, and a marine school ( 1 8 1 6) were 
established as well. The number of ships was increased, and the Sardinian Navy 
became a particularly efficient instrument. Ships were used for diplomacy and 
to support a coup at Tripoli ( 1 822). 
In 1 826 Admiral des Geneys published a new set of regulations concerning 
service, discipline, uniforms and artillery, and the administrative regulations 
were enacted in 1 830. All regulations were in French; the Italian language 
became obligatory later. 
During the Greek War of Independence ( 1 82 1 - 1830), the Sardinian Navy 
was used to protect the merchant traffic of Sardinia and its consulates in the 
Mediterranean. From 1 834, Sardinian warships operated in South American 
waters, especially off Brazil and in the Mar del Plata. Cruises to the Pacific 
were made via Cape Hom. 
In 1 837 steam propulsion was introduced, starting with merchant ships and 
corvettes. In March 1 840, the Sardinian Navy was reorganized once again, and 
a general staff of the combined forces was introduced. A solid merchant fleet 
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developed gradually alongside the navy. and Giuseppe Garibaldi was one of 
the captains of this merchant fleet. 
After the Milan uprising in 1848. King Carlo Alberto declared war against 
Austria. Sardinian naval infantry took part in the land campaign. while a 
squadron under Admiral Giuseppe Albini was sent to the Adriatic and joined 
the Neapolitan fleet in support of the new Republic of Venice. On 15 April 
1848. Sardinian ships hoisted for the ftrst time the Italian tricolor flag with the 
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Savoy 's coat of anns. The Sardinian squadron was involved in actions against 
the forts and in blockades of Trieste and in action along the Venetian coast. 
Following the Annistice, the Sardinian Navy cooperated extensively with the 
French and the British. 
In 1855, the Kingdom of Sardinia participated with France and Great Britain 
in the Crimean War against Russia. A IS,OOO-man expeditionary corps was sent 
by sea to the Crimean peninsula. The Sardinian Navy, in cooperation with the 
British, sustained the main logistic effort, assuring the continuous flow of 
supplies from Italy and managing merchant ships' requisition and hire. Its 
integration with the allied naval forces was outstanding, and the experience 
acquired was extremely important five years later when the Sardinian Navy 
became the core of the Italian Navy. 
Venetian Navy. The Venetian Navy was famous for its rigorous regulations, 
healthy administrative principles, and the close relationships between its Su­
perintendents and the Senate of the Republic. In wartime, the Republic selected 
a Captain General to whom absolute power was given. When the war was over, 
the Captain General was not to return directly to the city of Venice itself; he 
was to berth his ships in some other port and travel from there to Venice in 
civilian clothes. There, his action was judged by the Senate. 
Trade relations with the East, which once constituted the fortune of the 
Venetian Republic, were reduced greatly after the discovery of America, when 
trading interests switched from the Mediterranean Sea to the Atlantic Ocean. 
The Venetian Navy, which had maintained absolute dominion of the Adriatic 
Sea and part of the Mediterranean for centuries, became a modest one, operating 
in a limited number of areas after the loss of foreign bases. By the middle 1700s, 
Venice had become an advocate of peace and neutrality. Yet the Venetian Navy 
still held some military power and could not be ignored. On the other hand, it 
lacked the spiritual and political energy necessary for a warfighting force. 
In 1749 the Republic conceived a league with the Knights of Malta's naval 
forces, those of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and the Pontiff's fleet to 
counter the threat of North African piracy. In 1767 Venice took the initiative 
and sent a naval squadron under Admiral Angelo Erno, which landed in Algeria 
and forced the Bey of Algiers to take action. In 1784 Venice sent Admiral Emo 
again to North Africa, where he bombarded the port of Susa, set a naval 
blockade at Tunis and Susa, and then monitored from Malta the pirates' 
activities. Admiral Erno's transport of heavy cannons through shoal waters 
deserves mention. Cannons were off-loaded on special rafts; thus he surprised 
the enemy and created a tactic that since then has been copied by many others. 
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After Napoleon's conquest of Venice in 1797, many of the best ships and 
crews of the Venetian Navy were incorporated directly into the French Navy. 
When Napoleon was defeated, Venice was turned over to Austria and its navy 
became the Imperial Royal Venetian Navy. In 1 848, the Venetians rose up 
against Austria and proclaimed a short-lived republic. Many of the Imperial 
Royal Venetian Navy ships stationed at Venice, whose crews were mostly of 
Italian origin, chose to side with the new republic. The biggest part of the fleet 
was stationed at Pola (on the Istrian Peninsula) and remained loyal to Austria. 
The Venetian Republic was reincorporated into Austria in 1 849 and remained 
within the Austrian empire until its cession to Italy in 1866. 
Other Pre-Unification Navies. There were many other states in pre-unification 
Italy that had navies. Two of them are covered here-the navies of the Pontiff 
and that of Tuscany-although their influence on Italian Navy doctrine is 
negligible. 
The main objective of the Pontiff's navy was to take an active part in the 
struggle against the non-believers, the Moslems. The Vatican navy was 
particularly active in the sixteenth century when it participated, with a large 
number of ships, in all important naval encounters of that period-including 
Lepanto ( 1 57 1) .  It also cooperated with navies belonging to several knightly 
military orders. When Napoleon conquered Rome in 1 808, the Pontiff's 
navy was disbanded; and in 1 860 all papal ships were incorporated by the 
Italian Navy, when the papal port city of Ancona became part of the 
Kingdom of Italy. 
The Tuscan Navy, inheritor of the medieval Pisan Republic Navy, decayed 
progressively over the years due to the constant reduction of budget. Despite 
this, Tuscan ships participated, along with the Venetians, in battles against the 
Turks. Its last major combat was during a war over Corfu ( 1 7 1 5 - 17 1 8).  From 
the mid- 1700s, the Tuscans limited their naval operations to defense against 
the Turkish and the North African pirates infesting the Tuscan coasts. In 1775, 
a Tuscan squadron operating off North Africa was under the command of John 
Acton, who later went on to serve with the Neapolitan Navy. 
Due to the limited number of ships available, the Granducato of Tuscany 
eventually needed the help of other Italian states to protect his trade lines along 
the North African coast. Generally, it was the Kingdom of Naples that supported 
this suppression. In the nineteenth century the Tuscan Navy was reduced to 
even more modest dimensions. 
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The Birth of the Italian Navy: 1 86 1 - 1 882 
The official date of the birth of the Italian Navy is 17 March 1 86 1 .  when the 
Sardinian. Neapolitan. and Tuscan navies. and a few remaining ships from the 
Pontiffs navy. joined together. The intent of the new Kingdom of Italy was to 
create a navy appropriate for the international role the government wanted to 
fulfill. This became evident when Camillo Benso di Cavour. the first prime 
minister. stated that "it is the duty of a state located in the middle of the 
Mediterranean to create [the basis for] the widest development of its naval 
resources. taking advantage of the elements of force of its own provinces." 
But Italian naval policy was strongly conditioned by the prevalent land 
mentality of the politicians. The ships belonging to the kingdom were extremely 
diverse. with crews of different cultures and no common doctrine. From the 
doctrinal point of view. an autonomous Italian idea was slow to emerge. Even 
the recent events of the American Civil War were not well known. and the 
technological innovations adopted in those circumstances received only mini­
mal attention. On the other hand. the tactics of French Admiral Luis Bouet-Wil­
laumez and Russian Grigorij Boutakov were followed closely. 
Bouet-Willaumez wrote a series of publications that pioneered advances in 
navy doctrine. His Batailles de terre et de mer ( 1855). attached to a Project de 
tactique navale. outlined provisional tactics for screw-propelled steamships. 
Bouet-Willaumez's work was then adopted by the French Ministry of Marine 
in the form of their own doctrinal books. They were published in 1 857. outlining 
doctrine for ships of sail and steam. These French ministry doctrinal works and 
Bouet-Willaumez's other writings. especially his Tactique supplementaire: d 
[ 'usage d'uneflotte cuirassee ( 1 8 65). were adopted by the Italian Navy in 1 866 
as the Regolamento di tattica (Tactical Regulations).6 This doctrine paralleled 
a government decision in 1 863 to shift from sail to steam and ironclads. 
The tactical principles of French doctrine were applied. at least theoretically. 
in the famous and instructive Battle of Lissa ( 1 866). They inc luded principles 
of war-rules for combat-and movements of war-maneuvers to be executed 
by the main body and the flanks of the steam-propelled fleet to gain ad­
vantageous positions for combat. The general strategy for employment of the 
fleet at sea was to form up with the French. Spanish. or British against a common 
foe. Yet in its first battle. the Italian Navy fought alone. 
In 1 866. the Italian fleet. under Admiral Count Carlo Pellion di Persano. met 
an Austrian force. commanded by Rear Admiral Wilhelm von Tegetthoff. off 
the island of Lissa (now Vis) in the Adriatic in the first battle between annored 
fleets. Persano's objective was to cover an abortive landing operation. Upon 
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sighting the Austrian fleet, the Italians sortied their ironclads from the landing 
area to engage the enemy. Tegetthoff committed both his ironclads and wooden 
ships and scored a resounding defeat of the Italians. preventing the seizure of 
the island and driving off the Italian fleet. 
Persano's fleet had twice the combat potential of the Austrians. Persano, 
however, had neither conducted practice drills nor met with his captains to 
discuss how best to employ an ironclad fleet in conformance with the new 
doctrine. Instead, he assumed that the standing instructions and the new tactical 
doctrine were all that were needed and would be followed. The result was a 
disastrous melie. The embryonic Italian Navy had not yet had the time to 
exercise its new doctrine or formulate a national officer corps. It certainly had 
not had the years of experience that Horatio Nelson could count on when he 
trusted his "band of brothers" to carry out his standing orders. 
In what has been described as one of the most unfortunate ideas that an 
admiral could have ever conceived, Persano changed his flagship while his 
battle line was still forming and did not inform anyone; due to a squall. his 
subordinates did not see it. Unfortunately, Tegetthoff observed the slow-down 
of ships and a break in the line. He aggressively maneuvered his force to take 
advantage. After the presumed flagship was sunk. one of Persano's subor­
dinates signalled for chase and freedom of maneuver, but that signal was 
cancelled by Persano who, in doing so, made it known that he was aboard 
another ship. 
The lessons of the Battle of Lissa weighed heavily upon the Italian Navy for 
many years hence. Although most analysts have demonstrated how this battle 
mistakenly influenced warship construction for the next thirty years (a resur­
rection of the ram), it was also to have a dramatic impact on understanding the 
importance of doctrine. Persano formed his fleet to maximize the performance 
of their guns, rather than the ram. but then spoiled the plan with his decision to 
shift flags. The Italians failed to take advantage of their superiority in combat 
potential or their formation's superiority over that of the Austrians (who were 
formed to maximize ramming). 
The defeat must be imputed primarily to the lack of understanding between 
Admiral Persano and his commanders and to the modest qualities of the admiral 
himself. Persano did not take advantage of the greater flexibility of his line 
formation against Admiral Tegetthoff's wedge. Furthermore, after losing two 
ships, he did not counterattack despite the fact that he still outnumbered the 
Austrians. Austria used older and less well-armed ships, but the strong per­
sonality of Admiral Tegetthoff fixed trust in his crews and commanders, leading 
them to success. 
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The negative results of the Battle of Lissa had serious political and moral 
repercussions for the navy. The battle, however, increased the public's and 
politicians' awareness of conditions in the navy. Political leaders began to 
understand the importance of sea control and its relationship with land opera­
tions. They began to realize that the transport of troops and coastline defense 
were not the only roles that navies played in influencing land operations directly 
and strategically. 
The Battle of Lissa also marked the starting point of new naval thought. The 
Rivista Marittima (Naval Journal), born in 1 868, became an important vehicle 
for the discussion of new doctrine and strategy. Its writings captured the 
attention of the public and Parliament. It demonstrated the importance of the 
navy. It proposed new fleet assets and organizational reforms as a consequence 
of the lessons learned from the defeat at Lissa and of new technological 
innovations. It was recognized that many of the ships that had fought at Lissa 
lost in one-against-one battles, so shipbuilding concepts shifted toward larger 
ships. 
The follow-on debates on the pages of this journal helped to obtain the funds 
necessary to achieve qualitative and numerical levels comparable to those of 
both the Spanish and Austrian maritime forces. Despite some disagreements, 
from there on, the navy was considered an indispensable instrument in the 
conduct of solid foreign policy, ruling the colonies and assuring territorial 
defense. 
The total renovation of the fleet was conceived and committed with a 
ten-year plan. In 1 869 and in 187 1 ,  the Minister of the Navy, Rear Admiral 
Augusto Riboty, presented an Organic Plan/or the Navy to the Parliament. In 
1 870, planning started for new battleships as well. These included the first 
warships with revolving towers and 450mm caliber naval artillery; they were 
considered by many, especially the French, to be the most powerful ships of 
the time. 
Italian Navy units stationed in the Red Sea from 1 879 on, sometimes for very 
extended periods, carried out naval diplomacy missions in support of Italian 
colonies. The ships also carried out operations in direct and indirect support of 
the army, using arms and providing logistic sustainment, especially during the 
occupation of Eritrea ( 1 882- 1 890). 
In 1 88 1  the navy was debated again. The debate, involving both offtcers and 
Parliament, was about building battle cruisers instead of battleships. Numerous 
boards on the subject expressed different views. The new technologies had 
introduced many innovations, which gave rise to numerous questions about how 
to proceed. Old prejudices slowed down innovations. Despite the positive 
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results obtained with the new warships, many people believed that the navy was 
too ambitious; they argued for a fleet of smaller units. 
The supporters of large ships used examples from the British and American 
navies' experiences as ammunition against the idea that large ships were too 
slow or awkward in modem combat. Big ship supporters also had to refute the 
idea that the combat potential of a small number of large ships could be obtained 
equally by adding together the tonnage of a large number of small ships. Such 
an approach provides only equivalent tonnage and has no bearing on combat 
potential. This discussion was useful to defme criteria for shipbuilding and to 
start considering political-military objectives, given fmancial possibilities. 
Under Minister of the Navy Ferdinand Acton ( 1 880- 1883), Italian naval 
shipbuilding programs and doctrine were strongly influenced by the French 
jeune ecole. Italian ship procurement shifted to fast, lightly armored ships. The 
navy supported coastal fortifications and mine fields in conjunction with small 
well-armed naval units in defense of the coast. A few large battleships were 
also maintained, not to contest command of the western Mediterranean but to 
act rather as a mobile fleet-in-being. If actually used in combat, they would act 
primarily as coastal defenders, breaking up enemy formations that attempted a 
landing, or engaging in shore bombardment. 
Acton's program was opposed by Admiral Simone Pacoret de Saint Bon and 
Admiral Benedetto Brin. Each wrote books in 1 88 1 ,  La questione delle navi 
(The Question of the Ships) by Saint Bon, and La nostra Marina Militare (Our 
Military Navy) by Brin, which sought to argue the case for large capital ships 
and the decisive battle. 
The role of the navy during the occupation of Somalia was to support the 
initial invasion and subsequent diplomatic and military actions. During this 
period, the navy gained vast experience in distant operations. Numerous 
diplomatic missions outweighed efforts to limit the navy to the defense of 
maritime boundaries, and naval expeditions in the Far East and in South 
America supported this expanded role. Some twenty-one circumnavigations 
around the world also contributed to developing the navy's views and to 
supporting a greater role for the navy. 
People became more aware of the need for harmonizing the basic preparation 
of naval officers. The two existing naval schools at Genoa and Naples were 
unified to form a single naval academy in Livorno, between 1 878 and 188 1 .  In 
the meanwhile, some profound changes were occurring in the international 
situation. The French conquest of Tunisia in 188 1 affected Italian interests and 
drew Italy out of isolation. France, rather than Austria, became the assumed 
enemy. A costly arms competition with France overtaxed Italian resources and 
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left its navy with an excellent theory of naval construction but inadequate assets 
in the water. 
From 1 882 to World War I 
In 1 882 Italy signed the Triple Alliance Treaty with Gennany and Austria­
Hungary. The main objective of this treaty was the defense of the coastal 
regions. The French threat was assumed to be an initial strike at the Italian fleet, 
bombardment of the Ligurian and Tyrrhenian coasts, then neutralization of the 
railways followed by an amphibious landing which would cut Italy in two and 
outflank the land front. The Treaty was renewed in 1 89 1 .  
Admiral Giovanni Bettolo, Minister of the Navy at the tum of the century, 
succeeded in starting a new shipbuilding program. His plan consisted of 
building small, fast, annored ships carrying large caliber artillery, as wel l as 
new torpedo units. 
One of the more important naval theorists of the 1 880s and 1 890s was 
Commander Domenico Bonamico. Bonamico first attained prominence with 
the publication of La difesa marittima dell 'Italia (Maritime Defense of Italy) 
in 1 88 1 .  In this first work, Bonamico argued that navies were as important as 
land forces for the defense of Italy. Bonamico's ideas evolved with the publi­
cation of a subsequent book, La situazione navale mediterranea (The Naval 
Situation in the Mediterranean). In this later book, Bonamico aimed to develop 
a new regional organization able to control the vital points of the Mediterranean 
and thereby prevent general European wars. 
Bonamico's  major work was II problema marittimo dell 'ItaUa (The 
Maritime Problem of ltaly) in 1 899. Bonamico accepted the increased role for 
the navy in the defense of the national coastline. He outlined the fleet's main 
tasks as cooperation with the anny, control over the Tyrrhenian Sea, prevention 
of attacks from the sea, and monitoring the mainland and island coastal areas. 
Additional duties were the protection of coastal cities and installations against 
naval bombardments, the defense of maritime trade, and the safety of the 
colonies. Following his prescriptions, Italy established a series of fortified naval 
bases on its own soil, from which the fleet-in-being would maintain its vigil . 
In another major work, II potere marittimo (Maritime Power). Bonamico 
detailed the movement and dynamics of maritime power. Using historical case 
studies from the age of sail, he introduced the basic principles of war at sea. 
Bonamico argued that the military importance and influence of navies was no 
less than ever before. Bonamico states that: .. the entity and the character of a 
fleet must depend, first of all, on the objectives that the nations wish to achieve." 
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Bonamico pointed out that while French strategy had to be essentially against 
Britain, Italian strategy should be based on defense against maritime invasions. 
Without having attained success in defense against maritime invasions, success 
in other mission areas was irrelevant. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the writings of Captain Alfred Thayer 
Mahan in the United States, Vice Admiral Philip Colomb, and Major Charles 
E. Callwell in Britain had also added to the knowledge of naval war in the age 
of sail. Bonamico, Mahan, Colomb, and Call well collected lessons of maritime 
history and recorded the naval doctrines of the time. These authors had a 
resounding effect on the Italian Navy. Bonamico even wrote a book about 
Mahan and Callwell.7 Mahan and Bonamico are considered to be, in Italy, the 
most important philosophers of naval theory because of their ability to learn the 
proper lessons of naval history. 
Another significant author at the century 's end was Commander Augusto 
Vittorio Vecchj, also known as Jack La Bolina. Veechfs book. Storia generale 
della Marina Militare (General History of the Military Navy) in 1 892, docu­
mented the history of the Italian Navy, an essential step in the formulation of 
doctrine. Between 1 898 and 1902, Camillo Manfroni wrote a complete history 
of medieval Italian navies from the middle of the ftrst millennium to the Battle 
of Lepanto. Manfroni developed historical information on construction techni­
ques, naval customs, crew composition, armaments, and the nature of expedi­
tions and the organization of the fleets. 
Italian naval doctrinal thought received a further impulse from Lieutenant 
Giovanni Seehi. Seehi, an instructor at the Naval Academy, published his 
Elementi di arte militare mllrittimll (Elements of Military Maritime Art) in two 
volumes between 1903 and 1906. In addition to a standard and orthodox 
treatment of naval strategy, emphasizing war at sea and the deeisive battle, 
Sechi's book expressed an interest in combined operations and the role of 
logistics. 
Seehi emphasized principles of naval strategy based on a clear definition of 
objectives, followed by a deduction of the operations that are possible, given 
the capability of the fleet He completed a theoretical treatment indicating which 
situations required temporary and which the absolute control of the sea. Seehi 
argued that strategic success, not tactical, could be pursued with two possible 
altematives: a strategic offensive war or a strategic defensive war. Unusually, 
he interpreted the concept of fleet-in-being as an option that maintained naval 
forces deployed at sea rather than in port. Seehi, who influenced the Italian 
govemment to obtain fast dreadnoughts, was promoted eventually to admiral 
and served as Chief of Staff of the Navy after World War I. 
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Two additional books, Stona delle evolutioni navali (History of Naval 
Evolutions) in 1899 and Tattica nelle grandi battaglie navali (Tactics in the 
Great Naval Battles) in 1 898 by Rear Admiral G. Gavotti, were mostly descrip­
tive but again fonned the basis of an understanding of how navies fought so 
that doctrine could be fonnulated by the navy. Lieutenant Lamberto Vannutelli 
attempted to analyze night combat between ironclads and torpedo boats.8 
Lieutenant Romeo Bemotti published a series of articles in Rivista Marittima 
which addressed doctrinal issues being debated in the fleet. His book, 
Fondamenti di tattica navale (Fundamentals of Naval Tactics) in 19 10, was 
translated into English and published by the U.s. Naval Institute.9 This book 
addresses both elements of maneuvering as well as specific tactical maneuvers 
and the conduct of battle as a whole. Bemotti argued that "war is decided by 
means of a decisive battle." He also addressed the dividing of fleets into 
principal and flying squadrons (whose job it was to execute an envelopment 
maneuver, or crossing the "'), the proper distance for engagements as being 
that which allows the employment of all the fleet's assets, tactical versus 
strategic victory, and warfare of annihilation versus attrition. Bemotti did not 
develop historical examples for his doctrinal and tactical discussions but rather 
assumed the reader already knew these. 
The writings of foreign naval scholars also received attention in Italy. The 
pro-jeune ecole book, &sai de strategie navale ( 1 893), by French Commander 
Gabriel Fontin (pseudonym H. Monrechant) and Lieutenant Paul Vignot (pseu­
donym Commandant Z), was translated into Italian. Sir Julian Stafford 
Corbett's historical analyses of doctrine, strategy, and tactics in the days of sail, 
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy ( 1 9 1 1), was also studied in Italy. Russian 
Admiral Stephan O. Makarov wrote a book, Rassuz.Jukniia po voprosam 
morskoi taktiki (Discussion of Questions in Naval Tactics) in 1 898, which was 
translated into Italian. 
At the beginning of the new century, the Triple Alliance had begun to weaken 
and appeared somewhat unreliable. Rivalry and disagreement arose with 
Austria. By the end of 1905, Austria was again a potential adversary, stimulat­
ing an Italian-French reconciliation. The navy was encouraged to strengthen 
coastal defenses around Venice and to improve the support capability of the 
port of Brindisi. Joint exercises with the land forces were intensified. More 
attention was given to increasing the combat potential of the fleet. The lessons 
learned from the Battle of Tsushima (1905) led to the construction of dread­
noughts and other fleet modernization efforts. 
There were still many disagreements in the country and controversies over 
the utility of the fleet and expenses needed to improve it. Building was started 
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on coastal annoted ships and lightweight submarines designed to operate in the 
Adriatic. Naval strategic thought was inspired by Admirals Bettolo (Chief of 
Staff from 1907 to 19 1 1 ) and Thaon di Revel (Chief of Staff from 19 13  to 1915  
and from 19 17 to 19 19).  The navy budget was increased i n  1909 and in 191 1 ,  
allowing the acquisition of new fleet units. 
In the meanwhile, the training of officers was becoming much more ap­
propriate to the level of technological and doctrinal progress in the navy. The 
School of Naval Warfare was established at La Spezia in 1908 and was 
transferred after World War I to its present location in Livomo with the new 
name of Institute of Maritime Warfare. The school was the location of official 
naval doctrine development. 
Around 19 10, Italian naval preparation begin to consider the difficulties 
associated with warfare in the Adriatic. The Adriatic 's geography was a 
challenging factor. 
• Its shallow waters facilitated minelaying but hampered the employment of 
submarines. 
• Well-protected enemy coasts were close by. 
• The Austrian fleet could move with relative safety through the islands of 
the Dalmatian coast. 
• Italy lacked bases between Venice and Brindisi. 
• The low national coastline made defense difficult. 
The mainstream of the Italian Navy concluded that a potential war with Austria, 
therefore, had to be fought on the offensive at sea. Results of the analysis fueled 
additional debates between the proponents of battleships and those who desired 
to reinforce the coastal defenses. 
In the meanwhile, the Italian Navy saw extensive service in the war with 
Turkey ( 191 1- 1912). The main Italian flotilla was under the command of the 
Duke of Abruzzi. The navy supported the successful landings of troops and 
took much territory . Coastal towns were shelled and blockades were main­
tained. Successful amphibious landings were made in Tripolitania, Cirenaica, 
and some of the Dodecanese Islands. 
After the war, the navy began to plan for amphibious landings along the 
Adriatic coastline. Plans were made and assets prepared to carry them out, 
taking into account the experience gained with the successful conquest of 
Tripoli during the 191 1 war against Turkey . At Tripoli, new doctrine was 
developed that required the support of sailors specially trained as land fighters. 
These seagoing soldiers prepared the way for the follow-on landing of regular 
army troops, which were to be transported to the objective by the navy. 
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Also during the war against Turkey, aircraft were used by Italy for military 
purposes (in Libya) for the first time in history. Chief of Staff Admiral di Revel 
realized the importance of aircraft in naval war and directed the Navy General 
Staff to study and develop this element. Additional articles on the subject of 
naval operational art by then-Commander Bernotti appeared around this time, 
and some of them were translated into English and published in the u.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings. 10 
World War I 
The Italian Navy's situation before World War I, with its commitments to 
the defense of Libya and the Dodecanese Islands, appeared to be anything but 
easy. The opinion was that the navy was far from prepared to support Italian 
foreign policy. When hostilities broke out involving Austria, Italy's position 
was not initially clear. The navy began preparation to fight in the Adriatic. 
Training was intensified, the defense of ports increased. Light units prepared 
to sortie and plans for landings on the eastern Adriatic coast were reviewed. 
Landings on the coast in support of the Italian Army were intended to distract 
the Austrian forces from the northern theater. 
At the beginning of 19 15 a sound plan for operations in the Adriatic was 
drawn up. It required Italy to maintain an offensive posture with its larger ships 
against a more prudent Austrian Navy, and assumed that the enemy would use 
mines and submarines. The Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary 
officially ended in May 19 15 .  A new agreement between Italy and the Entente 
(France and the United Kingdom) was signed on 10 May 19 15, and Italy entered 
the war against Germany and Austria-Hungary. The combined naval assets of 
the Entente and Italy allowed them to dominate the Adriatic instead of just 
preventing Austrian transits through the Strait of Otranto. 
The contribution the Italian Navy gave to the war effort was important. The 
strategic objectives of the navy's employment were: 
• To cut off Austria from the rest of the world by interrupting its sea lines of 
communication. 
• To protect the maritime flow of friendly supplies to and from Albania and 
in the Mediterranean. 
• To prevent enemy naval operations along the coast. 
• To provide naval support in the Northern Adriatic to Italian land operations. 
Since the Adriatic is essentially a narrow gulf, clashes between large naval 
formations were unlikely and did not take place. During the Italian Army's 
withdrawal to the Piave River in December 1917, Lieutenant Commander Luigi 
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Rizzo sunk the Austrian battleship Wien inside the port of Trieste, using two 
motor torpedo boats. He pioneered a new form of attack in ports against major 
units that refused to fight at sea. 
Italian destroyers and motor torpedo boats struck against the Austrian fleet 
at Porto Buso, Trieste, Parenzo, Fasano, and Buccari. Assault teams attacked 
enemy naval forces twice at Pola. During the latter of these two actions the 
Austrian battleship Viribus Unitis was sunk by a slow-speed, two-seat, manned 
torpedo called a mignatta. The Italian Navy also was instrumental in the 
withdrawal operation of about 1 12,000 soldiers of the Serbian Army and 10,000 
horses from Vlore (in Albania) to CorfU (Greece), and later the transportation 
of an allied expeditionary corps consisting of 97,000 men from Italian harbors 
to Vlore. 
A 66-kilometer-long antisubmarine barrier made of nets was laid down in 
the Strait of Otranto to prevent the transit of Austrian submarines to the 
Mediterranean. This measure was extremely effective and the Austrians tried 
to destroy the barrier. Initial Austrian attempts to break through the Otranto 
Strait barrier ended with a naval clash against Italian and Allied units based in 
Brindisi. The Italians used their motor torpedo boats effectively, hindering the 
Austrian effort. During a second attempt, on 10 June 19 18, near the island of 
Premuda, the Austrian battleship Svent Iv stan was sunk by a motor torpedo boat 
from a section commanded by Lieutenant Commander Luigi Rizzo. Rizzo 
became a national hero, and this date was chosen as Italian Navy Day. 
The Italian Navy also gave a valuable contribution to the development of 
maritime aviation. In 1914 a special aviation organization operated at sea, and 
later, two seaplane support ships were built. During the war Italy used six 
hundred and fifty seaplanes and twelve airships for bombardment, aerial search, 
and blockade operations. The navy's aircraft were also used against ships, but 
with no significant results. 
During the First World War, Italian naval employment was tempered by a 
fear of risking their fleet on unfavorable terms against the Austro-Hungarian 
fleet. ll  The navy developed an excellent doctrine for the use of their torpedo 
boats and achieved remarkable results at very low cost. The Italian Navy took 
no part in Allied convoy efforts and refused to put its fleet under a Mediter­
ranean multinational command. It did, however, form combined units with the 
French. In the closing days of the war, Italian naval forces executed a successful 
amphibious operation at the head of the Adriatic. 
Now-Captain Bernotti continued his writings in Rivista Marittima during the 
war and his work was again translated into English and appeared in the u.S. 
Naval Institute Proceedings. 12 
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Interwar Years 
At the end of World War I, Italy, like many other nations, faced very difficult 
fmancial conditions. The difference between pre-war doctrine and on-the-field 
results was debated, and opinions fell initially into two main camps. One 
opinion was that the lessons of the jeune ecole had been validated by the war. 
Large capital ships had proven vulnerable to small vessels. Now-Admiral 
Bernotti accepted that Italy should take advantage of new technologies afforded 
by the [eune ecole and that fleet doctrine should be based upon a division of 
labor. 1 Bemotti wrote that war "had several fonns: guerrilla, military and 
commercial blockade, troop transport, coastal actions, combined operations 
with the Army." He also noted that during the past war, the main battle fleets 
had been almost inert, while escorts and submarines operated freely. The other 
school asserted that the mere presence of the armored battle squadrons as a 
deterrent to other main fleet units had allowed the smaller vessels more freedom 
of action. German Admiral Reinhardt Scheer's statement that .. the force of 
bigger armored ships was the handle of the dagger and the blade was the 
submarine force" was appreciated in Italy as well. 
Several Italian military experts supported the so-called "underwater revolu­
tion," which emphasized the role of submarines, considering them to be a 
decisive weapon. These experts were countered by others who believed that the 
submarines' success in World War I was due to the lack of preparation of 
surface ships and their low speed. They also considered submarines to be 
unsuitable for night or defensive operations. 
Eventually two main theories emerged on the type of surface naval units to 
be built. One, which we will call the "naval tradition," supported the concept 
of a kernel of traditional warships with large caliber guns and robust self-·defen­
ses. Despite their self-defense capabilities, additional antiair and antisubmarine 
protection would be provided by escort ships. The other theory, which may be 
called the "naval compromise," highlighted the role of quick, light, and heavily 
armed cruisers against primarily non-first-level navies. Their employment was, 
however, limited to offensive operations and required aircraft carriers for 
support. 
During this era, Commander Oscar di Giamberardino wrote extensively 
about these issues. Although di Giamberardino recognized the need to prepare 
for both offense and defense, he was primarily a supporter of the offensive 
form of warfare, i .e.,  destruction of the enemy fleet and forcing the enemy 
to fight in decisive combat. He recognized the usefulness of a small fleet of 
assault vessels, such as in commando-type operations, but considered them 
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non-decisive. The most important of di Giamberardino's works was L 'arte 
della guerra in mare (The Art of War at Sea) in 1937, in two volumes. Its 
theories influenced many politicians and military men, and di Giamberardino 
was eventually promoted to admiral. 
Even more influential were the writings of Commander Giuseppe Fioravan­
zo. 1n a 1925 article in Rivista Marittima, he postulated the need for what would 
eventually become command ships (LCC) in the u.S. Navy. Fioravanzo also 
wrote fA guerra sui mare e Ia guerra integrale (War on the Sea and War as a 
Whole), in two volumes (1 930- 193 1).  Fioravanzo examined the relationship 
between politics, strategy, and maritime power, and he became a supporter of 
the defensive form of warfare. He defmed the defensive in terms of an 
operational-level strategy used to protect the sea lines of communications by 
means of a navy employed on the tactical offensive. 
Fioravanzo felt that the most important characteristic of a military unit 
designed to operate in a relatively small sea, such as the Mediterranean, had to 
be invulnerability. On the other hand, the most important quality of forces 
designed to operate in the open oceans had to be autonomy. Fioravanzo's 
conclusion was that in narrow-sea areas light cruiser types were the worst 
option, as they were "not small enough to be naturally immune, but not big 
enough to be artificially immunized." 
In 1922, Admiral Bemotti was asked to reestablish the Instituto di Guerra 
Marittima (Naval War College) in Livorno. He wrote a series of important 
books, including Fondamenti di strategia navale (Fundamentals of Naval 
Strategy) and II potere marittimo nella grande guerra (Maritime Power in the 
Great War) in 1920; and fA guerra maritima (The Naval War) : studio critico 
sull 'impiego dei mezzi nella guerra mondiale in 1923. Fondamenti di politica 
navale (Bases of Naval Politics) was published in 1927. 
In The Naval War, Bernotti discusses how the navy should be linked to 
politics, the general naval policies of various nations, the maritime character of 
the World War, and new strategic possibilities. He believed that sea lines of 
communication had to be defended with methods other than those used during 
World War I, and he advocated a mixed system of direct protection, including 
antisubmarine and antiair capabilities, and indirect protection. The latter was 
to be achieved by means of offensive actions against enemy forces in port and 
at sea. 
Bernotti shifted his favor to large warships, but he warned that the type of 
ships available in the late 1920s were no longer adequate and could create 
unrealistic illusions, hiding real and urgent problems. Admiral Bernotti sup­
ported the need for aircraft carriers, recognizing that even ifItaly was in a central 
1 1 3 
'I'M Newport Papers 
position in the Mediterranean, "a naval force needing aircraft at any time had 
to include units capable of transporting a relevant number of aircraft." 
Bernotti rejected the construction of a ship-half as an aircraft carrier and 
half as a light cruiser-as a compromise solution to the need proposed at that 
time for naval air power. Admiral Bernotti's thoughts stimulated debates with 
the air force over the control of naval aviation and conflicted with the views of 
Admirals di Giamberardino, Angelo Iachino, and Virgilio Spigai, who were 
against the construction of aircraft carriers. In the end it was Fioravanzo's 
theory of defense that influenced the navy's leaders and resulted in the actual 
employment of the fleet during the next war. 
The theories of General Giulio Doubet received attention as well. Because 
airplanes appeared to be so capable, he assumed that in future wars the greatest 
effort would be sustained in the air. Doubet's doctrine considered the sea to be 
just a space to be flown over. He suggested that the air force would lead 
offensive action, and that the navy and anny would intervene a posteriori to 
exploit the results of the air battle. In Doubet's opinion, cooperation between 
the armed forces was not necessary, since the action carried out by "one head 
only" was better. Those who supported Doubet's air theories thought that a 
naval war could be won by aircraft alone. Air power advocates held the view 
that surface ships could not be defended successfully from air attack. It would 
become evident that the sea allowed surprise air bombardment missions against 
land targets, and fleets would be unsafe when in port. 
In 1923, the Regia Aeronautica was established, and all the aircraft were put 
under the control of this new service. The consequences were that for many 
years air doctrine in support of maritime operations was inadequate, and the 
effectiveness of airborne assets in naval warfare was reduced, with grave 
consequences. 
Most Italian strategic decisions were made without consideration of the naval 
elements. This problem was typified by the experiences of war in Ethiopia 
( 1935- 1936), which was fought to enlarge the empire, but without considera­
tion of the increased vulnerability at sea. Italy now had to use the sea and was 
pitted against the strongest maritime nations of the world. Italy's successful 
participation in the Spanish Civil War from 1936- 1939 created false illusions 
of Italian naval strength; success had actually resulted from the enemy's 
weakness. 
Italian naval thought between the two world wars developed doctrine based 
on a strategy that called for little more than interference with a superior fleet or 
convoys in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean was especially suited to light 
and swift forces built by Italy, which would quickly sortie from bases and strike 
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at a fleet offshore. The fleet would naturally retain a role for coastal defense. 
Another logical role for the Italian Navy was safeguarding the sea lines of 
communication to North Mrica. 
In 1940 Admiral Guido Po, historian of the navy, wrote La guerra sui mari 
(War at Sea), which stated that current Italian naval strategy was based on: 
• The offensive use of warships and extensive use of submarine packs. 
• The exploitation of Italy's geographical position in the Mediterranean to 
disrupt the enemy's communication lines. 
• Seeking the maximum cooperation with the Regia Aeronautica to over­
come the lack of aircraft carriers. 
The Italian Navy did not completely follow this doctrine in the next war. 
Before World War II, Italian naval plans were to keep forces together to 
maximize combat effectiveness against the presumed enemy, France. Due to 
the preponderance of French naval power in the Mediterranean, Italian doctrine 
was defensive, consciously avoiding doctrine for distant operations or even 
guerre de course. 14 More difficult to understand was the lack of doctrinal 
development for counterblockade techniques, night operations, or even convoy 
defense. 
World War II 
Italian Navy units that fought during the war were conditioned by interwar­
era doctrine. For example. cruisers were capable of very high speeds, since 
speed rather than armor was believed to be the best weapon to use against 
numerically and technically superior navies. Despite doctrinal debates on the 
wlnerability of surface ships and the theories of air power, the navy entered 
the war without its own aviation forces, aircraft carriers, and many of the latest 
technical improvements that might have aided air defense. Night-fighting 
equipment and radar were not introduced into the fleet until after their lack was 
felt in actual combat. 
Pre-war doctrinal development and training proved to be inadequate. There 
was no doctrine for joint actions with the Regia Aeronautica. and insufficient 
attention had been given to the management of maritime shipping and its 
protection, the doctrine for night fighting, and the role of aircraft in war at sea. 
The lack of aircraft carriers and inadequate cooperation by the Regia 
Aeronautica in maritime missions afflicted the navy throughout the war. 
Fascist government policy was ambitious, and it overestimated the level of 
military preparedness. The Italian military was told by Benito Mussolini in 
March 1 940  to plan for an air-naval offensive in the Mediterranean; a ground 
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offensive in Yugoslavia, while the anny maintained a defensive posture in 
Albania, Libya, and the Aegean; and a wait-and-see attitude on the French 
border. In April 1940, the Chief of Staff of the Navy, Admiral Domenico 
Cavagnari, summarized the navy's key shortfalls to the head of the government. 
Cavagnari believed that the only possible strategy was defensive, but his 
recommendations were made to an Italian Supreme Command dominated by 
Mussolini and the anny, neither of whom understood naval warfare. 
Concepts for initial operations in the Mediterranean were released by the 
Chief of Staff on 29 May 1940, about two weeks prior to Mussolini's declara­
tion of war. This initial guidance directed the navy to maintain a defensive 
attitude but to exploit opportunities for medium-sized clashes. The navy was to 
prepare to defend itself and act as a fleet-in-being. In fact, no decisive clash 
occurred during the war, although there was a series of minor engagements 
throughout. 
Mussolini assumed that the resupply of Libya would not become an issue 
and mistakenly predicted a short war. Hence, more than two hundred ships of 
the merchant fleet were located and captured outside the Mediterranean at the 
beginning of hostilities. 
The command organization of the Italian forces included a Chief of General 
Staff and three high commands for each of the three anned forces. These high 
commands were headed by the respective service chiefs of staff. Strategic-level 
tasks were issued by the Chief of the General Staff. Centralized strategy and 
doctrine were oriented toward the centralization of responsibilities. Super­
marina, the high command of the navy, converted these strategic-level direc­
tives into orders and forwarded them to subordinate naval commands. These 
Supennarina orders were very detailed, leaving little freedom of action to local 
commanders. The tactical commander was given only limited decision-making 
authority. 
After the brief conflict with France and the removal of the threat of the 
Toulon fleet (i.e., the French fleet}, the Italian Navy was tasked with interdicting 
British ships resupplying Malta and Alexandria; preventing the massing of the 
British fleet; and attacking the British in port. The navy was also told to protect 
Italian shipping going to North Africa. Due to the limited capacities of North 
African ports, the navy had to fonn numerous small convoys instead of a few 
big ones; more than 1 ,200 convoys were fonned in one thirty-six-month period. 
The need to protect its own convoys drained resources and limited the Italian 
fleet's freedom of action against the British. Navy tasking was eventually 
modified to require offensive operations in only the central Mediterranean. 
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Raids against British convoys to Malta produced a number of important 
clashes between the British and Italian fleets. is The most memorable are: Punta 
Stilo (9 July 1940); Cape Teulada (27 November 1942) ; Channel of Sicily ( 1 0  
January 1942) ; Sydra ( 17  December 194 1); and operations "Mid-June" ( 12- 16 
June 1942) and "Mid-August" ( 1 1 - 14 August 1942). 
When Germany strongly suggested to Italy that it sortie a fleet to disrupt 
British sea lines of communication to North Mrica, the Italians complied. The 
resulting Battle of Cape Matapan (28 March 194 1) was an unequal match 
between the British (who had radar, air support, and "Ultra" cryptanalysis data), 
and the Italians (who had none of these). 16 Admiral Angelo Iachino, Com­
mander in Chief Afloat, paid heavily for his fleet's inability to fight at night and 
for its lack of proper weapons-a price that arose from the positions that he 
himself had adopted in programming debates prior to the war. Although the 
severe losses suffered at Matapan are traditionally imputed to the lack of radar 
and suitable doctrine for night fighting, the lack of information and of a clearly 
stated mission are to blame as well. 
Both opponents used the strategy of attacking the enemy in port. The British 
used shipbome planes at Taranto ( 12 November 1940). The Italian Navy was 
successful using assault vessels at Souda Bay (27 March 194 1), midget sub­
marines at Alexandria ( 19 November 1941), and in later attacks at Gibraltar, 
Haifa, and Malta. Forces were trained during the 1930s for the now well­
developed doctrine for raids by assault. During the war, Italy also employed 
naval forces outside of the Mediterranean. Italian Navy submarines operated in 
the mid-Atlantic during the war, and they achieved a high degree of combat 
success, perhaps in excess of that of the average German V-boat. The German 
high command requested assistance for naval operations on the Black Sea 
against the Soviet Vnion and the Italian Navy obliged. Additional units fought 
against the Soviets on Lake Ladoga. 
By the end of 1942, the strategic conduct of war became solely defensive, 
but the effort to maintain the sea lines of communication with Tunisia con­
tinued. On 10 July 1943, the Allies landed in Sicily. As this phase of the war 
approached an end, Italy attempted to maintain what was left of its fleet for use 
in diplomatic negotiations. This decision disappointed many crews and com­
manders who wanted to prove their worth in combat. When the armistice was 
declared (8 September 1943), 65 percent of the remaining Italian fleet was 
moved to Malta in accordance with the orders of the new government; the rest 
were scuttled, disabled by the crews, or taken over by the Germans. 
War against Germany was declared by Italy on 1 3  October 1943. Its ships 
began to cooperate with the Allies for escort operations, withdrawal of Italian 
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soldiers from the Balkans, and for special missions. The San Marco Naval 
Infantry Regiment had an active role in the struggle for the liberation of the 
peninsula. Many cadets from the Naval Academy fought under the command 
of the Italian Corps of Liberation. 
Not everyone had originally supported Italy's 1940 entry into the war, but 
everyone in the navy did his job, nonetheless, even when all was lost. On 8 
September 1943, each individual had the opportunity to choose on which side 
to fight. Some went with the ships to Malta, and some decided to stay or to 
move to the North because they believed their duty was to continue the war 
supporting the Gennans. Such complications for naval personnel, rare in many 
navies, appear to be frequent in the history of Italy. 
There have been many assessments of Italy's perfonnance during the war. 
According to Admiral Iachino, commander of naval forces from 1940 to 1943, 
Italy found itself fighting a modem war with an obsolete naval organization. I? 
In 1956, retired Admiral Bernotti clearly and concisely evaluated Italian 
naval perfonnance in the Second World War in 1 principi della guerra nel 
secondo conflitto mondiale (The Principles of War in the Second World War). 
He affmned that the lessons learned from history emphasized that war presup­
poses risk and that the necessary aggressive attitude consists of both the will 
and the capability to act. In Bernotti 's opinion, the policy of avoiding battle 
with superior forces Was flawed. Bemotti also argued that centralized com­
mands should not expect automatic and passive obedience to orders but should 
encourage initiative and ingenuity by subordinates in combat. 
Italian naval doctrine in World War II can also be criticized because it did 
not acknowledge that when a defensive posture is applied, it must be pursued 
to the end. Cooperation between the anned forces Was not efficient, due to the 
absence of joint doctrine. Furthennore, doctrine did not provide for an assess­
ment of risk that considered the advantages that can be gained even from lost 
battles when the behavior of the forces has been admirable. The gallant behavior 
of officers and crews, even in defeat, must be mentioned because it led directly 
to some of the Italian successes . 
Italian Navy doctrine in World War II was probably proper for the conditions 
at the time. The problems that beset the fleet were beyond the navy 's ability to 
correct. Given the resources provided, the overall strategy of the war effort, 
individual service and overall strategic culture, geography and demographics, 
and the type of government, the Italian Navy performed about as well as could 
be expected. Italy had been a unified nation for about only a hundred years, and 
its navy's performance against the Royal Navy during the war, despite serious 
handicaps, speaks well of its combat effectiveness. 1 8  
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After World War IT 
At the end of the 1940s and at the beginning of the 1950s, the tasks of the 
navy were defmed as .. the defense of the Adriatic and Ionian maritime fronts 
against Yugoslavia." Italy's naval role changed over the years as it adhered to 
the North Atlantic Treaty, the European Economic Community, and the 
Western European Union, and due to its strategic position in the Mediterranean. 
Italy became the link between Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. 
Although Italy had become a medium-sized power, it had first-class respon­
sibilities and duties. 
NATO's southern flank was generally considered less vulnerable to direct 
Soviet aggression, but the likelihood of an air-naval threat in the Mediterranean 
placed a great deal of responsibility on the Italian Navy and imposed the need 
for adequate numerical and qualitative strength. When Italy first joined NATO, 
its tasks were .. the protection of merchant and military shipping, coastal 
defense, and mine countermeasures operations." Over time, the navy's main 
tasks shifted to providing support to the U.S. Sixth Fleet, contributing to the 
maintenance of sea control and to the protection of the sea lines of communica­
tion in the Mediterranean. 
The General Staff of the Navy published a white paper in 1973 entitled 
Prospettive e orientamenti di massima della Marina Militare per il periodo 
1 974-1984 (Principal Perspectives and Orientations for the Military Navy in 
the Period 1974- 1984). The white paper defmed the navy's missions and tasks: 
• A credible and continuous presence. 
• The protection of trade. 
• Offensive operations wherever required. 
• The direct and indirect participation in the protection of the allied naval 
deterrent. 
• Limited-scope immediate reaction with amphibious forces. 
It further outlined fleet improvements that would be required if the navy were 
to be expected to carry out autonomous missions. This document was very 
important because it represented the first exhaustive official statement on the 
naval situation since the end of World War II. 
In the post-World War II period, most commentary on the navy derived from 
unofficial sources. The lack of forceful personalities able to express their ideas 
on naval policy and doctrine was felt strongly. Old writers like Admirals 
Bernotti, Fioravanzo, and di Giamberardino continued to express ideas based 
on their experiences in war and how they applied in the new international 
situation. 
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Admiral di Giamberardino wrote a short piece entitled Il prossimo eon­
fUtto mondiale (The Next World Conflict) in 1 947. He also updated his 
classic L 'arte della guerra in mare (The Art of War at Sea) . In the revised 
version, di Giamberardino stated that "doctrinal preparation in the world war 
turned out to be in part erroneous and lacking. "  He explored the relations 
between politics and the art of war, and defmed the way in which strategic 
maneuver and the employment criteria for naval air forces should be con­
ceived. 
Admiral Bemotti retired in 1 940 but continued to write on tactics and 
doctrine for many years. His later works included 1A Guerra sui mari 1939-
1941 (The War at Sea 1939- 1 94 1) in 1947. He published several articles 
defming a new naval strategy for the Mediterranean and supported emerging 
NATO strategies. In 1956, Admiral Bemotti wrote a fmal piece for the U.S. 
Naval Institute Proceedings in which he attacked the fonner fascist regime in 
Italy during World War 11. 1
9 
This article criticizes the Regia Aeronautica for 
its overly optimistic claims and overriding influence. Bemotti's Cinquanta anni 
nella marina militare (Fifty Years in the Military Navy), in 197 1 ,  was extremely 
wel l received. 
In 1 956 Admiral Fioravanzo wrote the Storia del pensiero tameo navale (A 
History of Naval Tactical Thought) in which he discussed the appropriate 
doctrine for the new international situation in which the use of nuclear 
weapons was possible. The book is a concise work that summarizes naval 
tactics, tactical concepts (doctrine), and provides illustrative battles in the 
age of oared ships, the age of sail , the age of the screw propeller, and the 
age of naval aviation. It was translated into English and published by the 
U.S.  Naval Institute in 1 979.21 
Fioravanzo also wrote that the disannament policies of the interwar years 
stimulated scholars and engineers to fmd legal technological improvements to 
warships, resulting primarily in increased speed and weaponry. Because of the 
inevitable security leaks and the resulting exchange of infonnation on tech­
nological progress, retaining superiority in any one area became impossible. 
Fioravanzo advocated a compromise between speed, weaponry, and armor. 
Admiral Fioravanzo co-authored The Italian Navy in World War II, which was 
published in 1957 by the U.S. Naval Institute. 
Another post-war author was Admiral Virgilio Spigai, who became Chief 
of Staff of the Navy in 1 968 . Spigai documented the Italian Navy 's 
shortcomings in relation to its tasks in Il problema navale Italiano (The 
Italian Naval Problem) , in 1 963 . He always worked to have the navy 's 
problems expressed in terms of the broader issues of global naval strategy 
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and developments. Spigai dedicated himself to convincing the politicians that 
Italy, a nation that was deeply involved with the sea for its economy and 
security, needed a strong navy. 
Other writers, many of whom were civilians, wrote also on naval matters, 
but their approach was more historical than doctrinal. These writers included 
Commander Marc 'Antonio Bragadin, Admiral Angelo Iachino, Mr. Franco 
Micali Baratelli, Professor Virgilio Ilarl, Professor Alberto Santoni, Dr. Giorgio 
Giorgerini, Commander Ezio Ferrante, Professor Carlo Maria Santoro, and 
many others. 
Italy, according to the current Chief of Staff of the Navy, Admiral Angelo 
Mariani, will be called to a more active participation in international affairs and 
must reconsider the relationships between foreign policy and military 
capabilities. Italian Navy units have contributed to multinational operations in 
Lebanon ( 1 98 1 - 1 984), the Persian Gulf ( 1987 - 1 99 1 ), Somalia ( 1992- 1994), 
and the Adriatic ( 1992-ongoing). 
Even if it will maintain a limited numerical level, the Italian "naval 
instrument" must be able to support a maritime-oriented policy no longer 
dedicated to the defense of the national boundaries. According to this vision, 
Sir Julian Corbett's joint strategic concept is considered more important than 
the one, typically naval, expressed by Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. 
O
ne of the most important outcomes of this research is the conclusion that 
rmding a word that equals the term doctrine in other countries is very 
difficult. When looking for parallels, it is necessary to explore the full range of 
possible topics that are sometimes referred to as strategy, operational art, tactics, 
military art, and naval art and science, etc. Whereas in the U.S., doctrine is 
generally considered guidance, in many other nations doctrine is more directive 
in nature. Hence, there are problems in rmding parallel meanings. These 
problems must be overcome before any meaningful discussions on doctrine can 
take place. 
Second, because the doctrine of many navies was not written, in order to 
uncover past doctrine, it is necessary to ascertain behavior by reviewing navy 
and military history. This does not mean that doctrine did not exist-on the 
contrary, naval doctrine always existed but not necessarily in the form most 
recognizable by those more familiar with land armies. 
Third, the difficulties in building a true national Italian Navy doctrine can 
be compared to current efforts to build multinational navy doctrine. Italy 
attempted to integrate a number of national fleets and found that integrating the 
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traditions and doctrines of the Sardinian and Neapolitan navies appeared to be 
the best solution. 
Next, it seems that the influence of doctrine in foreign navies was strong in 
the case ofltaly. Similarly, there has been a great deal of interest in Italian naval 
doctrine in the United States-evidenced by the frequent translation of many 
important theoretical works by the U.S. Naval Institute. All of these theoretical 
works that were translated were written by serving or retired uniformed officers. 
Apparently, in Italy, writing theoretical works on naval warfare is not an 
impediment to promotion. Civilians do not appear to have had nearly the impact 
that they do in other nations. 
Fifth, there appears to have been a great deal of doctrinal innovation in the 
Italian Navy. Whereas in other navies, the age of sail shifted emphasis from the 
improvement of combat capability to the procurement of new hardware, the 
Italian Navy has a tradition of continuing to look for improvements to combat 
potential by attempting to fight better with the technologies that have been made 
available. 
Sixth, the Italian case study is important because there is no tradition of 
superpower status for unified Italy. France, Spain, and Britain all enjoyed 
superpower status at one time, whereas modem Italy has only attempted to be 
a dominant regional power. Hence, the Italian Navy is an excellent case study 
for the concept of a medium-power navy. Medium power does not mean less 
than first class, rather it only refers to the desire to "tty to create and keep under 
national control enough means of power to initiate and sustain coercive actions 
whose outcomes will be the preservation of its vital interests . .. 2 1  Italy's naval 
strategies, art, doctrine, etc., appear to have been in conformance with its 
national self-identity . 
Finally, Italy has a strong tradition in the analysis of past wars and lessons 
learned. Needless to say, although the navy may have learned the proper 
lessons, they do not appear to have discovered the "magic elixir" to explain 
those lessons to politicians who are unfamiliar with the sea environment. 
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"Revolutions in Military Affairs," 
Paradigm Shifts, and Doctrine 
James J. Tritten 
T
HE u.s. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS established the Naval Doctrine 
Command, which is charged with the preparation of multiservice naval 
doctrine, navy service-unique doctrine, and multiservice input to joint and 
multinational doctrine. As part of that process, new concepts for the use of na val 
power are being addressed in the context of what many claim to be an ongoing 
"revolution in military affairs" today. 
This paper describes the role that military-including naval-doctrine could 
play in such a revolution in military affairs and associated paradigm shifts. It 
also looks at lessons from historical shifts in past paradigms and "revolutions 
in military affairs." This study suggests that we need a theory of "revolutions 
in military affairs" and paradigm shifts. The military today is being asked to 
embrace a new revolution in military affairs, or at least a new paradigm of 
warfare, and cannot do so without understanding how major changes in warfare 
occur. It is also suggested here that "maneuver" warfare is a new paradigm that 
needs to be managed once we have developed appropriate theory. This essay 
is intended to be suggestive rather than prescriptive, but it questions the basic 
assumption that technology leads doctrine in a "revolution in military affairs." 
Revolutions in Military Affairs 
A revolution in military affairs is a fundamental shift in military strategy, 
doctrine, and tactics, which occurs generally, but not always, because of a 
change in technology. With a revolution in military affairs comes the need to 
reconsider all existing military theory and a transition to a new process of 
warfare. New types of military formations have caused new types of military 
organizations, tactics, doctrine, and military strategy. Heavily armored, 
mounted knights disappeared from the battlefield as a new branch of troops and 
artillery appeared. This kind of example is common in history. 
At sea, the introduction of firearms resulted in a fundamental shift in the form 
of combat, from ramming, boarding, and hand-to-hand fighting as the decisive 
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form, to that of stand-off destruction by artillery. This shift from close to distant 
combat was not well recognized initially. During the defeat of the Spanish 
Annada ( 1 588), the Spanish concept of combat operations remained a close-in 
battle by boarding enemy ships in a general milie. The English recognized the 
Spanish sailing skills, numbers, and close-in tactical abilities and kept their 
distance, using long-range artillery to wreak havoc on the Annada. 
The introduction of artillery on warships changed both the design of ships 
and how they would be used in battle. Eventually navies learned how to mass 
their firepower in the maritime battle space and introduced the line of battle­
similar to lines of battle found ashore. Today we still see surface ships using 
firepower to engage distant opponents, although with new technologies and 
without formal lines of battle. 
The shift of paradigms to distant battle with artillery did not occur overnight. 
Boarding and hand-to-hand combat, which were initially considered a comple­
ment to artillery, lasted for many years. Although boarding and hand-to-hand 
combat may occur occasionally today, they will never again determine the 
outcome of a fleet engagement. Ramming also died out, although it resurfaced 
for a short time following its success at the Battle of Lissa ( 1 866). 
The subsequent development of rifled firearms and machine guns con­
tributed to a new revolution in military affairs ashore-the demise of lines of 
battle in ground warfare and their replacement by the infantry skinnish and 
forms of maneuver warfare. The new weaponry increased the spatial and 
temporal scope of combat, requiring better logistics support and planning. 
Imperial Germany attempted to master this new revolution in military affairs 
with its domination of Europe via the Schlieffen plan and short wars with quick 
decisive battles. Rather than a quick war of annihilation, however, Germany 
fought an extended war of attrition from 1914  to 1918 .  
At sea, the introduction of rifled artillery, steam propUlsion, annor, and 
modem communications systems all contributed to new combat uses for the 
fleet-but they did not constitute a revolution in military affairs. New forms of 
warships appeared that had combat potential far exceeding their nominal 
tonnage-giving rise to the French jeu� ecole (new school) theory of less 
capable forces. New designs of ships, such as HMS Dreadnought, could make 
entire national fleets obsolete. Steam power and radio allowed many ships to 
assemble temporarily for decisive engagements. Navies were less at the mercy 
of the wind and could steam more autonomously to meet temporal commit­
ments. Also, steam-powered transportation could affect the maneuver of 
strategic-level formations of ground forces. 1 
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Navies, however, despite all the infusion of technology, thought they were 
still about "slugging it out" with an enemy line of battle in artillery duels. The 
battle of Jutland ( 1 9 1 6) became the model to be studied at naval war colleges 
throughout the interwar years, because fundamentally war at sea seemed not to 
have changed. Therefore, for every revolution in military affairs ashore, there 
is not necessarily a parallel at sea. 
The marriage of airplanes, tanks, and mobile artillery gave rise to another 
shore-based revolution in military affairs. The blitzkrieg, a form of maneuver 
warfare that doomed positional warfare, gave rise to the theory that rapid 
annihilation warfare could again be practiced ashore. Although Nazi Germany 
succeeded initially, and in many cases continued to do so at the operational and 
tactical levels of warfare throughout the war, Germany was unable to win an 
extended war of attrition. 
By the end of World War n, allied military forces were engaged in multiple, 
simultaneous, strategic-level combat actions in more than one theater of a global 
war. One of the most successful examples of blitzkrieg was the August 1945 
Soviet Manchurian Campaign of annihilation, which achieved the unheard of 
sustained rate of advance of up to fifty kilometers a day, and on individual days 
between ninety and one hundred kilometers a day.2 This campaign became a 
model for the type of maneuver blitzkrieg warfare that the West anticipated 
would be waged by the Warsaw Pact against NATO. 
At sea, there was a revolution in military affairs that paralleled, although not 
exactly, the blitzkrieg. The development comparable to the blitzkrieg was the 
mobile fast carrier task force and its accompanying logistics train. Such forces 
were able to roam the oceans, virtually at will, in search of enemy battle fleets 
that could be engaged at vast distances from one's own fleet. Alternatively, 
naval task groups could be formed to attack enemy shore installations, using 
their own form of maneuver warfare which bypassed strong points. The battle 
line, with surface ships "slugging it out," fmally died at Surigao Strait during 
the Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 1 944), and naval artillery generally yielded 
to the airplane and the missile. Naval warfare had fmally changed from the basic 
battle line artillery duel to a more complex form of combined arms warfare. 
The most recent revolution in military affairs occurred when nuclear 
warheads were married to intercontinental delivery systems. Due to the massive 
accumulation of nuclear weapons in the mid- 1950s, the main and decisive 
arm of warfare shifted from ground forces to nuclear forces. In the U.S . ,  
the Eisenhower administration used the arrival of nuclear weapons as 
justification for the "New Look" -a massive downsizing of conventional war­
fighting capabilities. Similarly, NATO chose not to field a credible conventional 
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warfighting force capable of defeating the Warsaw Pact, opting instead to use 
nuclear weapons as a substitute. 
The postwar revolution in military affairs also caused nations to reevaluate 
military theory. Some theorists said that nuclear warfare could not possibly be 
war in the Clausewitzian sense-there could never be a political purpose to it. 
Others questioned the need for war termination strategy, since nuclear warfare 
would be irrational and therefore devoid of theory. Many disagreed and argued 
that all wars in the future between nuclear powers would automatically be 
nuclear wars. Hence, policies, strategy, and doctrine were required for the 
continued deterrence of nuclear weapons during the initial conventional phase 
of future war. 
A tremendous amount of literature was generated in the former Soviet Union 
over the concept of a revolution in military affairs, which had occurred at the 
end of World War n. Their army was large and needed to be modified 
significantly to fight under the new technological conditions. In 1946, for 
example, there were still over one million horses in the Soviet armed forces. 
The term "revolution in military affairs" was selected as a Communist Party 
slogan that would explain the changes in warfare that would be required in the 
nuclear age.3 A series of pamphlets was prepared by the Soviet armed forces 
from the 1960s into the 1980s to explain how the revolution in military affairs 
affected each branch of service and combat arms. 
In addition to the nuclear revolution in military affairs, the Soviet military 
argued that there was an on-going fmal stage of the latest "revolution in military 
affairs," which was being caused by the introduction of radio-electronics and 
cybernetics. During their last years, the military of the USSR worried that 
advancements in technology would permit conventional ordnance to perform 
tasks assigned previously to nuclear weapons, resulting in a new revolution in 
military affairs. 
There has been substantial discussion recently over a revolution in military 
affairs, with emphasis on the technical aspects of it.4 For example, a shift in 
paradigms occurred with the introduction of stealth technology into the air 
combat environment. Stealth allowed a shift from active to passive defense of 
individual aircraft. Due to increased costs and fewer platforms, stealth drove 
the need for even greater precision in delivered ordnance. With the capability 
to deliver conventional ordnance safely and with increasing accuracy, we might 
be able to usher in a counter-revolution in military affairs, whereby nuclear 
weapons could be replaced with modern conventional ordnance, some of which 
could be delivered via unmanned systems. Such capabilities could result in 
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major shifts in doctrine, drastic shifts in military organizational development, 
and parallel shifts in programmatics. 
The Basic Model of the "Revolution in Military Affairs" 
The general, or basic, model for the "revolution" is that new technological 
opportunities must parallel organizational and doctrinal development. One 
common approach in the thinking is for industry, or the research community, 
to present new technological opportunities to the military, who will then 
consider development of new capabilities and a doctrine for their employment. S 
From these technological opportunities, major shifts have occurred in the very 
nature and theory of warfare, requiring new strategy, doctrine, and tactics. 
An example of technology that led a paradigm shift and a revolution in 
military affairs was the introduction of artillery at sea. Naval artillery changed 
the fundamental nature of war at sea from close to distant battle. Eventually 
professional navies were needed to master its potential, which resulted in the 
demise of the privateer. The end of privateering and the dual use of commercial 
ships as warships was a major paradigm shift for naval warfare.6 All of these 
events were caused by the opportunities that technology afforded. 
Revolutions in military affairs usually cause changes in a military organiza­
tion. In antiquity, the basic branches of combat forces included the infantry, 
chariot troops, elephant troops, and cavalry.7 The infantry eventually learned 
how to defeat chariots and elephant troops, and these exotic formations disap­
peared from armies. Cavalry, although not as numerous as infantry, was the 
decisive branch. With time, cavalry became a supporting arm, eventually being 
replaced by new troops-armor. Further, the marriage of tanks, aviation, and 
mobile infantry led to other types of ground force units being formed which 
capitalized on the doctrine of blitz./crieg warfare.8 We now have mechanized 
infantry and aircraft in close support of armor. 
As mariners mastered the revolution in military affairs that added artillery 
to ancient sail, navies were able to take on other missions, and fleets were soon 
reorganized accordingly under national command and controt.9 Parts of fleets 
remained subordinate to the desires of European ground force commanders in 
need of support on their maritime flanks. Other naval forces, including ground 
forces, were organized into distant-water expeditionary forces. Some units were 
dedicated to the interdiction of the sea lines of communication and others for 
the protection of the sea lines. Main battle fleets were retained to deal with their 
enemy counterparts. 
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With the introduction of long-range ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, 
some nations fonned new and independent military services to field these 
weapons. Where new services were not created, the operational chain of 
command for nuclear weapons release was distinct and separate from that of 
conventional warfighting, and new classes of weapon systems were produced 
to carry the new weapons. For the first time, navies were capable of direct attack 
on the centers of gravity of continental powers and determining decisively the 
outcome of a global war. 
Inadequate Doctrinal Development Can Stifle A 
"Revolution in Military Affairs" 
Case studies demonstrate that many opportunities for a revolution in military 
affairs have been lost when technologies were available but military doctrinal 
development lagged behind. This suggests a rather strong relationship between 
the need for both technology and parallel doctrine development. For example, 
we have the case of the French Anny failing to adapt to the Belgian-invented 
and French-developed Montigny mitrailleuse (machine gun), first introduced 
during the Franco-Prussian War of 1 870- 1 87 1 . 10 Although the mitrailleuse 
increased the effective firepower on the battlefield by an order of magnitude 
and might have swung the war in favor of France, its introduction during this 
war failed to tum the tide because its initial operational employment was judged 
ineffective. I I  On the other hand, the machine gun was rapidly assimilated into 
the Gennan and Russian ground forces, and it was the Gennans who developed 
new and successful military doctrine by capitalizing on the technological 
opportunities presented by the gun. 
The blending of the tank, aircraft, mobile artillery, and the radio into a 
powerful tool for "maneuver" blitzkrieg warfare-or the fast carrier task force 
counterpart at sea-is a similar story. Yet it was not the individual technological 
opportunities afforded by any one specific weapon system that constituted a 
revolution in military affairs; the revolution in military affairs occurred when 
someone put together all of the pieces. Synthesis of how to use individual 
components occurred during doctrinal development. 
Paradigm Shifts 
There have also been less dramatic but nonetheless significant examples of 
major changes in warfare that do not meet the full criteria of a revolution in 
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military affairs. These major changes in how we go to war are described more 
correctly as paradigm shifts and will be considered next. For the purposes of 
this paper, a paradigm shift is an important change in military policy, program­
matics, strategy, doctrine, or tactics, which is important but does not fundamen­
tally alter the nature of warfare. 
Some examples of paradigm shifts are related to a concurrent revolution in 
military affairs. For example, with the advent of modem aircraft with extremely 
accurate delivery systems, air forces no longer needed the capability or doctrine 
for massed bomber formations attacking enemy cities as was done in World 
War n. This paradigm shift in strategic bombardment was not significant 
enough to be a revolution in military affairs, but it nonetheless was important. 
The bomber paradigm shift was due both to improved conventional delivery 
systems-creating the capability for precision strikes by single aircraft-and 
the understanding that strategic bombing would be carried out using nuclear 
weapons that did not need to be delivered so accurately. 
With the nuclear revolution in military affairs, some nations chose to forgo 
the manned bomber altogether and to rely instead on new long-range missile 
systems. Forgoing manned bombers required new strategic-level doctrine for 
the completion of strategic-level tasks. This paradigm shift was the result of 
both the nuclear revolution in military affairs and the qualitative improvements 
in antiaircraft defenses. 
Nuclear propUlsion, a by-product of the nuclear revolution in military affairs, 
resulted in new opportunities for endurance and stealth, making it possible for 
submarines to deploy long-range missiles with nuclear warheads. In tum, this 
resulted in a major paradigm shift whereby navies were able to influence 
directly the outcome of general wars through strikes and the threat of strikes by 
the decisive weapons of war. 
The nuclear revolution in military affairs spawned other shifts in existing 
paradigms, such as how best to defend Europe, achieve strategic objectives 
against distant centers of gravity, and fight tactical engagements at sea. The 
Soviet Union, and subsequently NATO, considered the nuclear revolution in 
military affairs so successful that it permitted the attainment of strategic tasks 
at a fraction of the previous cost-maximizing the benefit-cost ratio. Benefit 
and cost analysis dominated Western programming during the Cold War. Along 
with the multitude of fundamental changes caused by the end of the Cold War 
was yet another that made affordability as important as military capability. 
Yet nations that faced severe budgetary restrictions have managed to be 
innovative and produce prototypes of new and sophisticated hardware-inter­
war Germany being the classic case in point. Doctrinal and technological 
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innovation continued in the U.S. even during the Great Depression. In other 
words, affordability need not stifle creativity. There is no reason that efforts to 
increase efficiency cannot be part of a current revolution in military affairs or 
a paradigm shift undertaken during time of severe fiscal austerity. 
Other major postwar paradigm shifts, such as the mass introduction of the 
jet engine into air forces, were not necessarily by-products of the nuclear 
"revolution in military affairs" and are not sufficiently significant to constitute 
their own "revolution in military affairs." For example, the jet engine resulted 
in increased aircraft speed requiring reduction in decision time for the man-in­
the-loop. This paradigm shift has had an enormous impact on aviation, but is 
insufficient to be termed a "revolution in military affairs." 
Recent Naval Paradigm Shifts 
With the end of the Cold War and associated reductions in military expen­
ditures has come a shift in the paradigm of fleet versus fleet being replaced by 
fleet versus shore. The most important message contained in ... . .  From the Sea" 
was that the U.S. Navy is now focused on naval operations in the context of a 
joint task force involved in a major regional contingency rather than as a 
semi-independent force engaged in global conventional war. 12 With this 
paradigm shift, the Navy moved its focus from fleet engagements to power 
projection ashore, and the Naval Doctrine Command was founded to explore 
fully the implications of this move. 
In 1994 the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps published their initial centralized 
multiservice doctrinal publication, Naval Waifare, NDP- I P  This document 
serves as an overview and introduction to the more substantive follow-on 
doctrinal pUblications that address naval intelligence, operations, logistics, 
planning, and command and control. Of note is the naval services' embrace of 
the three levels of warfare, the concepts of center of gravity and critical 
vulnerability, and the principles of war-none of which are doctrine, but all of 
which are major statements of policy. 
The doctrine in Naval Waifare establishes that naval forces will be organized 
by task and will favor offensive and maneuver warfare. The document reviews 
the historical and current roles, missions, and functions of the naval services 
and highlights inherent operational capabilities emphasized under current con­
ditions. Naval Waifare also commits the naval services to full partnership in 
joint and multinational operations. This commitment to jointness and multina­
tional operations is another example of a major paradigm shift. 
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Likewise, the fundamental consideration in procurement has been 
revolutionized. When the new attack submarine was first developed as an 
alternative to the Seawoif SSN 2 1 , programmatic directives made it clear that 
capability was important, but cost was more important. Similarly, naval 
aviation's stealth aircraft was doomed, in part, by the budget cutter's ax because 
of this new paradigm, regardless of the capability that the A- 1 2  would have 
brought to the fleet. This consideration is now paramount. and the Clinton 
administration has made it clear that we need to free resources if we are to build 
the "next Navy.,,14 
Problems with the Existing Model of 
"Revolutions in Military Affairs" 
Examination of historical examples suggests that the model of technology 
leading a revolution in military affairs is inadequate. In some cases, a new 
technology has not been recognized immediately as having caused a revolution 
in military affairs or given rise to the need for new doctrine. The failure of 
cavalry and infantry to adapt to the firearm during the Renaissance is perhaps 
the classic case in point. 1.5 The firearm was not initially recognized as having 
caused a revolution in military affairs; it took about four centuries for these 
weapons to become so perfected that the transformation was complete. 16 
During the Middle Ages, foot soldiers gradually lost their ability to fight as 
cohesive units and were upstaged by men on horseback. The Swiss Confedera­
tion discovered, however, that infantry could counter the men on horseback by 
improving tactical formations alone. In short, a doctrinal solution was found to 
counter the threat of the mounted knight. 
The knight was countered by infantry squares, resembling the old 
Macedonian phalanx, armed with an equally old technology-very long pikes 
or spears-which permitted the foot soldier to withstand the charge of a 
mounted horse. Having been kept at bay, the horse was attacked with hand 
weapons, resulting in the dismounting of the knight who then lay helpless on 
the ground. 17 These changes in tactical doctrine unseated the knight, although 
this lesson has been lost and folklore persists that the demise of the man on 
horseback was due to the invention of the ftreann. 
A lesson learned from studying the age of knights is that improved military 
doctrine does not necessarily need to have a technological push-pull. Combat 
potential can be improved by perfecting how to fight with existing, or even 
antiquated, skills and procedures. Eventually, however, the scope of the 
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flrearm's capabilities came to be understood, and the fundamental nature of 
warfare changed, resulting in a revolution in military affairs. 
Paradigm shifts, however, do not necessarily have to result from tech­
nologies developed at that time-the knight was defeated by the infantry's use 
of old techniques and weaponry. Similarly, it was the use of unsophisticated 
contact mines that caused the u.S. Navy to focus again on mine warfare-a 
paradigm shift for the U.S. Navy to again be seriously concerned with a lesser 
technological threat. And the Strategic Defense Initiative (SOl) explored the 
use of optical sighting of incoming delivery systems. 
Are there other capabilities and mature technologies that could be resurrected 
and used in modem warfare? Might not some of these "obsolete" methods of 
warfare result in a new revolution in military affairs? If the threat from non-state 
armed groups continues to develop, what good will existing theories of warfare 
be? Is this not a revolution in military affairs? 
Even if one were to accept the leading role of technology in a revolution in 
military affairs, emerging technologies do not necessarily need to be developed 
from independent original research funded by every service. The Navy and 
Marine Corps can and should borrow liberally from technologies developed by 
others, such as those developed by one combat arm for use by another-or 
borrowed by one nation from another. All services should look at doctrine 
developed by other types of forces for similar problems. Advocates of a current 
revolution in military affairs appear to suggest major new research programs, 
even though existing knowledge might be sufflcient if applied in an innovative 
manner. 
For example, modem stealth bomber doctrine could capitalize on the 
doctrine for the employment of equally covert submarines searching for and 
attacking important defended targets. Similarly, modem submarines planning 
to operate in closer proximity to underwater terrain might learn from the 
doctrine and technological needs of infantry. When Karl von Clausewitz stated 
that the means of protecting long lines of communication were very limited, he 
considered a standard solution to this dilemma at sea-the convoy-only a 
special means to be employed ashore. 18 Perhaps Clausewitz might have learned 
something from studying naval models. In short, rather than focusing attention 
on emerging technology in the research labs, military services might better 
beneflt from fleld technology deployed elsewhere. 
By focusing on unexploited technologies, nations might skip entire develop­
ment cycles, thus avoiding the need to develop their own revolution in military 
affairs technology base. For example, there was some degree of borrowing of 
American technology that stimulated the Soviet revolution in military affairs 
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brought on by the marriage of long-range delivery systems and nuclear war­
heads. 
On the other hand, it is not clear that a military can advance from one basic 
form of warfare without fIrst passing through the next stage. Could navies have 
moved from boarding and close-in battle directly to fast carrier battle groups 
without fll'St having passed through the artillery stage? Can navies move from 
technology-based warfare directly into a fourth generation of idea-based war­
fare without fll'St mastering maneuver warfare?19 
An underlying assumption about revolutions in military affairs and paradigm 
shifts is that nations will undertake actions to capitalize upon new technologies. 
Hence, if the technology "genie" gets out of the bottle, we need a technology 
"fIx." A more detailed study of technological opportunities that have been 
known to nations strongly indicates alternative models of national behavior. 
For example, by the mid- 1930s, the Imperial Japanese Navy (UN) recog­
nized that, despite all of the technological and industrial efforts being made to 
upgrade the fleet, its projected capabilities would not be suffIcient to meet the 
rapidly improving U.S. Navy in a decisive battle at sea-both sides preferred 
doctrine for war at sea. The UN, therefore, gave impetus to the development of 
night tactics and eventually formed specialized night combat groups (yasengun) 
that could weaken the U. S. PacifIc Fleet to such a degree that, subsequent to 
night battle between main fleets, daylight battle would be an assured victory 
for the Japanese.20 
Thus a technological threat was met with a doctrinal, not a technological, 
solution that theoretically negated the new technologies. In fact the UN fought 
exceptionally well at night during World War n, frequently bettering the U.S. 
Navy, until the U. S. PacifIc Fleet mastered radar. This prowess, however, was 
insufficient to offset the advantages that the Allied powers brought to the war 
in the Pacific. 
For another example, as the United States developed new technologies that 
could be used to enhance long-range nuclear missiles, the preferred solution of 
the Soviet Union was to ban the new technology with an arms control agree­
ment. The Soviets displayed similar behavior as the U.S. explored sm. Most, 
but not all, nations have agreed to keep the chemical and biological warfare 
"genie" in the bottle. and they have not used such weapons. 
Another model for responding to new technologies is to ignore them. Nations 
with the clear ability to participate in a revolution in military affairs have not 
always chosen to do so. Sweden, for instance, has yet to develop its own nuclear 
weapons, although it clearly has the potential to become a nuclear power?) 
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There are also examples of revolutions in military affairs that probably have 
no foundation in new technologies. For example. Napoleon Bonaparte caused 
a major paradigm shift in ground warfare when he successfully mobilized 
citizens to fight for ideas and not money. 22 The shift to mass armies caused a 
shift in the basic object of warfare ashore from seizure of territory to defeat of 
the enemy army. Under this paradigm. both sides in World War II considered 
certain parts of the enemy economic base as legitimate military targets due to 
whole nations generally being mobilized for war. 
Did technology play a role in causing this major paradigm shift in warfare. 
a shift to considering the entire nation as being in arms. or did technology merely 
react to a new vision for warfare? Certainly. modem industrial capability was 
required for such an effort. as technology allowed for attacking the full breadth 
and depth of an enemy nation and population. While some consider the nation 
in arms as a legitimate revolution in military affairs. it is not at all certain that 
the Napoleonic revolution in military affairs was caused by technology. 
There are cases where technology has been given the opportunity to lead the 
way in developing new fonns of warfare. but introduction of the new technol­
ogy was hampered because it was developed outside of the government, without 
an internal advocate. In such cases. where a new vision of a future battle space 
is advocated by someone "outside the system." associated technology develop­
ment is often opposed by those in the government. When there is an absence of 
an internal constituency for systems for which a doctrinal or other need has not 
been established. paradigm shifts and revolutions in military affairs take longer 
to occur. 
For instance. the technological opportunities afforded by the development 
of the light-weight radial aircraft engine were not appreciated by the Royal 
Navy during the interwar years. Because of this. Great Britain. and the Fleet 
Air Ann in particular. were found wanting early in World War n. Indeed. it 
was not until late in the war that the Royal Navy changed its concepts of 
operation to center around the aircraft carrier. altering the paradigm of warfare 
at sea. 
On the other hand. the U.S. Navy capitalized on the development of the 
light-weight radial aircraft engine. and interwar peacetime doctrinal develop­
ment for carrier warfare outpaced all other nations.23 In the 1920s and 1930s. 
the U.S Navy laid the basis for a doctrinal change from decisive battle centered 
around the battleship to the ability to engage the enemy battle fleet as well as 
influence the shore with the aircraft carrier. This change was permitted by the 
development of the radial aircraft engine and of new concepts of operations by 
a group of heretical officers who believed in the potential of naval aviation.24 
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Paralleling the technological innovation was a series of organizational 
developments that permitted the upward mobility of aviation officers into 
command positions during World War II. Similarly, the Bureau of Aeronautics 
was created to sponsor conceptual and technological development. These 
organizational changes facilitated fleet experimentation with the new technol­
ogy. Fleet exercises were paralleled by the development of concepts of opera­
tions that were tested at the Naval War College. Hence, when the main battle 
fleet was sunk on 7 December 194 1 ,  the U.S. Navy was able to respond quickly 
to the requirements of war with a new Pacific Fleet centered around the aircraft 
carrier. This reconstituted force was able to use the airplane as its main striking 
arm because of the pioneering work that was done between the wars by a few 
believers in naval aviation. The revolution in military affairs at sea that 
paralleled the blitzkrieg was inculcated into the U.S. Navy. 
It is worthwhile to take note here that doctrinal rigidity can have a marked 
negative influence on a military service's appreciation of the new warfighting 
opportunities that may be afforded by a revolution in military affairs.23 An 
organization can overcome the tendency to ignore new ideas if its focus is a 
shared vision to create improvement. The relationship between doctrine and 
new technologies and how it might lead to a revolution in military affairs is a 
critically important topic for investigation. 
The Need for a Theory of 
"Revolutions in Military Affairs" and Paradigm Shifts 
Since revolutions in military affairs and paradigm shifts do not happen 
instantaneously, theory is needed to help them reach fruition. Although it 
perhaps no longer takes centuries to understand and shape current or future 
revolutions in military affairs. it does probably take decades. At a minimum. a 
theory of revolutions in military affairs and paradigm shifts should assess the 
integration of anticipated different and emerging technological opportunities 
into existing bureaucratic organizations. Military services should understand 
the general method by which they change and the role that various groups and 
organizations play in causing successful change. 
New theory will need to address cases where new technologies are 
countered by doctrinal solutions alone-absent a revolution in military 
affairs or even a major paradigm shift. A theory of change in military 
services must also address the many cases where they benefit from new and 
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revolution in military affairs or paradigm shift. A theory will also have to make 
use of case studies of failed paradigm shifts as well as successful revolutions 
in military affairs. 
Among the last, a very interesting case study is that of the interwar develop­
ment of the dirigible. The Navy first developed concepts for warfare in the 
Paciftc under the then-revolutionary organization of a joint Anny-Navy war­
planning staff. The story of the brilliant work done in developing War Plan 
Orange and the subsequent Rainbow Plans is well known. As part of that overall 
effort, the Navy recognized the need for long-range reconnaissance and sur­
veillance of Japanese home waters. The inadequate technology of the time­
dirigibles with on-board fighters-however, did not meet the needs of the fleet. 
Fulfilling the requirement for distant surveillance had to await the development 
of long-range patrol aircraft, subsurface, and space assets. 
The excellent ideas developed by Major Earl H. Ellis, U.S. Marine Corps, 
for expeditionary amphibious operations across the Pacific in support of War 
Plan Orange languished on the shelf until the intervention of Commandant 
of the Marine Corps, General John Russell. General Russell retired senior 
offtcers who were unwilling to make the shift to amphibious warfare. The 
Marine Corps needed only to borrow the technology from Japan that per­
mitted the development of modem amphibious landing craft and ships.26 
This case represents both a failure to change the paradigm and a subsequent 
success. 
Another case study of a changed paradigm involves the World War II U.S. 
Navy submarine service. Although a group of submarine officers explored 
alternative concepts of operations for their combat arm prior to the outbreak of 
war, submariners in general entered the war prepared to be integrated with the 
battle fleet; to be used against combatants; and with a doctrine that assumed 
their antisubmarine adversary would be able to sink them if he attacked. 27 
During the initial period of the war in the Pacific, these three conditions 
changed. The submarine operated independently on long and distant patrols, 
and the targets for submarine attack shifted to merchant ships that generally did 
not fight back. Finally, submariners learned that enemy antisubmarine 
capabilities were not as good as expected, and that their own ships stood up 
well to attack. The sum of these three major changes was that the submarine 
could be used in a manner not necessarily well exercised before the war­
boldly, on the surface at night, with immediate re-attacks rather than attack 
and hide. The submarine service offtcer corps went through a catharsis 
during the war, and commanding offtcers who were unable to adapt to the 
bold, new wartime paradigm were reassigned. 
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In general, the three major concepts in a paradigm shift are: 
• The idea 
• The messenger 
• A senior officer who permits its development. 
The first American to understand that the striking power of aircraft at sea 
could equal that of the battleship was Lieutenant Commander Henry C. Mustin, 
U.S. Navy. Like Ellis, Mustin needed senior flag and general officers within 
the established organization to protect his new ideas and allow them to grow.28 
Mustin found his protector in the form of Rear Admiral William Moffett, U.S. 
Navy, just as Ellis had found General John Russell for amphibious operations. 
The experiences of Spanish Vice Admiral Jose de Mazarredo Salazar 
strongly suggest that just having the good idea is not enough. De Mazarredo 
was the author of excellent doctrinal works and many good recommenda­
tions for improving the Spanish fleet prior to the defeat at Trafalgar ( 1 805).  
Although de Mazarredo was never defeated at sea and thus had the 
credibility of a proven warrior, his outspoken criticism of the state of the 
fleet and its lack of combat preparedness, as well as his audacity in ques­
tioning Spanish foreign policy, doomed all of his good ideas to the history 
books. He therefore did not cause any actual improvement in the combat 
potential of the Spanish navy. 29 
Even with gifted personnel in the various levels of the bureaucracy, the 
organizational climate within the bureaucracy itself can doom good doctrinal 
development and therefore advancements in revolutions in military affairs or 
changes to paradigms. For example, the distinctly secondary place afforded to 
the UN led directly to the lack of sound warfare capabilities development. 
Coupled with a number of missed opportunities, this lack of good doctrinal 
development eventually led to the defeat of Japan in World War 11.30 Had the 
UN, or similarly the Royal Navy in the case of carrier aircraft development, 
been allowed to pursue what warfare specialists knew were important mission 
areas, the performance of these services during World War II would have been 
better. 
Relationship of Military Doctrine to "Revolutions in 
Military Affairs" and Paradigm Shifts 
The basic model of a revolution in military affairs, which gives a leading 
role to technology, is incomplete. Revolutions in military affairs and paradigm 
shifts are not wholly responsive to technology-they can also be stimulated by 
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doctrinal development New doctrinal concepts can create a can start a cycle 
during which doctrine pulls the future development of technology. Advances 
in technology then result in subsequent alterations to organization and to 
doctrine. 
In such an alternative case, military leaders ftrst outline a vision, concepts, 
or doctrine for warfare and then refme the vision in tenns of capabilities 
desired-a concept-based requirements system. The role of industry under this 
approach to a revolution in military affairs is to respond to these visions, 
concepts, and doctrinal development. President Ronald Reagan's visionary 
speech on the SOl is a classic example of such an approach. Unfortunately, a 
leader's vision is often thwarted by the bureaucracy's failure to exploit emerg­
ing technologies. Hence, there must be a theory for translating leaders' visions 
into change within large organizations. Military services should draw upon the 
excellent work that has been done by business schools and management 
consulting ftnns in their investigations of "learning organizations" and the 
special skills required of leaders in such organizations. 31 
A good example of military doctrine leading technology was shown by the 
Japanese during the interwar years. The UN's doctrine called for deep ocean 
battles, preferably in a short war of annihilation, and the UN generally insisted 
on technological superiority in each weapon system that it produced. This 
resulted in a search for new technological opportunities to carry out the 
preferred vision of the future battle space. As a result of their doctrine's leading 
role, the UN ftelded the Yamato-class super-battleship and the Mitsubishi Zero 
ftghter-two of the numerous examples of good doctrine that led to the ftelded 
technology that was useful in war.32 This is essentially the same model for the 
relationship between doctrine and technology that has governed U.S.  Navy 
programming since World War II. 
The U.S. Army also appears to accept this exact model of doctrine that leads 
revolutions in military affairs. The U.S.  Army Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC) recently issued a new pamphlet, Force XXI Operations, TRADOC 
Pamphlet 525-5, which attempts to shape the on-going revolution in military 
affairs with a visionary statement of the future battle space.33 Following this 
pamphlet is one that is more authoritative, with an introduction signed by the 
Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army. 34 
These examples are intended to show that the rudimentary, albeit popular, 
model of a revolution in military affairs is flawed in its fundamental assumption 
that doctrine depends upon technology as its major input and output. For 
example, the Napoleonic revolution in military affairs was certainly more a 
product of political, social, and economic conditions than of a speciftc military 
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technology. Hence, we need to look at these other factors that impact on doctrine 
in order to understand how doctrine influences revolutions in military affairs 
and paradigm shifts. 
How Doctrinal Inputs Influence "Revolutions in 
Military Mfairs" and Paradigm Shifts 
A review of where doctrine originates, or what influences doctrine, informs 
us that technology is merely one of many possible inputs.3.1 Others include 
current policy, available resources, current strategy and campaigns, current 
doctrine, threats, history and lessons learned, strategic culture, geography and 
demographics, and forms of government. If doctrine follows merely the push 
or pull of new technology, then it misses the opportunity to develop new 
concepts of combat operations-and new doctrine-based upon all other 
inputs. Let us consider some good examples of factors other than technology 
that have recently changed doctrine. 
First, nations often make major changes to doctrine and organization after 
reviewing newly published policy and strategy, without giving consideration 
to new technology. This is what happened when the U.S. Navy and Marine 
Corps founded the Naval Doctrine Command (NOe) after publishing their 
major white paper, ... . .  From the Sea." The United States shifted its interests in 
the world from a primary focus on containment of communism and the USSR 
to more diverse and regional interests. With this change in interests came 
alterations in the focus on different types of warfare. Similarly, the U.S. Navy 
changed its orientation from open-ocean deep water operations to joint opera­
tions in the littoral and maneuver warfare. With changes to policy alone came 
new doctrine and organization, such as NOe, and interest in new technologies 
to support new warfare interests. If there is an on-going revolution in military 
affairs, it will be affected by the current interests of the U.S.  Navy and Marine 
Corps in maneuver warfare doctrine. 
Normally, when a new technology is introduced into the military, an existing 
organization acts as its sponsor. Later, as the technology is refined and a 
doctrine is formulated, a separate organization is created, whose central identity 
is the new technology. This occurred with the creation and evolution of offices 
within the U.S .  Navy that were responsible for aviation during the interwar 
years. These new offices evaluated the new aviation technologies within the 
framework of the doctrine for their intended use in the fleet. 36 
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In cases where a doctrinal concept precedes a demonstrated technology, it 
may occur that an organization will manage both doctrine and technology 
development. A good example is the Strategic Defense Initiatives Office 
(SOlO), which was charged with developing the doctrine for war in space in the 
absence of an organization dedicated to this purpose. Today, we see a series of 
doctrine organizations, centers, and commands created by the anned forces, all 
charged with improving how to fight. None of these new organizations came 
into being to manage new technology; all have the license to develop new 
doctrinal concepts to shape the development of new technology. 
Second, there is ample evidence that nations make major changes in doctrine 
after understanding the latest decisions in resources to be made available to the 
military services-resource decisions that are not dependent upon new tech­
nologies. The 1993 changes in U.S. Anny doctrine from the AirLand Battle 
version of FM 100_537 were a direct result of a drastic change in the amount of 
resources that were going to be allocated to the Anned Forces, and not due to 
technological opportunities. Correspondingly, the U.S. Air Force is exploring 
the concept of maneuver warfare as a result of similar budget decisions.38 
Hence, budgetary reasons have caused these two services to change their 
doctrine, and this new doctrine influences their view on any on-going revolution 
in military affairs. Very simply, if we cannot afford ample new technology, 
must we also postpone any on-going revolution in military affairs? 
Third, another "trigger" for changes to doctrine is newly published military 
doctrine and campaign concepts, some of which result from existing, not new, 
technology. As the Naval Doctrine Command publishes its multiservice 
doctrine for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, it will have a direct impact on 
service-unique doctrine issued by each of those military services. A case in 
point is the maneuver warfare doctrine found in Naval Warfare, NDP- l.  First 
adopted as part of the multiservice naval doctrine, the concept of maneuver 
warfare will next find itself articulated in doctrine for the U.S. Navy. 
Similarly, new joint doctrine will impact on multiservice naval doctrine. As 
joint campaign concepts are developed by the new U.S. Atlantic Command 
(USACOM), they will affect all forms of joint, multiservice, and service-specific 
military doctrine. The doctrine of the U.S. Air Force has been influenced 
directly by the exploration of maneuver warfare concepts by the U.S. Anny. 
Should the U.S. Anny succeed in developing its vision for mobile strike forces, 
such new doctrine would obviously again affect air power doctrine. Hence, 
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doctrine from outside one military service can have an enonnous effect on the 
desire for a revolution in military affairs. 
As long as the services have primary control over programmatics, they will 
retain the development of programmatic doctrine, i.e., doctrine that supports 
programming and is not necessarily reflective of how they will actually fight. 
Operational combat doctrine, however, is the province of joint doctrine. For 
example, the U.S. Marine Corps has fully embraced maneuver warfare doctrine, 
but such doctrine is not yet a part of joint or multinational doctrine for actual 
warfighting. If only the services embrace a revolution in military affairs, we 
will not necessarily see a change to operational combat doctrine. 
Recent attempts to make the chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff more 
directly responsible for a military programmatic input to the annual budgetary 
debate constitutes a major change in U.S. defense practices and will enhance 
the influence of joint doctrine. Efforts being made by Admiral William Owens, 
vice chainnan, include an enhanced role for the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council (JROC) to set overall military programming priorities.39 Until now, in 
the programmatic world, service doctrine has been dominant. If joint doctrine 
is to predominate over service doctrine, then major changes in joint doctrine 
must address future, not just current, warfare concepts. 
Fourth, a major cause of revised military doctrine can issue from reviews of 
actual and emerging threats, especially those not foreseen during earlier 
programmatic deliberations. Before any war, there is an anticipated enemy for 
which military doctrine is designed. When the intelligence community mis­
represents the capabilities of the enemy, it is likely that prewar doctrine will be 
deficient. Naturally there are difficulties with capabilities versus intentions 
estimates. Hence, it is likely that the correct doctrine for actual warfighting 
depends largely on accurate intelligence (along with a solid understanding of 
the capabilities and intentions of one's own forces). It follows, then, that 
opportunities will be lost for revolutions in military affairs unless the military 
services fully back programming in support of intelligence. 
Today, the expected enemy has changed dramatically. The U.S.  no longer 
faces the Soviet Union and cannot treat all other threats as lesser included cases. 
The threat challenge is complicated, as is the challenge to attempt to model the 
behavior of the wide diversity of potential actors with whom the U.S. will have 
to interact in the future. In the past, American defense planners had the luxury 
of a well-developed concept of operations by the expected enemy and the 
benefit of campaigns and operations planned by a long-standing alliance 
structure. Today, they lack the internal resources to predict accurately the 
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behavior of every potentiaJ enemy. Military commanders will have to deal 
increasingly with non-governmental organizations, including private volunteer 
organizations and an aggressive and technologically sophisticated media not 
dependent upon government for information. In such an environment, will 
doctrine by based on old familiar threats. generic new threats, or threats based 
on someone's estimate of the "most likely" future threats? Is it safe to assume 
that the real new revolution in military affairs will allow Americans to plan to 
be able to do almost anything militarily that they want to do against a Third 
World enemy? 
A fifth manner in which doctrine changes is by reviewing the lessons of 
history. For instance, the doctrine for military planning was changed in many 
nations of the world once they reviewed the victories of Prussia in the Seven 
Weeks War ( 1 866) against Italy, Austria, Hanover, and Bohemia, and in the 
Franco-German War ( 1 870- 1 87 1). Dramatic and rapid campaigns of annihila­
tion brought about intense anaJyses of the Prussian victories with a consensus 
that the General Staff had been. to a large degree, responsible.40 This in tum 
led to a worldwide imitation of the Prussian General Staff-a major paradigm 
shift. 
Although one might assume that all nations review their military history 
before doctrinal development, in fact, doctrine has been developed prior to such 
studies. When nations start up new doctrine centers and commands, they have 
the opportunity to take a comprehensive look at previous military history and 
extract the lessons of past attempts at doctrinal development. When full ap­
preciation of prior lessons is available to current doctrine writers, this can lead 
to a new vision of how best to create concepts of warfare which, in tum, can 
stimulate a "revolution in military affairs." 
Sixth, one would expect doctrine writers to make full use of the prior studies 
of nations' strategic cultures before preparing their doctrine. In recent times, 
we have witnessed newly emerging nations created out of old nations, wherein 
the strategic culture of that new nation does not necessarily reflect immediate 
history. In such cases, because of the changes in population, geography (bor­
ders). or government, the new nation has the opportunity to make significant 
doctrinal changes. Even modifications in government alone have afforded 
nations the opportunity to embody major doctrinal changes. An excellent 
example of this is the change in navy doctrine that France incorporated 
following the replacement of the Vichy regime by the Fourth Republic.41 
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In the days when the Soviet Union faced NATO and saw itself essen­
tially encircled by imperialism, its mil itary doctrine was appropriate for 
its high-technology adversary. Today, Russia can afford to develop a series 
of parallel military doctrines, making the assumption they are technologically 
inferior in the western theater of military operations but superior in the 
southern theater.42 This change in threat has nurtured new doctrine, perhaps a 
doctrinal revolution similar to that proposed above. 
Fonnal navy doctrine encountered a setback with the introduction of new 
technologies and the end of the Anglo-Franco wars during the age of sail. 
Doctrine was developed and refmed frequently during the wars between Britain 
and France over hundreds of years. During the age of sail, there were long 
periods of warfare with essentially the same technology. Hence, improvements 
to navy warfare occurred via other avenues of advancement. Additionally, 
modem recruitment techniques had yet to be discovered, hence, improvements 
in personnel and leadership was not yet the method for improving combat 
potential. Advances in the naval art had to arise from doctrine. Debates over 
doctrine and the existence of written doctrine was nonnal practice. As navy 
doctrine advanced, so did combat potential. 43 
Since the early part of the nineteenth century, two events have had a profound 
effect on the nature of navy doctrine: technology and the frequency and 
participants of war. From the time that the ironclad was introduced, navy 
technology has changed so quickly and so often that navies have seldom had 
the time to deal with doctrinal issues for forces on hand. By the time of the 
Battle of Lissa ( 1 866), between Italy and Austria, warship designs were 
advancing before navy doctrine could be reevaluated and rewritten. Navies 
turned more of their attention to dealing with improvements to naval art and 
combat potential by improving technologies and programming rather than 
learning to fight "smarter." 
M
any non-technological factors that often result in new concepts for 
military doctrine can have major impacts on revolutions in military 
affairs. All of these issues must be considered by doctrine commands and 
centers if there is to be a true doctrinal renaissance that makes possible a 
revolution in military affairs. As navies become more comfortable with the 
concept of centralized written doctrine, they will have many opportunities to 
develop new doctrinal concepts with ideas that originate outside the realm of 
technology. 
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More often than we would like to admit, there has been no accepted military 
doctrine for the use of newly introduced technologies. Increasingly, therefore, 
improvements to combat potential were attributed to effective programming 
skills rather than skills that assess warfighting doctrine. Today, the focus should 
shift from introducing new technologies to other, less expensive, methods of 
improving combat potential, namely. navy doctrine as a force builder. The 
continued search for "silver bullets" in new technology threatens to distract 
professional officers from perfectly good solutions that may make possible 
advances in the next revolution in military affairs. 
The difficulty in changing paradigms. doctrine, and recognizing revolutions 
in military affairs can best be studied in the detailed and fully developed case 
studies that result from specific lessons learned. For example. Stephen Rosen's 
Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military. is an excellent 
examination of change in military organizations.44 It contains a number of cases 
that provide the military doctrine supervisor with a quick overview of the 
problems of change during peacetime as well as during war. 
To get to the heart of change, however, more in-depth, book-length in­
dividual case studies should be consulted. One such study of an organization's 
attempt to come to grips with a new technology is Harold R. Winton's To 
Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armored 
Doctrine, 1927-1 938.45 After studying such cases, one can more easily accept 
the need for recommendations contained therein, such as, support at the top, a 
mechanism for the building of consensus, and a "learning organizational" 
climate that accepts rational analysis as the basis for doctrine and force 
structure. 
In learning organizations, individuals "continually expand their capacity to 
create the results they truly desire, [it is] where new and expansive patterns of 
thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people 
are continually learning how to learn together." Learning organizations also 
have a shared vision of the future-indeed a shared vision is one of the five 
cornerstones necessary for such organizations.46 The German Army was a 
"learning organization" during World War I when it assessed recent combat 
experience and then made changes to their doctrine as the war progressed. An 
untold story is how the U.S. Navy learned from its combat experience and 
changed its doctrine during World War JI'7 -the German Army is not the only 
military "learning organization" that has existed. 
Whether or not there is a current and on-going revolution in military affairs 
is still being debated. What the next paradigm will be has yet to be decided. We 
do know, however, that revolutions in military affairs and paradigm shifts will 
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occur. We need to manage these changes and create processes and organizations 
to deal with these issues; Naval Doctrine Command is an organization that is 
concerned with managing change. Good doctrinal development can create 
revolutions in military affairs. 
It is time for the Navy to become a learning organization that holds a shared 
vision of the future as well as a shared vision of continued improvement. 
Leadership in such an organization is similar to that required of process 
designers, stewards of the vision, and teachers who foster learning. This new 
type of leader is charged with building an organization "where people continual­
ly expand their capabilities to understand complexity, clarify vision, and 
improve shared mental models . ..48 
For the next paradigm we must question if it will be a logical outgrowth of 
the ongoing revolution in military affairs, recognizing the importance of affor­
dability or the opportunities permitted by stealth. Will this paradigm result from 
new technological opportunities, such as unmanned air and subsurface 
vehicles? Unmanned systems allow distant decision making, reduced costs, and 
subsequent changes in cost versus risk calculations. Will a new paradigm be 
oriented on speed-hypersonic vehicles? Increased speed will again reduce 
decision times and make fundamental changes in basing requirements. In­
creased range supports the more grandiose theories of air power once advocated 
by Alexander DeSeversky and Billy Mitchell. On the other hand, is the new 
warfare paradigm framed by ideas and the information explosion? It is very 
likely that fourth generation warfare, idea-driven or information-based warfare, 
is indeed a major paradigm shift away from warfare based upon technologies. 
Whatever the new paradigm, one must not overlook the leading role that 
doctrine can play to stimulate technological development. 
The model for doctrinal development in support of paradigm shifts and 
revolutions in military affairs instructs that the fIrst step is to communicate a 
vision of the future battle space, then develop concepts for operations, and then, 
after testing those operations by interactions with the fleet and analytic com­
munity, develop prototype doctrine. Approved doctrine can result in hardware 
and software requirements as well as direct improvements to combat potential, 
irrespective of technological change. 
The introduction of new ideas into the military and the management of 
change to a new paradigm are dimcult tasks requiring both combat leadership 
skills and experience as well as the administrative and bureaucratic skills of the 
Washington "in-fIghter." Critical thinking, the temperament of combat-ex­
perienced leaders, and the administrative competence are needed to ensure that 
the most promising ideas are accepted and implemented by the Navy. 
147 
The Newport Papers 
Notes 
1 .  During World War I, France transported by sea a half-million colonial soldien and 
two hundred thousand worken to aid her in her hour of need. This was in addition to two 
million U.S. troops received by sea from North America. 
2. P. A. Zhilin (General-Lieutenant), ed., 1M History of Military Art (Moscow: Voyeniz­
dat, signed to press 23 January 1 986), translated inJPRS-UMA-87-()(}4-L (Washington: 27 
March 1 987), p. 233; and V. Larionov et al., World War 11: Decisive Battle of the Soviet Anny 
(Moscow: Progress Publishen, 1 984),  p. 5 10. 
3. Harriet Fast Scott and William F.  Scott, 1M Anned Forces of the USSR, 3rd ed. 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1984),  p. 48. 
4. DavidJablonsJer, (Colonel, USA, Retired), "U.S. Military Doctrine and the Revolu­
tion in Military Affain, ' Parameters, Autumn 1 994, .pp. 1 8-36. In April 1994, the U.S. Army 
War College and the Strategic Studies Institute (SSt) hosted a conference, "The Revolution 
in Military Affain: Defining an Army for the 2 1 st Century. " A number of p�en presented 
at this conference have now appeared as SSI monographs. For eX2mple, see Jettry R. Cooper, 
Arwther Vuw of the Revolution in Military Affairs, 15 July 1994; Paul Bracken and Raol Henri 
Alcala, Whither the RMA: Two Perspectives on Tomorrow's Anny, 22 July 1 994; and Stephen 
Metz and J�es Kievit, 1M Revolution i� Military Affairs and Conflicts Short of War, 25 July 
1994; all published by the U.S. Govt. Pont. Off., 1994. 
5.  Philip D. Shuder (Lieutenant General, USMC, Retired), "Thinking about Warfare," 
Marine Corps Gazette, November 1 987, pp. 18-20; John W. Bodnar (Captain, USNR) , "The 
Military Technical Revolution: From Hardware to Information," Naval War College Review, 
Summer 1993, pp. 7-21 ;  Paul Bracken, "The Military After Next," 1M Washington Quarterly, 
Autumn 1 993, p. 1 59; and James R. FitzSimonds (Commander, USN) and Jan M. van Tol 
(Commander, USN), "Revolutions in Military Main," Joint Force Quarterfy, Spring 1 994, 
pp. 24-31 . 
6. The parallel ashore to privateering was the condottieri. Originating in Italy during the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the condottieri was a mixture of entrepreneun and warrion. 
They eventually spread to France, Spain, Alsace, and Switzerland. Their ultimate demise 
came about with the formation of standing mercenary armies and was not due to technology. 
See Karl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. 0.]. Matthijs Jolles (New York: The Modem 
Library, 1 943), p. 577; and Hans Delbriick, History of the Art of War, Volume 111: Medieval 
Waifare, trans. WalterJ. Renfroe, Jr. (Lincoln, Nebr. and London: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 
1 985), pp. 506-8 [original German venion published in 1 923] ; and History of the Art of War, 
Volume IV: The Dawn of Modem Waifare, trans. Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. (Lincoln, Nebr. and 
London: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1 985), pp. 1 6-7, 224 [original German venion published 
in 1 930] . 
7. Zhilin, pp. 6-7. 
8. K. V. Zababashlcin (General-Major), "The Structure and O�anization of Forma­
tions, Units and Subunits of the Armed Forces," in N. A. Lomov (General-Major) ,  ed. , 
Scientifo- Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs (Moscow: Voyenizdat, signed 
to press 1 5  November 1972),  translated and published under the auspices of the U.S. Air 
Force, Washington: U.S. Gov't. Print. Off., 1 980, pp. 1 B-5 .  
9. F .  F. Gayvoronskiy (General-Colonel), ed. , 1M Evolution of Military Art: Stages, 
Tendencies, Principles (Moscow: Voyenizdat, signed to press 4 May 1 987), translated in 
JPRS-UMA-89-0 12-L, 12 October 1 989, p. 32. 
10. Frederick William von Mellenthin (Generalmajor) and R.H.S. Stolfi with E. Sobik 
(Colonel), NA TO Under Attack: Why the Western Alliance can Fight Outnumbered and Win in 
Central Europe without Nuclear Weapons (Durham, N.C. :  Duke Univ. Press, 1 984), pp. 12-6. 
The Garling gun-introduced in 1862-worked on different principles. 
1 1 .  The reason for its Wlure on the batdefield was primarily that the French Army 
guarded their new capability too well and they were caught up on the technical details of 
development. They failed to devise an effective doctrine for the new weapon or to test 
various tactics. Furthermore, the mitrailleuse was assigned to artillery units where it was viewed 
as a rather short-range weapon that was extremely vulnerable to counter-battery fire. 
TriNen * Revolutions 
12 .  Department of the Navy, White Paper, . . . . .  From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service 
for the 2 1 st Century" (Washington: U.S. Gov't Print. Off., 28 March 1994) . 
13 .  Naval Doctrine Command, Naval Wa!fOrr, NDP (Naval Doctrine Publication)-1 
(Washington: U.S. Gov't. Print. Off., 28 March 1994). 
1 4. John H. Dalton, "A Vision of the Navy After Next," remarks as delivered by the 
Honorable John H. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy, Sea-Air-Space Exposition, Washington, 
D.C . ,  30 March 1994. For the concept of a military after next, see Bracken, "The Military 
Mter Next," p. 1 57. 
15 .  Hans Delbriick, History of the Art of War, Volume II: The Barbarian Invasions, trans. 
Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. (Lincoln, Nebr. and London: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1 985), p . 
41 1  [original German version published in 1921 ] ;  History of the Art of War, Volume lll: Medieval 
Waifarr, pp. 327, 468, 635, 650-6; and History of the Art of War, Volume IV: The Dawn of 
Modem Waifarr, pp. 41 ,  126. 
1 6. Vasily Danilovich Sokolovskiy (Marshal of the Soviet Union), ed., Soviet Military 
Strategy, 3rd ed. , with an analysis and commentary by Harriet Fast Scott, ed. (New York: 
Crane Russak, 1980), 1 st raper ed. , p. 229. 
17. Richard A. Gabrie and Karen S. Metz, A Short History of War; The Evolution of Waifarr 
and Weapons, Professional Readings in Military Strategy, no. 5 (Carlisle Barracks, Penna. :  
U.S .  Anny War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 30 June 1 992), pp.  50, 70-1 .  
18. Clausewitz, pp. 306, 493, 545. 
19. William S.  Lind, Keith Nightingale (Colonel, USA), John F. Schmitt (Captain, 
USMC), Joseph W. Sutton (Colonel, USA) and Gary I. Wilson (Colonel, USMC), "The 
Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989, 
pp. 22-6; Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1 991);  
Antulio J. Echevarria (Captain, USA) andJohn M. Shaw (Captain, USA), "The New Military 
Revolution: Post-Industrial Change," Parameters, Winter 1992-93, pp. 70-9; Robert J. 
Bunker, "The Transition to Fourth Epoch War," Marine Corps Gazette, September 1994, 
pp. 20-30; William S. Lind,John F. Schmitt (Major, USMCR), and Gary I. Wilson (Colonel, 
USMCR), "Fourth Generation Warfare: Another Look," Marine Corps Gazette, December 
1994, pp. 34-7. 
20. David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun [Navy]: Strategy, Tactics and Technology 
in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1 887- 1 94 1, August 1994 draft book manuscript, chapter 8. 
21. Terrence R. Fehner, "National Responses to Technological Innovations in Weapons 
Systems, 1815  to the Present," History Associates, Inc. , Germantown, Md. : 7 January 1986. 
22. B. V. Panov, V.N. Kiselev, 1.1. Kartavtsev et al. ,  The History ofMi/itaryAtts: A Textbook 
for Military Academies oj the Soviet Armed Forces (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1 984), translated in 
JPR5-UMA-85--OO9-L (Washington: 2 1  March 1985), pr.. 2-3. 
23. For additional information, see James J. Tritten, ' Introduction of Aircraft Carriers 
into the Royal Navy: Lessons for the Development of Naval Doctrine," The Naval Review, 
July 1994, pp. 260-7; and Norman Friedman, Thomas C.  Hone, and Mark D. Mandeles, 
"The Introduction of Carrier Aviation into the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy: Military­
Technical Revolutions, Organizations, and the Problem of Decision," draft report prepared 
for the Director, Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 12 May 1 994. 
24. Charles M. Melhorn, (Commander, USN, Retired), Two-Block Fox; The Rise of the 
Airmift Carrier, 1 9 1 1- 1 929 (Annapolis, Md. :  Naval Institute Press, 1 974). 
25. Jablonsky, p. 33. 
26. Japanese" amphibious warfare doctrine developed in parallel with that of the U.S. 
Marine Corps. The Japanese Anny was in a different position vis-a-vis the navy than in the 
United States and was able to secure earlier cooperation in the development oflanding craft. 
The Shinshu Maru, the world's first ship specifically designed for amphibious operations-a 
prototype for what would later become the landing ship dock-was laid down in 1933 and 
completed in 1934-years before anything similar in the U.S. Japanese amphibious landing 
ships were observed by a U.S. Marine Corps officer stationed in the Far East, and his reports 
led eventually to the building of similar craft and ships in the U.S. See Evans and Peattie, 
chapter 14. 
149 
The Newport Papers 
27. Dean Allard, "The U.S. Navy Prepares for War," presented at the World War II in 
the Pacific Conference, Alexandria, Va. :  1 0  August 1 994. 
28. Stephen Peter Rosen, WInning the Next War: Innovation and t� Modem Military 
(Ithaca, N.Y. and London: Cornell Univ. Press, 1 991),  pp. 70, 82-5. 
29. John D. Harbron, Trqfalgar and the Spanish Navy (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute 
Press, 1988), pp. 98-1 02. 
30. Evans and Peattie. 
3 1 .  Peter M. Senge, ThL Fifth Discipline: ThL Art and Practia oj t� Learning Organization 
(New York: Doubleday, 1 990), pp. 339-63. 
32. Evans and Peattie, chapter 17 . 
33. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRAnOC), Fotu! XXI Operations: A 
Conapt Jor t� Evolution oj Full-Dimensiort41 Operations Jor t� Strat� Anny oj t� Early 
Twenty-First Century, TRAnOC Pamphlet 525-5 (Fort Monroe, Va. :  TRAnOC, 1 August 
1994) [with 8 September 1 994 errata] , pp. 1-3, 3-20, 4-2. 
34. Department of the Army, Congressional Activities Division, Anny Focus 94: Fotu! 
XXI (Washington: September 1 994), p. 18.  
35. These ideas were first developed in James J. Tritten, "Naval Perspectives for Military 
Doctrine Development," Naval War College RMew, Spring 1995, pp. 26-3 1 .  
36. I [rving] B [rinton] Holley, Jr. , Ideas and Weapons: Exploitation oJt� Aerial Weapon by 
the United States During World War I: A Study in t� Rtlationship oj Technological Advance, 
Military Doctrine, and the Development oj Weapons (Washington: U.S. Gov't. Print. Off., 1 983, 
for the Office of Air Force History), p. 19 [originally published in 1953 by Yale Univ. Press] . 
37. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM (Field Manual) 1 00-5, Operations 
(Washington: U.S. Gov't. Print. Off., 14 June 1 993) . 
38. Martin van Creveld, with Steven L. Canby and Kenneth S. Brower, Air Power and 
Maneuver Waifare (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, July 1994), p. 268. 
39. William A. Owens (Admiral, USN), ''JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight Coun­
cil] : Harnessing the Revolution in Military AfWrs," joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1 994, pp. 
55-7; John Boatman, "The Jane's Interview" (with Vice Chairman of the Joint ChiefS of 
Staff Admiral William A. Owens, USN), jane 's Defence Weekly, 23 July 1 994, p. 32; address 
by Admiral William A. Owens, USN, to the Military Operations Research Society JROC 
[Joint Requirements Oversight Council] Process Workshop, Arlington, Va. : 17 October 
1994; Vincent C. Thomas, Jr. , interview with Joint ChiefS of Staff Vice Chairman Admiral 
William A. Owens, USN, ' The Necessary Elements of Warfighting, " Sea Power, December 
1994, pp. 9-13.  
40. John E. Tashjean, "A Military Aspect of Circulation of Elites," Cahiers Vi!fredo Pareto, 
no. I I ,  1967, p .  71 . 
4 1 .  For additional information, see "Navy and Military Doctrine in France," in this 
volume, pp. 37-75. 
42. A Savelyev, vice president of the Institute of National Security and Strategic Studies, 
"Does Russia Need a 'Potential Enemy'?" Krasrt4ya zvezda (Moscow) in Russian, 19 March 
1992, p. 2 (FBIS-SOV-92-1 oo), 22 May 1992, p,p. 33-5. 
43. For further details see James J. Tritten, ' Lessons and Conclusions from the History 
of Navy and Military Doctrinal Development," NDC Technical Report 3-00-007, Norfolk, 
Va. :  Naval Doctrine Command, January 1995, p. 9. 
44. See Rosen. 
45 . Harold R. Winton, To Change an Anny: General Sir john Burnett-Stuart and British 
Annored Doctrine, 1 92 7- 1 938 (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1 988) . Another good 
example is James S. Corum, ThL Roots oJBlitzkrieg: Hans von Steckt and Gennan Military ReJonn 
(Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1 992). 
46. Senge, pp. 3, 9, 205-32. 
47. Admiral W.H. Standley, Chief of Naval Operations, doctrinal War Instructions: United 
States Navy, 1 934, F.T.P. 1 43 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., signed 28 March 1 934; 
these instructions governed fleet actions during the initial stage of World War II ,  and stressed 
the future of joint warfare. F.T.P. 1 43 revised an earlier version that drew upon the lessons 
of World War I. During World War II,  Admiral E[rnest] J. King, Commander in Chief, 
1 50 
Tritten * Revolutions 
United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, issued revised War Instructions: United 
States Navy, 1944, F.T.P. 143 (A) (Washington: U.S. GOvt. Print. Off., 1 November 1 944). 
This and other doctrinal publications made full use of the lessons of the early stages of the 
war. Immediately following World War II, the U.S. Navy convened a Tactical Publications 
Panel, which consolidated doctrinal publications and resulted in the Chief of Naval 
Q£erations' Principks and Applications of Naval Waifarr: United States Fleets, 1947, USF-l 
(Washington: Off. of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1 May 1947), signed by Admiral of the 
Fleet Chester W. Nimitz, USN. USF-l was applicable to both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets 
and made full use of lessons from all stages of the war. 
48. Senge, p. 340. See also Bracken, "The Military After Next," p. 171,  for a discussion 
of the need for "organizational learning"; and Peter M. Senge et al., The Fifth Discipline 
Fieldbook: Strategies and Tools for Building a Leaming Organization (New York: Doubleday, 
1994) . 
The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not necessarily represent those 
of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Navy. 
15 1 
About James J .  Tritten 
Dr. Tritten serves as a special advisor to the commander of the Naval 
Doctrine Command, Norfolk, Virginia-an organization created in 1993. He 
holds advanced degrees from the University of Southern California and fonner­
ly served as a faculty member and chairman of the National Security Affairs 
Department of the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr. Tritten's publications have 
won him a number of awards, including the Alfred Thayer Mahan Award for 
Literary Achievement from the Navy League of the United States, two awards 
from the U.S. Naval Institute, and the George Washington Honor Medal from 
the Freedom's Foundation. His two most recent books address our new 
regionally focused national security strategy. Dr. Tritten retired from active 
duty with the U.S. Navy in 1989 after serving as the Assistant Director of Net 
Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as a joint strategic planner 
in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and previously in the fleet as a 
carrier-based naval aviator. 
Dr. Tritten's current research interests include the theory and history of naval 
doctrine, the concept of maneuver warfare, and combat leadership for the sea 
services. Some of his most recent publications include: "Let's Put 'War' Back 
into Warfighting," Strategic Review, Winter 1995; "Operations interannees: 
I 'Historie a la lumiere de la doctrine moderne," Cols Bleus, January 1995; 
"Naval Perspectives on Military Doctrine," Naval War College Review, Spring 
1995; and "Maneuver Warfare at Sea," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 
September 1995. 
About Vice Admiral Luigi Oonolo, Italian Navy (Retired) 
Luigi Donolo was born on 2 1  September 1 935 in Santo Stefano Magra (La 
Spezia). He completed the normal course at the Italian Naval Academy in 1 958. 
Admiral Donolo specialized in antisubmarine warfare and is qualified as a 
raider-frogman. He attended the first course for senior staff officers at the Italian 
Naval War College in Livorno, where he was later assigned as a teacher and 
director of courses. 
Admiral Donolo commanded several minesweepers, the frigates Umbeno 
Grosso, Carlo Bergamini, and Perseo, as well as the 5th Frigate Squadron. He 
also commanded in 1993 and 1994 the Italian naval group in Lebanon for the 
protection of the Italian troops ashore. Other assignments included duty as Chief 
of Staff of Maritime District of the southern Tyrrhenian Sea, Deputy Chief of 
Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Italian Fleet, commander of the 
prestigious group "Teseo Tesei" (a naval division of raiders, frogmen, and 
divers), and commander of the Italian Naval War College. 
In addition to numerous essays, he is the author of "War Gaming," in 
Simulation ( 1 989), edited by Franco Angeli, and "The Problems of Security in 
Europe from 1 990- 1 992" (Italian Naval War College, 1992). Admiral Donolo 
has lectured in Italy and abroad. He addressed the symposium at Georgetown 
University (Washington, D.C.) in March 1994 on the "Role of International 
Navies after the Cold War," and he also addressed the "Twelfth International 
Seapower Symposium" at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, in 
November 1993. 
On 30 December 1994, Vice Admiral Luigi Oonolo retired from the Italian 
Navy. 
